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Abstract 
Wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) has become a matter of increasing concern in 
recent years as a crucial element in wireless network security. WIDS monitors 802.11 traffic to 
identify the intrusive activities, and then alerts the complementary prevention part to combat the 
attacks. Selecting a reliable WIDS system necessitates inevitably taking into account a credible 
evaluation of WIDSs performance. WIDS effectiveness is considered the basic factor in 
evaluating the WIDS performance, thus it receives great attention in this thesis. Most previous 
experimental evaluations of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) were concerned with the wired 
IDSs, with an apparent lack of evaluating the wireless IDSs (WIDSs). In this thesis, we try to 
manipulate three main critiques of most pervious evaluations; lack of comprehensive evaluation 
methodology, holistic attack classification, and expressive evaluation metrics.   
In this thesis, we introduce a comprehensive evaluation methodology that covers all the 
essential dimensions for a credible evaluation of WIDSs performance. The main pivotal 
dimensions in our methodology are characterizing and generating the evaluation dataset, 
defining reliable and expressive evaluation metrics, and overcoming the evaluation limitations. 
Basically, evaluation dataset consists of two main parts; normal traffic (as a background) and 
malicious traffic. The background traffic, which comprises normal and benign activities in the 
absence of attacks, was generated in our experimental evaluation tests as real controlled traffic. 
The second and important part of the dataset is the malicious traffic which is composed of 
intrusive activities. Comprehensive and credible evaluation of WIDSs necessitates taking into 
account all possible attacks. While this is operationally impossible, it is necessary to select 
representative attack test cases that are extracted mainly from a comprehensive classification of 
wireless attacks. Dealing with this challenge, we have developed a holistic taxonomy of wireless 
security attacks from the perspective of the WIDS evaluator. The second pivotal dimension in 
our methodology is defining reliable evaluation metrics. We introduce a new evaluation metric 
EID (intrusion detection effectiveness) that manipulates the drawbacks of the previously 
proposed metrics, especially the common drawback of their main notion that leads to measuring 
a relative effectiveness. The notion of our developed metric EID helps in measuring the actual 
effectiveness. We also introduce another metric RR (attack recognition rate) to evaluate the 
ability of WIDS to recognize the attack type. The third important dimension in our methodology 
is overcoming the evaluation limitations. The great challenge that we have faced in the 
experimental evaluation of WIDSs is the uncontrolled traffic over the open wireless medium. 
This uncontrolled traffic affects the accuracy of the measurements. We overcame this problem 
by constructing an RF shielded testbed to take all the measurements under our control without 
any interfering from any adjacent stations. Finally, we followed our methodology and conducted 
experimental evaluation tests of two popular WIDSs (Kismet and AirSnare), and demonstrated 
the utility of our proposed solutions.
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Résumé 
La sécurité des réseaux sans fil fait l’objet d’une attention considérable ces dernières années. 
Toutefois, les communications sans fil sont confrontées à plusieurs types de menaces et 
d’attaques. Par conséquent, d’importants efforts, visant à sécuriser davantage les réseaux sans 
fil, ont dû être fournis pour en vue de lutter contre les attaques sans fil. Seulement, croire qu’une 
prévention intégrale des attaques peut s’effectuer au niveau de la première ligne de défense d’un 
système (pare-feux, chiffrement, …) n’est malheureusement qu’illusion. Ainsi, l'accent est de 
plus en plus porté sur la détection des attaques sans fil au travers d'une seconde ligne de défense, 
matérialisée par les systèmes de détection d’intrusions sans fil (WIDS). Les WIDS inspectent le 
trafic sans fil, respectant la norme 802.11, ainsi que les activités du système dans le but de 
détecter des activités malicieuses. Une alerte est ensuite envoyée aux briques chargées de la 
prévention pour contrer l’attaque. Sélectionner un WIDS fiable dépend principalement de 
l’évaluation méticuleuse de ses performances. L’efficacité du WIDS est considérée comme le 
facteur fondamental lors de l'évaluation de ses performances, nous lui accordons donc un grand 
intérêt dans ces travaux de thèse. La majeure partie des études expérimentales visant 
l’évaluation des systèmes de détection d’intrusions (IDS) s’intéressait aux IDS filaires, reflétant 
ainsi une carence claire en matière d’évaluation des IDS sans fil (WIDS). Au cours de cette 
thèse, nous avons mis l’accent sur trois principales critiques visant la plupart des précédentes 
évaluations : le manque de méthodologie d'évaluation globale, de classification d'attaque et de 
métriques d'évaluation fiables. 
Au cours de cette thèse, nous sommes parvenus à développer une méthodologie complète 
d'évaluation couvrant toutes les dimensions nécessaires pour une évaluation crédible des 
performances des WIDSs. Les axes principaux de notre méthodologie sont la caractérisation et 
la génération des données d’évaluation, la définition de métriques d'évaluation fiables tout en 
évitant les limitations de l’évaluation. Fondamentalement, les données d’évaluation sont 
constituées de deux principales composantes à savoir: un trafic normal et un trafic malveillant. 
Le trafic normal que nous avons généré au cours de nos tests d’évaluation était un trafic réel que 
nous contrôlions. La deuxième composante des données, qui se trouve être la plus importante, 
est le trafic malveillant consistant en des activités intrusives. Une évaluation complète et 
crédible des WIDSs impose la prise en compte de tous les scénarios et types d’attaques 
éventuels. Cela étant impossible à réaliser, il est nécessaire de sélectionner certains cas d'attaque 
représentatifs, principalement extraits d'une classification complète des attaques sans fil. Pour 
relever ce défi, nous avons développé une taxinomie globale des attaques visant la sécurité des 
réseaux sans fil, d’un point de vue de l’évaluateur des WIDS. Le deuxième axe de notre 
méthodologie est la définition de métriques fiables d’évaluation. Nous avons introduit une 
nouvelle métrique d’évaluation, EID (Efficacité de la détection d'intrusion), visant à pallier les 
limitations des précédentes métriques proposées. Nous avons démontré l’utilité de la métrique 
EID par rapport aux autres métriques proposées précédemment et comment elle parvenait à 
Performance Analysis of WIDSs  Khalid Nasr 
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mesurer l’efficacité réelle tandis que les précédentes métriques ne mesuraient qu’une efficacité 
relative. L’ EID peut tout aussi bien être utilisé pour l’évaluation de l’efficacité des IDS filaires 
et sans fil. Nous avons aussi introduit une autre métrique notée RR (Taux de Reconnaissance), 
pour mesurer l’attribut de reconnaissance d'attaque. Un important problème se pose lorsque des 
tests d’évaluation des WIDS sont menés, il s’agit des données de trafics incontrôlés sur le 
support ouvert de transmission. Ce trafic incontrôlé affecte sérieusement la pertinence des 
mesures. Pour outrepasser ce problème, nous avons construit un banc d’essai RF blindé, ce qui 
nous a permis de prendre des mesures nettes sans aucune interférence avec quelconque source 
de trafic incontrôlé. Pour finir, nous avons appliqué notre méthodologie et effectué des 
évaluations expérimentales relatives à deux WIDSs populaires (Kismet et AirSnare); nous avons 
démontré à l’issue de ces évaluations pratiques et l'utilité de nos solutions proposées. 
11 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction I.
To meet the growing demand for communication at a distance easily and efficiently, 
numerous telecommunications techniques and protocols have been developed, especially for 
wireless networks. Wireless networking technology has emerged as a very popular alternative to 
wired networking technology in recent years. Flexibility in dealing with these protocols and 
their vulnerabilities creates a problem of poor security. Consequently, several security efforts 
have been exerted and many security defense mechanisms have been developed such as 
authentication, encryption, and firewalls. These mechanisms aim to control the access to the 
system as a first line of defense. Nevertheless, most of the wireless systems are still susceptible 
to attacks. Unfortunately, complete attack prevention at the first line of defense is not 
realistically attainable due to lack of centralized monitoring and management points, 
dynamically changed network topologies [Bidg06], openness of wireless medium, system 
complexity, design and implementation flaws, configuration and administration errors, etc. Thus 
the emphasis on detecting the wireless attacks through a second line of defense, in the form of 
Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS), has been increasing in this context. Basically, 
WIDS monitors 802.11 wireless traffic and system activities to identify the intrusive activities, 
and then alerts the complementary prevention part to combat the detected attacks. Despite the 
importance of WIDSs in wireless network security, their performance is sometimes not 
satisfying in practice. Thus evaluating WIDSs performance is a pressing necessity. Evaluation 
can be defined as a systematic assessment of the ability of a WIDS to meet the intended and 
expected performance. 
 Motivations 1.1.
The break-ins occur almost daily in wireless networks and the distinct lack of the evaluation 
of wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDSs) are the main motivations for this work. Despite 
the great concern of most previous work with the evaluation of the intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs), their evaluations suffer from some drawbacks. In this thesis, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the previous work are discussed and analyzed to extract the main problematics of 
this topic, to subsequently develop reasonable solutions for managing a credible evaluation of 
WIDSs.    
Selecting a reliable WIDS depends significantly on its performance. Basically, there are 
many different attributes that evaluate the WIDS performance such as effectiveness, efficiency, 
interoperability, collaboration [Axel99], redundant alerts correlation, the impact on the 
monitored system resources, attack type recognition, scalability and flexibility, etc. WIDS 
effectiveness is considered the basic factor in evaluating the WIDS performance, and it thus 
receives considerable attention in this thesis. Effectiveness reflects the ability of WIDS to detect 
the intrusive activities and the absence degree of the false alarms which are considered the main 
great challenges facing the IDSs performance. 
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 Research Goals 1.2.
Dealing with the above-mentioned motivations, our research goal is performing a credible 
evaluation of WIDSs (Figure  I-1) that can be achieved through two main phases; preparation 
phase and experimental phase. The preparation phase includes three main pivots that are 
manifested in preparing a comprehensive evaluation methodology, characterizing real and 
representative dataset, and defining expressive evaluation metrics. These three pivots altogether 
are considered in the experimental phase that is managed with regard to predefined conditions to 
ensure the accuracy of the experimental measurements. 
 Contributions 1.3.
Figure  I-1 shows our concept of managing a credible evaluation of WIDSs performance. We 
commence with introducing a comprehensive evaluation methodology that is considered the 
road map of our work in the thesis. This methodology takes into account the remaining key 
dimensions to achieve a credible evaluation.  
 Comprehensive Evaluation Methodology 1.3.1.
 Our proposed methodology covers the essential dimensions for a comprehensive and 
credible evaluation of WIDSs performance. The methodology dimensions or tasks are organized 
in a sequential and well- engineered manner, starting from the main goals of WIDSs evaluation 
reaching the intended objectives. This methodology considers some significant dimensions 
which have been disregarded in the previous work, such as analyzing the evaluation limitations 
 
 
Figure I-1: Key Dimensions of Credible Evaluation of WIDSs. 
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in order to take the proper measures to overcome them. The pivotal dimensions that receive 
great attention in our methodology are characterizing and generating representative and real 
dataset, and defining reliable and expressive evaluation metrics. Basically, the evaluation dataset 
consists of two main parts; normal traffic (as a background) and malicious traffic. The 
background traffic, which comprises normal and benign activities in the absence of attacks, can 
be generated using real or synthetic dataset as described in chapter 3 and chapter 6. In our 
experimental work in this thesis, we use real background traffic (chapter 6). The second part of 
the dataset is the malicious traffic which is composed of intrusive activities. No doubt that the 
credibility of the WIDS evaluation depends significantly on a comprehensive characterization of 
the malicious traffic. Thus a holistic classification of wireless security attacks is a pressing 
necessity. 
 WIDSs Evaluation Centric Taxonomy of Wireless Security Attacks 1.3.2.
The ability of WIDS to detect the intrusive activities is an important aspect of the WIDSs 
effectiveness. Thus, the intrusive traffic used in the evaluation of WIDSs effectiveness should be 
representative of the possible intrusions in the environment of interest. Dealing with this 
challenge, we have developed a holistic taxonomy of wireless security attacks from the 
perspective of the WIDS evaluator. Our proposed taxonomy includes all relevant essential 
dimensions for wireless attacks classification and it helps in generating and extracting the 
representative attack test cases. We also consider a new concept of the probability of occurrence 
of the attack test cases that leads to accurate results of WIDSs evaluation. All these issues are 
more fully treated in chapter 4. 
 Novel Evaluation Metrics  1.3.3.
Defining expressive evaluation metrics is a crucial task in the evaluation process. Dealing 
with this issue, we develop a novel metric called intrusion detection effectiveness (EID) for the 
evaluation of IDSs/WIDSs effectiveness. EID manipulates the drawbacks of the existing metrics, 
especially the common main drawback that is manifested in their main notion of measuring the 
IDSs effectiveness on the basis of comparing two IDSs or more to select the best one, whereas 
this selected one may be ineffective. The effectiveness measured by this approach can be 
described as relative effectiveness. For measuring the actual effectiveness, the notion of our 
developed metric EID is based on comparing the operating curve of the IDS/WIDS (system 
under test) to the optimal operating curve (i.e., created as a zero reference curve ZRC) by 
calculating the variation between the two curves. The variation value interprets the deviation of 
the IDS operation from the intended optimal operation. EID can be used for evaluating the 
effectiveness of wired or wireless IDSs. The distinct advantages of EID over the previously 
proposed metrics are demonstrated in chapter 5. 
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We also introduce another metric called attack recognition rate (RR) to measure the 
proportion of the detected intrusions that are recognized. This metric is related to the diagnosis 
ability that helps consequently in taking the proper measures.  
 RF Shielded Testbed 1.3.4.
One of the great challenges that we have faced in the experimental evaluation of WIDSs is 
the uncontrolled 802.11 traffic from the adjacent wireless stations in the open wireless medium 
which obstructs the accurate measurements of the considered parameters. We overcame this 
problem by constructing an RF shielded testbed to manage all the measurements under our 
control without any interfering from any uncontrolled traffic. This significantly facilitates our 
task of generating and managing real and representative dataset.   
As a complement, we follow the remaining dimensions of our methodology to finally 
conduct experimental evaluation tests of two popular WIDSs (Kismet and AirSnare), to 
demonstrate the utility of our proposed solutions. 
 Thesis Outline 1.4.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of wireless networking technology and the associated 
benefits and limitations, with a great concern about the wireless network security. A security 
conceptual model is introduced to clarify the relationships between the network security 
concepts, the importance of the security countermeasures, and the significant role of WIDS as a 
second line of defense.  
Chapter 3 introduces our proposed methodology for evaluating the WIDSs performance as a 
consequence of analyzing some existing experimental evaluations of IDSs and the associated 
critiques. The dimensions of this methodology are described in detail, starting from the main 
evaluation goals, passing the related subsequent tasks, until reaching the ultimate objective of 
experimental testing and evaluation of WIDSs. 
Chapter 4 presents a new holistic taxonomy of wireless security attacks from the perspective 
of the WIDSs evaluator. This chapter differentiates between the attack classifications on the 
basis of the classification orientation, whether it is evaluation-centric or defense-centric 
classification; the later one is the main concern of this chapter. The proposed taxonomy helps in 
extracting the representative attacks test cases. Also, the new concept of the test cases 
probability is considered in this chapter.   
Chapter 5 introduces a novel evaluation metric called intrusion detection effectiveness (EID). 
This chapter discusses in detail the existing metrics and their advantages and disadvantages. Our 
developed metric EID manipulates the drawbacks of the existing ones, taking into account all 
essential and related parameters for measuring the actual effectiveness of IDSs/WIDSs. Another 
new metric called attack recognition rate (RR) is also introduced in this chapter.   
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 Chapter 6 is considered as a proof of concept and it presents the experimental evaluation 
tests of two well-known WIDSs; Kismet and AirSnare. The results are interpreted and the utility 
of the proposed methodology, the holistic taxonomy of wireless security attacks, and the 
developed evaluation metrics are demonstrated.  
Chapter 7 summarizes our final conclusions and future work. 
28 
 
29 
 
 Chapter 2: Wireless Network Security  II.
Wireless networking technology has become a widespread alternative to wired networking 
technology in recent years, owing to the associated valuable features such as mobility, 
scalability, flexibility, and installation simplicity. However, wireless communications suffer 
from numerous security threats and attacks. Consequently, several security efforts have been 
exerted to keep the wireless communications systems invulnerable to attacks. This chapter 
provides an overview of wireless networking technology and the associated benefits and 
limitations, with a great concern about the wireless network security that is considered the most 
critical challenge in this context. To understand well the wireless security, we introduce in this 
chapter a security conceptual model that elucidates the relationships between the network 
security concepts; vulnerabilities, threats, threat sources, risks, system infection, and 
countermeasures. These dimensions are discussed in a sequence of cause and consequence until 
reaching the last dimension which is the security countermeasures to be aware of their great and 
crucial roles in the network security. The security countermeasures manipulate or neutralize the 
system vulnerabilities, combat the attack attempts, and mitigate the attack effects. We study the 
role of each security countermeasure, and how the countermeasures at the first line of defense, 
such as authentication, encryption, and firewalls, are susceptible to be breached or bypassed by 
some attacks. This thus necessitates installing wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDSs) at 
the second line of defense to detect the attacks that eluded the first line of defense.  
 Wireless Networking 2.1.
Basically, there are two main ways for networking the computing devices to communicate 
with each other, exchange data, and/or share the network resources; via either wired connection 
using Ethernet cables or wireless connection using radio frequency (RF) waves. Wireless 
networking technology has been growing to become the norm of networking in universities, 
enterprises, and homes. Wireless networking makes the life easier and more comfortable 
without the hassles of cables that are massively used in wired networks. Sometimes a 
combination of wired and wireless technology is needed to meet the networking requirements. 
The following subsections describe the advantages of wireless networks over wired networks, 
and the associated limitations as well.  
 Wireless Networking Benefits 2.1.1.
 Mobility: Mobility is the prominent attribute and most obvious advantage of wireless 
networks, and it is manifested in the seamless roaming capabilities. Mobility gives the 
network users and stations the ability to access the wireless network and maintain the 
connection as they roam freely and move from one place to another within the network 
coverage area. Wireless mobility serves the employees within a corporate campus to 
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manage their work at any convenient location without obligatory physical connection to 
the network, and it then enhances the productivity gain. Also, the cell phone user can 
move and drive hundreds of miles during the course of a telephone conversation where 
the phone maintains the network connection through cell phone towers.  
To appreciate the significance of mobility, it is important to understand the difference 
between the true mobility and mere portability. Portability provides the ability to carry 
the portable computing device (e.g., laptop) between different locations, but it is still 
necessary to physically plug into the network and reestablish a network connection at 
each new location. As for mobility, the network connections stay active even while the 
portable device is in motion. In short, portability removes only the physical barriers to 
connectivity, but mobility removes further barriers; most of which are based on the 
logical network architecture [Gast05]. Mobility is crucial to the domains that require 
continual network connections such as the health care domain, where mobility supports 
mobile access to the hospital database and facilitates the communication between 
patients, doctors and hospital staff, and thus helps in improving the quality of the 
hospital care. 
 Installation simplicity and rapidity: the installation of wireless networks does not 
require complex undertakings as that are associated with the wired networks. For wired 
networks, it is not easy task to wire up traditional Ethernet cables to numerous locations. 
Besides, many old buildings are preserved by historic preservation laws that increase the 
difficulty of installing the wired networks. Wireless networking, on the other hand, 
makes it easier to deploy the wireless equipment and install the network. Moreover, the 
installation of wireless networks is a time-saving task, in contrast to the installation of 
wired networks that is a time-consuming task; just deploying the wireless stations and 
configuring them to associate with the network via RF waves.  
 Scalability: Growing the network size to serve a wider area is a critical issue in the 
networking technology. The wireless network can be easily scaled up to serve a large 
number of stations, and this can be achieved by adding extra access points to extend the 
network coverage area. As for wired networks, scalability requires additional wires 
and/or routers, and complicated undertakings to properly install the extra part that serves 
the additional area.  
 Flexibility: Wireless networks offer greater flexibility than wired networks, where the 
wireless stations are not constrained by physical connections. In modern press 
conferences, wireless networks allow journalists to take unrestricted locations with 
privileged access to the network. Moreover, business, research, and academic staff can 
hold quickly the meetings without predetermination of obligatory locations for the staff 
members. 
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 Wireless Networking Limitations 2.1.2.
 Interference: Interference is one of the performance limitations of wireless networks. 
Interference occurs when the receiving node picks up different signals on the same 
frequency.  Many wireless devices such as cordless phones, baby monitors, medical 
devices, and microwave ovens share the same RF band of 2.4 GHz, and this may cause 
interference. There are two main types of interference; adjacent channel interference and 
co-channel interference [Seyb05]. Adjacent channel interference is produced by 
transmissions on adjacent or partially overlapped channels, but co-channel interference is 
caused by transmissions carried on the same frequency channels.  
 Security: Network security is the critical issue confronting the wireless networks. Unlike 
wired networks, where any station should have physical connection and passes many 
defense lines to gain access to the network, the open wireless medium renders the 
wireless networks more susceptible to attacks. Consequently, Wireless traffic can be 
easily intercepted and eavesdropped by attackers within the network coverage area. 
Moreover, the wireless attacks can come from any direction and target any node. Thus, 
wireless network security has become a matter of increasing concern in recent years. 
Despite these limitations of wireless networking technology, wireless networks nowadays 
have become widespread, where their benefits dominate their limitations. Since the wireless 
network security is considered a serious limitation, it receives considerable attention in the 
following sections. 
In the same way as “security” is defined in linguistic dictionaries [Oxfo11][Merr03], we can 
define “network security” as the procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the safety of a 
network or system against misuse or malicious activities.   
 Wireless Security Requirements    2.2.
In order to ensure the security of information systems, it is essential to understand the 
requirements for securing the system. The main requirements for the information security in 
wireless networks are the same as in wired networks, and they include three main aspects; 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The malicious activities are usually concerned with 
compromising one or more of these security requirements. 
 Confidentiality: Confidentiality means preserving authorized restrictions on access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information 
[Usc12]. Confidentiality ensures that data is only accessible to the authorized users, and 
hinders any hostile attempt to get hold of the data from the network. Confidentiality is an 
important aspect in wireless network security due to the fact that the openness and 
broadcast nature of wireless networks facilitate eavesdropping. To provide 
confidentiality and keep the transmitted information secure, access control and 
cryptographic techniques are used. 
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 Integrity: Integrity means guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity [Usc12]. 
Data integrity ensures that the transmitted message is preserved intact and is not 
illegitimately altered or corrupted during the transmission between the wireless nodes. 
Typically, this can be achieved by generating checksum of the message with a one-way 
hash function, or by using cryptographic techniques. As Vines stated in [Vine02], 
assuring integrity is a three-part endeavor: 1) prevent modification of information by 
unauthorized users, 2) prevent unauthorized or unintentional modification of information 
by authorized users, and 3) preserve the internal and external consistency of databases. 
 Availability: Availability means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information [Usc12]. Availability ensures the survivability of network service and the 
absence of denial of service. This means keeping the network service to be accessible to 
the authorized users whenever needed. The system should be resilient in the face of 
hardware failures, software faults, and denial of service attacks. Fault tolerance 
techniques [TDSC02] are commonly used techniques to keep survivability of system 
services. Also, there are several proposed techniques to combat the denial of service 
(DoS) attacks.   
 Wireless Security Conceptual Model 2.3.
To understand well the wireless security challenge, it is important to study the main 
dimensions of wireless network security. This section presents a conceptual model of network 
security that explains the relationships between the network security concepts as shown in 
Figure  II-1. This conceptual model is considered a general model for either wired or wireless 
networks; just the difference lies in the nature of vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures 
that are different according to the characteristics of each network. Our concern in this study is 
the wireless networks. We will explain the dimensions of the security conceptual model 
(Figure  II-1) in a sequence of cause and consequence. The pivotal dimension in this context is 
the network vulnerabilities that are considered the main cause and motive for the remaining 
dimensions. Wireless security vulnerabilities expose the network assets to the security threats 
that could be realized by the threat sources (i.e., accidental events or intentional attacks). When 
the vulnerabilities are exploited by the threat sources, the likelihood of risks is raised and this 
could lead ultimately to the system infection. Consequently, security countermeasures are 
developed to proactively counter the potential threats and manipulate, compensate, or neutralize 
the system vulnerabilities, and to reactively counter the security risks and alleviate the system 
infection.  
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 Vulnerabilities 2.3.1.
 As the vulnerability is defined in [Shir07][Cnss10], with a little adaptation, the vulnerability 
is a flaw or weakness in a system design, implementation, configuration, or security measures 
that could be accidentally or intentionally exploited by a threat source, and results in a violation 
of the system security policy. The open and uncontrolled medium between the communicated 
nodes in wireless networks is the main critical vulnerability that can be easily exploited and, 
moreover, opens the door for exploiting the other wireless network vulnerabilities.  
We differentiate between two main categories of network vulnerabilities; physical 
vulnerabilities and logical vulnerabilities. Physical vulnerabilities refer to the weaknesses in the 
physical security measures (e.g., locks, keys, enclosures and shielding), and they can be 
exploited by physical tampering and vandalism attacks. Logical vulnerabilities can be found in 
the network services, protocols and applications besides the logical security measures (e.g., 
cryptographic algorithms, authentication techniques, etc.), and they can be exploited by logical 
attacks. 
One of the critical weaknesses in physical security of wireless networks is suspending the 
wireless access points (APs) and wireless sensor network (WSN) nodes in open and unprotected 
places. This exposes APs and WSN nodes to physical attacks that can damage or steal them. 
Also, the open wireless medium exposes the wireless communications to eavesdropping, RF 
jamming and other types of logical attacks. Effect of logical attacks may reach the physical 
 
Figure II-1: Security Conceptual Model. 
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system, and the same for the physical attacks that may affect the logical system [AnWi11]. It is 
worth mentioning that our concern in this thesis is the logical security issues that are related to 
the evaluation of wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDSs). 
All wireless vulnerabilities can be categorized under four main classes; exposed medium, 
design flaws, implementation flaws, and configuration errors; they will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. 
 Security Threats     2.3.2.
As the threat is defined in [StGF02] [Cnss10], with a little adaptation, the security threat is 
the potential of a threat source to accidentally or intentionally exploit one or more of system 
vulnerabilities, with adversely impact on the system operation and resources. Briefly, security 
threat is a potential violation of the system security.  
Network security threats and vulnerabilities go hand in hand. The security threat in itself is 
not an action, it is merely a potential for exploiting the system vulnerabilities. Security threats 
are realized by the threat sources that represent the real risky action against the system 
vulnerabilities. Common security threats in wireless networks are manifested in the potential of 
eavesdropping, spoofing, denial of service, and breaching the security measures.  
 Eavesdropping  2.3.2.1.
Eavesdropping in wireless networks refers to intercepting the radio traffic transmitted over 
the air. The open wireless medium increases the potential of eavesdropping. The eavesdropper, 
who is just in the vicinity of a wireless network without any required physical connection, needs 
only an adequate RF antenna along with wireless sniffing tools, such as NetStumbler [Nets13] 
and WireShark [Wire13], to capture wireless data stream. The captured and collected data can 
be decoded, and secret or private information may be easily extracted. Eavesdropping can be 
countered using encryption mechanisms to safeguard data transmission. Thus, even if the 
eavesdropper intercepts the encrypted data, he cannot be able to access the original data unless 
he gets or cracks the encryption key. Eavesdropping is usually used as a preliminary step 
towards other attacks ranging from spoofing[LiTr07], to information theft, to denial of service 
(DoS) attacks [BeSa03]. 
 Spoofing 2.3.2.2.
Spoofing threat refers to the potential of a malicious node to masquerade as another identity 
to gain legitimate privileges or deceive the legitimate nodes or stations. Spoofing is a serious 
threat, where spoofing attacks [YCTC09][LiTr07] can be easily launched in wireless networks 
with the open medium. For instance, ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing attack can 
access and corrupt ARP cache, where MAC and IP pairs are stored, and sends spoofed ARP 
messages to redirect sensitive data from a legitimate node to another location where the attack 
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station. Spoofing attacks can facilitate a variety of traffic injection attacks, such as rogue access 
point [HSTL11], session hijacking [DCTA12], and denial of service [BeSa03] attacks. 
 Denial of Service 2.3.2.3.
The most serious threat facing wired and wireless networks is the denial of service. Wireless 
networks are highly susceptible to denial of service (DoS) attacks due to the broadcast nature of 
wireless communications. DoS attacks aim to deplete the network resources and hinder the 
network services. Many types of DoS attacks [BiTa09] can be launched at the physical layer and 
MAC layer of wireless network, and cause considerable threat against the network’s normal 
operation. For instance, the attacker can exploit the broadcast and openness nature of wireless 
medium and launches so-called jamming attack [XTZW05] that causes radio frequency 
interference and consequently prevents the wireless nodes from accessing the wireless channel.   
 Breaching Security Measures 2.3.2.4.
There is no completely immune security measure. Thus, most security measures have the 
potential to be breached. For example, the attacker can use cryptanalysis techniques [Swen08] to 
breach the cryptographic security mechanisms and break ciphers; this is called cryptanalytic 
attack. This attack exploits the weaknesses in encryption algorithms, plus some probable 
knowledge of the general characteristics of the plaintext or even some sample plaintext-
ciphertext pairs, to deduce a particular plaintext or encryption key [Stal10]. As another example, 
the attacker may exploit the weaknesses in authentication techniques to interrupt the connection 
by deauthentication requests. Moreover, other security systems such as firewalls and WIDSs, 
may be defeated by some malicious evasion techniques [FoLe06][SmEJ06]. 
In conclusion, the threat refers to the intent to cause disruption or infection to a secured 
information system. Basically, the security threats cannot be eliminated, but by using the 
security countermeasures we can proactively counter the threats, address the vulnerabilities, 
reactively counter the consequent risks, and finally alleviate the system infection or restore the 
system operation. 
 Threat Sources 2.3.3.
Threat source is either 1) an intentional attack with an intent and method targeted at the 
intentional exploitation of the system vulnerabilities [Cnss10], or 2) a system fault or 
environmental incident that may accidentally exploit the system vulnerabilities. 
 System Faults and Environmental Accidents  2.3.3.1.
Unintentional system faults and environmental accidents are significant events that should 
be considered in studying and analyzing the threats sources. System faults refer to the 
operational errors due to software bugs or hardware failures, or faults induced accidently by the 
system operator. Examples of system faults are failure in wireless access point, nodes, data 
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storage devices, and battery depletion of sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). 
Environmental accidents refer to unpleasant events in the system’s surroundings and the 
peripheral components. Environmental accidents include the sudden power failure and the 
system’s components being destroyed by external events, in addition to the natural incidents that 
affect the system operation such as thunderstorms, floods, etc.  
 Wireless Security Attacks 2.3.3.2.
Wireless security attacks are the focal point of scientific research in wireless network 
security. Wireless attacks have been receiving great attention, along with appreciable and 
valuable effort to develop appropriate security countermeasures. In this section, we present a 
quick review of some wireless attacks that exploit the network vulnerabilities. More details 
about wireless attacks will be presented in chapter 4. 
 RF Jamming Attack A)
RF jamming attack is a type of denial of service (DoS) attacks that are the most dangerous 
attacks against wireless networks. RF jamming attack aims to prevent the wireless stations from 
exchanging information by keeping the wireless medium busy by emitting jamming signals to 
interfere with the radio frequency (RF) used by the legitimate stations. Jamming attack is 
sometimes difficult to be prevented, where the attacker doesn’t need to gain access to the 
network to launch the attack. Xu et al. [XTZW05] differentiate between four models of jamming 
attacks:  
 Constant jammer: It continuously emits a radio signal with random bits to the channel 
without following the MAC layer rules. Constant jammer with signal strength higher 
than the threshold (i.e., used to determine whether the channel is idle or not) can prevent 
the legitimate stations from using the channel.  
 Deceptive jammer: It constantly injects regular packets, instead of emitting random bits, 
to the channel without gap between subsequent packet transmissions. Due to the constant 
stream of incoming packets, the legitimate stations will be deceived and remain in the 
receiving state even if they have packets to send. 
 Random jammer: It alternates, in pulsing manner, between sleeping and jamming 
phases. During jamming phase, it can be either constant jammer or deceptive jammer. 
This model is usable for jammers with limited biasing power to conserve energy. 
 Reactive jammer: It jams the channel only when the transmission activity is detected, 
and stays quiet when the channel is idle. This evasion technique of reactive jammer 
makes it difficult to be detected.  
There are many security countermeasures have been proposed to combat the jamming 
attacks. One of these countermeasures is the spread spectrum based techniques. The common 
used spread spectrum techniques are Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency 
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) [Skla01] which are based on secrets that need to be shared 
between the sender and the receiver before starting the communication. Also, Popper et al. 
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[PoSC09] proposed so-called Uncoordinated DSSS (UDSSS) that enables spread spectrum anti-
jamming broadcast communication without the requirement of shared secrets. Chiang and Hu 
[ChHu08] developed a scheme for jamming mitigation based on spread spectrum and a binary 
key tree. Lin and Noubir [LiNo05] introduced Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes as a 
method to defend against the jamming attacks. 
 Wormhole Attack B)
Wormhole attack is one of the most severe attacks in wireless Ad Hoc networks, especially 
against many routing protocols and location-based security systems [HuPJ03]. In wormhole 
attack, the attacker records packets at one location in the network, tunnels them to another 
location, and replays them from that location into the network. The wormhole attack can be 
launched by two different modes; hidden mode and participation mode [KhMB09]. In hidden 
mode, the attackers do not declare their identities and act as two simple transceivers that capture 
messages at one end of the wormhole and replay them at the other end. In participation mode, 
wormhole attackers participate in the routing as legitimate nodes and use the wormhole to 
deliver the packets sooner and/or with a smaller number of hops. In this mode, the attacker uses 
cryptographic key that can be used to launch a more powerful attack.  
For tunneled distances longer than the normal wireless transmission range of a single hop, 
the wormhole attacker uses either a single long-range directional wireless link or a direct wired 
link between the transmitting and receiving points to tunnel the packets that arrive before other 
packets transmitted over the normal multihop route. Also, the attacker can forward each bit of 
the packet over the wormhole tunnel directly without waiting to aggregate the entire packet 
before beginning to tunnel the bits of the packet, in order to minimize the delay.  
Many security mechanisms and approaches were proposed to combat the wormhole attacks 
[HuPJ03] [LPMS05] [KhMB09]. Hu et al. [HuPJ03] introduced a new mechanism called packet 
leashes for detecting and defending against wormhole attacks. They proposed two types of 
leashes: geographic leashes and temporal leashes. Also, they proposed an authentication 
protocol called TIK for using it with the temporal leashes. Lazos et al. [LPMS05] introduced 
theoretic approach with derived conditions for detecting and combating the wormholes. They 
also proposed a defense mechanism based on local broadcast keys. In the same way, 
Khabbazian et al. [KhMB09] proposed a timing-based solution to defend against the wormhole 
attacks.  
 Sybil Attack C)
  In Sybil attack [Douc02], a malicious node illegitimately claims multiple identities and 
pretends to be multiple and distinct nodes in the system. Sybil attacker obtains Sybil identities 
by forging new false identities for the Sybil node or by stealing identities of other legitimate 
nodes.  
There are several impacts of Sybil attacks ranging from the possibility of defeating the 
redundancy mechanisms of distributed storage systems [Douc02], to the malicious effect on 
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routing protocols in sensor networks [KaWa03], to bypass the reputation system in peer-to-peer 
system. Also, in Facebook-style Social Network Systems (FSNS), where the authorization 
decision is the function of the topology of the social graph, it is possible for Sybil attack by a 
group of pseudonymous identities to manipulate the social graph topology and gain access 
privileges that would otherwise be forbidden [Fong11]. 
Yu et al. [YKGF06] proposed SybilGuard decentralized protocol for limiting the corruptive 
influences of Sybil attacks. Also, Yu and Gibbons [YGKX08] proposed another protocol called 
SybilLimit that leverages the same notion of SybilGuard with an improvement to reduce the 
number of Sybil nodes accepted per attack edge.   
 Security Risks 2.3.4.
Security risk is the likelihood that the vulnerability will be exploited by the threat sources, 
and losses will occur. Threat sources and vulnerabilities are the key drivers of the security risk.  
As attempts to address the risk impact, numerous literatures were concerned with risk 
management in the last few years, such as [Gibs11] [StGF02]. Risk management is the practice 
of identifying, assessing, controlling, and mitigating risks [Gibs11]. Risk management helps in 
identifying and differentiating severe risks from minor risks and their impact to manage the 
security measures, taking into account the trade-off between the security cost, potential loss, and 
quality of service (QoS).  
 Risk Impact 2.3.5.
Risk impact is manifested in losing one or more of security requirements; confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. Risk impact translates the attack intent or objective to a system 
infection. Attack objectives are ranging from merely nuisance, to spy, to information theft, to 
compromising data integrity, to denial of service, to vandalism. The realized attack objectives 
can be categorized as a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 
 Loss of Confidentiality: Loss of confidentiality means the unauthorized access to 
confidential information that can lead to disclosing secret and proprietary information. 
This disclosed information may be used in theft or extortion of users and organizations; 
the objective may rise until threatening national security.  
 Loss of Integrity: Loss of data integrity means unauthorized alteration or corruption of 
the transmitted messages or data, and that results in many unpleasant impacts. 
Compromising data integrity can be attained either by intentional alteration of the data 
for the objective of revenge or vandalism, or by unintentional alteration of the data 
caused by operator mistakes, software errors, or hardware faults [Vine02].  
 Loss of Availability: Loss of availability refers to denial of service which means that the 
network service is unavailable or inaccessible to the authorized users. The consequent 
impact of the lost availability can be observed by the harmful effect on the operational 
performance, commercial services, and financial services of the system. For instance, in 
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February 2000, Yahoo, Amazon, eBay, and other popular sites were targets of denial of 
service (DoS) attacks that cause cumulative loss, estimated by Yankee Group, of almost 
$1.2 billion [Step01]. 
 Security Countermeasures 2.3.6.
Security countermeasure can be defined as actions, devices, procedures, or techniques that 
counter a threat, vulnerability, or attack by eliminating or preventing it, minimizing the harm it 
can cause, or discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken [Cnss10]. There 
are two main types of the security countermeasures: proactive countermeasures and reactive 
countermeasures. 
 Proactive countermeasures: Proactive countermeasures help in reinforcing the system 
immunity by proactive techniques to hinder or even decrease the potential malicious 
activities against the system vulnerabilities. Proactive defense techniques play a vital 
role in manipulating, neutralizing, and compensating the system vulnerabilities. Access 
control, authentication, and encryption mechanisms are clear examples of proactive 
countermeasures. 
 Reactive countermeasures: As a complement, reactive countermeasures are concerned 
with countering the malicious activities at the violation phase and infection phase. Thus, 
there are two main dimensions of the reaction of these countermeasures: 1) detecting and 
preventing the attacks that attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities at the violation phase, 
and 2) detecting and combating the attacks that already occurred and infected the system 
resources at the infection phase, as well as alleviating the malicious impact.  
Some security countermeasures play the two roles; as a proactive and reactive 
countermeasure, such as firewalls. When the firewall rules are adjusted to block traffic on 
certain ports and allow traffic on other ports, in this case the firewall acts as a proactive 
countermeasure. On the other hand, when the firewall detects malicious activities with the 
incoming traffic on a certain port and consequently blocks the malicious traffic on this port, then 
the firewall acts as a reactive countermeasure in this case. The intrusion detection system IDS 
(whether wired or wireless) is purely reactive countermeasure. In the following sections, we 
present wireless security countermeasures with a major concern with the wireless intrusion 
detection system (WIDS) that is the focal point of this study.  
 Authentication 2.3.6.1.
Authentication is the first barrier to wireless stations to gain access to wireless networks. 
This is comparable to physical plugging of Ethernet cable into Ethernet jack in wired networks. 
IEEE 802.11 standard basically specified two approaches of authentication; open system 
authentication and shared key authentication. These approaches were improved by other 
developed authentication mechanisms such as WPA-PSK authentication and IEEE 802.1X-
based EAP authentication as shown in the following.    
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 Open system authentication: open system authentication involves a two-step 
authentication frame exchange. The wireless station initiates the authentication process 
by sending an authentication request to the access point. When the access point receives 
the authentication request, it replies by authentication response containing approval or 
disapproval of authentication. In open system authentication, the access point accepts the 
wireless station wishing to join the network without verifying its identity. Open system 
authentication does not offer any level of security, and it is then advisable to use it along 
with an auxiliary security mechanism such as encryption techniques, MAC address 
filtering, or higher level authentication such as 802.1X-based EAP authentication. The 
encryption algorithm is not used as a part of the open system authentication process, but 
it is used to provide verification after the authentication and association occur. To boost 
security level, many access points offer a security option of MAC (Media Access 
Control) address filtering that provides network access solely for wireless stations with 
specific MAC addresses. 
 Shared key authentication: shared key authentication basically relies on using WEP 
(Wired Equivalent Privacy) key shared between the access point and wireless stations 
willing to join the network. It is similar to open system authentication but it includes 
additional challenge and response exchanged between the wireless stations and access 
point; it involves a four-way authentication frame exchange. The wireless station sends 
an authentication request frame to the access point, and the access point replies by a 
challenge text in a response frame to the wireless station. The wireless station encrypts 
the challenge text by the configured WEP key, and then sends it back to the access point. 
The access point then decrypts the received frame and compares it to the original 
challenge text to determine if they are matched or not, and accordingly sends the final 
authentication response to the wireless station with approval or disapproval. 
However, WEP offers weak security and it can be broken by trivial attacks. This can be 
overcome by another security algorithm WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) that improves the 
encryption mechanism and boosts the security level. 
 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 2.3.6.2.
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is the optional cryptographic algorithm specified by IEEE 
802.11 to provide data confidentiality that is subjectively equivalent to the confidentiality of the 
wired local area network (LAN) medium. WEP [Ieee12] helps in protecting the data streams by 
encrypting them, thus preventing unauthorized disclosure or alteration of the data. It also helps 
in managing the network access control by verifying the authorized access to the network. WEP 
algorithm was not designed for ultimate security in wireless networks, but rather to be at least as 
secure as wired networks.   
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WEP encryption process is shown in Figure  II-2, and it includes two crucial branches; a 
branch of computing the integrity check value (ICV), and another one of generating the key 
sequence. The results of the two branches are XORed to produce the ciphertext. The encryption 
process can be described as follows: 
ICV generation; 
1- The plaintext is firstly manipulated by the integrity algorithm - Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC-32) - to produce the integrity check value (ICV). 
2- The resulting ICV is concatenated with the plaintext payload.  
Key sequence generation; 
3- The secret key is concatenated with an initialization vector (IV) to produce WEP 
seed.  
4- The resulting WEP seed is fed to pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) - RC4 
encryption algorithm - to produce a key sequence of pseudo-random bytes equal in 
length to the number of data bytes of plaintext plus 4 bytes, since the key sequence is 
used to encrypt the plaintext data in addition to the integrity check value (ICV). 
Encipherment; 
5- The resulting key sequence is XORed with the plaintext concatenated with the ICV 
to produce the ciphertext.  
6- The final output of this encryption process is a message containing the ciphertext and 
IV.   
WEP PRNG is the actual encryption engine in WEP encryption process, and it uses RC4 
encryption algorithm [Rive92] that transforms a relatively short secret key into a long pseudo-
random key sequence. RC4 algorithm is a variable key-size stream cipher with byte-oriented 
operations, and it is based on the use of a random permutation. The initialization vector (IV) 
extends the useful lifetime of the secret key and provides the self-synchronous property of the 
algorithm. The secret key remains constant while the IV may be changed as frequently as every 
 
 
Figure II-2: WEP Encryption. 
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plaintext. Each new IV results in a new seed and key sequence. The IV travels with the 
encrypted message to the receiver. 
The initially deployed standard of WEP key length was 64-bit WEP seed that consists of 40-
bit shared secret key concatenated with a 24-bit initialization vector (IV). Then 128-bit WEP 
seed was deployed to boost the security by a longer key length. 128-bit WEP includes 104-bit 
secret key and a 24-bit initialization vector (IV). Many manufacturers of access points 
implement and support an option of using 256-bit WEP, although the incremental security by 
using this long key is dubious due to inherent weaknesses in WEP mechanism.    
To recover the original message, the receiver should decrypt the ciphertext with identical 
secret key. The decryption process shown in Figure  II-3 can be described as follows: 
Key sequence generation; 
1- The IV of the received message is concatenated with the secret key, and the result is 
fed into the WEP PRNG to generate the key sequence that is necessary to decrypt the 
received message. 
Decipherment; 
2- As a reverse process, the ciphertext is XORed with the key sequence to extract the 
original plaintext and ICV. 
Data Integrity Check; 
3- The decryption is verified by applying the integrity check algorithm on the recovered 
plaintext and comparing the produced ICV' to the ICV transmitted with the message. 
4- If ICV' matches ICV, then the original message is correctly recovered. on the other 
hand, if they do not match, then there is an error in the received message and 
consequently an error notification is sent back to the sending end.  
Unfortunately, WEP has serious security flaws in the main used and implemented algorithms 
(the encryption algorithm RC4 or the integrity check algorithm CRC-32), thus it is susceptible to 
attacks such as FMS attack [FlMS01] and chopchop attack [Kore04]. 
 
 
Figure II-3: WEP Decryption. 
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 Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 2.3.6.3.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) [Wpa03] was mainly developed to address WEP 
vulnerabilities, and to boost more robust security mechanism. WPA is a subset of the ratified 
IEEE 802.11i [Ieee04] security specification, and it is also compatible and can be implemented 
on majority of 802.11 products out today and old ones by updating their firmware; WPA is both 
forward and backward compatible. 
 WPA uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) to provide data encryption 
enhancements including a per-packet key mixing function. It also adds a message integrity 
check (MIC) to protect against packet forgery. WPA2 is the second generation of WPA that 
provides a stronger encryption mechanism. It includes a new advanced encryption mechanism 
using the Counter-Mode/CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) called the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES). 
 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP): WPA uses TKIP to address the encryption 
deficiencies of WEP and minimize the problem of encryption key reuse. TKIP uses the 
RC4 encryption algorithm with increasing in the key size to 128-bit temporal key, and 
generates a unique encryption key to every packet. TKIP replaces the single static key 
used in WEP with keys that are dynamically generated and distributed by the 
authentication server. Also, TKIP uses a key hierarchy and key management 
methodology that obstructs the malicious attempts to predict and exploit the key.  
 Message Integrity Check (MIC): As a second important component to ensure the data 
integrity, WPA uses a message integrity check (MIC) (sometimes called Michael) that 
protects the transmitted data against the malicious altering attempts. Unfortunately, MIC 
does not provide perfect integrity. It is particularly vulnerable to bit-filliping, where the 
attacker can change a bit in the message, then changes the integrity check of the resulting 
message. 
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-CCMP): Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
[Aesa01] is a block cipher, and it is considered a stronger alternative to RC4 encryption 
algorithm. Variety of modes can be used in conjunction with AES. CCMP security 
protocol defines a set of rules which are built around AES for data encryption. CCMP 
uses AES with 128-bit key and 128-bit block size. AES-CCMP combines AES CTR 
(counter mode) for encryption and ensuring data confidentiality and AES CBC-MAC 
(Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code mode) for data integrity. AES-
CCMP is used by WPA2 and 820.11i to enhance the encryption mechanism.    
WPA and WPA2 operate in two different modes [Wpaw05], personal mode and enterprise 
mode: 
 Personal Mode: Personal mode is designed for Small Office Home Office (SOHO) 
environments, where authentication server is not required. This mode uses a Preshared 
Key (PSK) approach for authentication. A preshared key can be configured manually on 
both the access point and wireless stations. This mode is considered as unmanaged 
mode. 
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 Enterprise Mode: Enterprise mode is designed for enterprises, and it operates in 
managed mode to meet the rigorous measures of enterprise security. This mode requires 
an authentication server, which typically is a Remote Authentication Dial-In User 
Service (RADIUS) server, with IEEE 802.1X and the Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) to strengthen mutual authentication between the wireless station and 
authentication server via the access point.  
WPA-Preshared Key (WPA-PSK) Authentication: WPA-Preshared Key (WPA-PSK) 
[Gast05] authentication is based on distributing a preshared key (WPA-PSK) to all wireless 
stations. Key derivation for the wireless link is based on random numbers exchanged along with 
the preshared key. This authentication approach is vulnerable to dictionary attacks due to the 
distributed preshared key. In most cases, a single preshared key is used for all stations in the 
same SSID (Service Set Identifier). Then all stations share the same master key. With the 
preshared key, the attacker can monitor the four-way handshake and derive the unique keys for 
any other station which shares the same preshared key. The attacker can also forge the messages 
to make re-authentication, and then he may be able to capture the four-way handshake. 
IEEE 802.1X-based EAP Authentication: IEEE 802.1X is a port-based authentication 
method for wired and wireless networks. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is defined in 
IETF – RFC 3748 [ABVC04] as an authentication framework that supports multiple 
authentication mechanisms such as EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), EAP-Tunneled 
Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS), and Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(PEAP) [StWA05]. 
 In 802.1X/EAP authentication, the access point acts as a pass-through agent that tunnels 
EAP request/response messages between the wireless station and the authentication server, 
typically is RADIUS. When a station sends an EAP authentication request to access a network, 
the access point firstly allows the station to communicate solely with the authentication server to 
verify the access privileges of the station. Once the authentication process is completed 
successfully, the access point then allows the authenticated station to communicate over the 
network with other entities. The mutual authentication with the authentication server using 
802.1X and EAP protects the wireless stations from accidental connection to rogue access 
points, and also ensures the access privilege of  the wireless stations that join the network. 
 Association 2.3.6.4.
When the wireless station is authenticated, it should be associated with the access point to 
gain full access before sending data frames. Association is a record keeping procedure that 
allows the network to track the location of each wireless station, so frames from the wireless 
station can be delivered to the correct access point. Association is necessary to synchronize the 
station and access point with important information, such as supported data rates. The station 
initiates the association by sending an association request frame containing elements such as 
SSID (Service Set Identifier) and supported data rates. The access point responds by sending an 
association response frame containing Association ID (AID) along with other information 
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related to the access point. The AID [Gast05] is a numerical identifier used to logically identify 
the station to which buffered frames need to be delivered, and it is usually used with power 
saving operation. Once the station is associated with the network, it can send and receive data 
frames. 
 Reassociation 2.3.6.5.
When a wireless station moves from the coverage area of an access point to another one, it 
issues a reassociation request to the new access point to keep the connection with the network 
and to inform the network about its new location. Reassociation request is similar to the 
association request. The only difference is that the reassociation request frames contain a field of 
the address of the old access point. The new access point communicates with the old access 
point to verify the previously registered association. Reassociation process is also used when the 
station leaves the coverage area of an access point and returns alert to the same access point, to 
rejoin the network. 
 Disassociation 2.3.6.6.
When a wireless station wants to terminate the existing association with an access point, it 
sends a disassociation frame to the access point. The access point is also able to remove any 
station from the network by sending a disassociation frame to the station. Once the station is 
dissociated, any mobility data stored in the distribution system is removed, and consequently the 
station is not able to exchange data frames with the access point. Disassociation is a notification, 
not a request that is considered a polite task to do during the station shutdown process.    
 Deauthentication 2.3.6.7.
The wireless station can send a deauthentication frame to terminate the authentication 
relationship between it and the access point, then it is disconnected from the network. 
Deauthentication is also a notification, not a request, to inform the access point about the station 
leaving the network. Also, the access point is able to deauthenticate any station by sending a 
deauthentication frame to it. Once the station is deauthenticated, it is no longer able to access the 
network. Since the authentication is prerequisite of the association, then the side effect of 
deauthentication is the termination of any current association.  
Figure  II-4 summarizes the 802.11 authentication and association processes and the relevant 
parts that form three sequential states: 
 State 1: unauthenticated and unassociated. 
 State 2: authenticated and unassociated. 
 State 3: authenticated and associated. 
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 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 2.3.6.8.
Virtual private network (VPN) [RiRa04] provides a way for secure communication over 
public or unsecured network connections. Wireless networks can use VPNs as a part of their 
security solutions. In wireless networks, VPN is usually installed on the access points to provide 
a secure connection to tunnel the wireless stations to the network. Access points in open 
wireless medium are susceptible to attacks. Then, it is recommended to use a VPN gateway 
server at the edge of the protected network segment. Using VPN is a mandatory for remote 
access and it is useful to the researchers and employees who need to access the network from 
remote locations. VPN uses encryption to ensure that the third party cannot access the 
transmitted data and authentication to ensure that only the authorized users can access the 
network.  
 Firewalls 2.3.6.9.
As we mentioned, the firewall can be used as a proactive countermeasure by controlling the 
access to the network and as a reactive countermeasure by reactively inspecting and detecting 
the malicious events that threaten the network. Firewalls are a controversial issue in wireless 
networks. The firewall was initially developed to separate between the wired network segments 
and filter the network traffic to determine which is allowed and which are denied according to 
the filtering policies. Security researchers argue about the conception of firewall in wireless 
networks. Some researchers consider it as a packet filtering firewall, which is mainly designed 
for wired networks, with some adaptations [TKLB11][NGML08] to be usable and compatible 
with the wireless network operation and to overcome the wireless network challenges such as 
the open network architecture, shared wireless medium, and dynamic network topology. The 
 
 
Figure II-4: States and Services. 
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firewall in this form is unable to monitor the radio spectrum to defend against the wireless 
attacks. In this case, the firewall is usually used as a part of the overall security system of the 
wireless network, and it operates in collaboration with other security solutions to reinforce the 
network security. Other researchers consider the wireless firewall as a security countermeasure 
installed on the wireless access point to monitor the radio spectrum and detect the malicious 
traffic besides controlling the access according to the filtering policies. Most firewalls developed 
in this case are composed of intrusion detection or prevention mechanisms and filtering policies 
[JNPF10] [YZZW12].        
 Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDSs) 2.3.6.10.
Although the appreciable roles of the aforementioned security countermeasures which 
represent the first line of defense, they might be breached or bypassed by attacks that may 
penetrate into the secured system. This necessitates installing a second line of defense to boost 
the system security by monitoring and detecting the attacks escaped from the first line of 
defense. This can be realized using the wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) which 
monitors the wireless network traffic and analyzes it for identifying any signs of attack, and then 
alerts the complementary prevention part to combat the detected attacks. The intrusion can be 
defined as a malicious event or a set of malicious events that attempt to compromise 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass security mechanisms of a system [BaMe01]. 
The complementary prevention part is either a system administrator who observes the WIDS 
output alerts and takes reactions accordingly or a prevention countermeasure that reacts directly 
according to the WIDS output alerts.   
Wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDSs) deviate, but not much more, from the wired 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs). WIDSs are in accord with IDSs on the main concept of 
intrusion detection and some characteristics, but they are different in some other characteristics 
due to the structural and behavioural differences between wired and wireless networks as well as 
the related differences between wired and wireless attacks. Basically, it is impossible for a 
wireless network to directly utilize the wired IDS. Characteristics of wireless networks and 
wireless attacks are considered in the design and implementation of WIDSs. It is worth 
mentioning that we always use “IDS” to refer to the wired intrusion detection system and 
“WIDS” to refer to the wireless intrusion detection system.    
Most WIDSs operate and monitor the wireless frames at MAC Layer, but there are some 
WIDSs designed to monitor the potential attacks at the physical layer besides the MAC layer. 
WIDSs are limited in their ability to identify the upper-layer attacks that are traditionally 
identified by wired IDSs. Some systems overcame this WIDS limitation by integrating a WIDS 
with a wired IDS to boost the system security, such as WHIFF system [AmGP03] that integrates 
Kismet WIDS [Kism13a] with Snort IDS [Snor13]. 
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Wireless intrusion prevention system (WIPS) operates in the same way as the WIDS with an 
additional capability to automatically react to prevent intrusions. 
The research on intrusion detection systems (IDSs) has been conducted for over 30 years 
[Ande80] [DeNe85] [Denn87]. Most research efforts are concerned with wired IDSs [LuJa88] 
[DeDW99] [WaDe01] [Levi02] [DeMo02] [RuJM05] [ArCh07] [JLMY12] with little interest in 
wireless IDSs (WIDSs) [ZhLH03] [VGSB04] [SuSA06] [GiSC06] [YGXC10].  
 Wireless Intrusion Detection Process A)
The main concept of the intrusion detection process in WIDS systems is shown in 
Figure  II-5 that explains the sequential manner of collecting the wireless traffic from the 
network, preprocessing it, and then analyzing it according to the detection technique used to 
differentiate between the normal and malicious events. 
 Data Collection: at the data collection stage, the WIDS collects the raw 802.11 traffic 
from the network and preprocesses it to be readable and useable for data analysis and 
intrusion identification that will be managed at the next stage by the detection engine.  
 Detection Engine: it is considered the core of intrusion detection process, where the 
WIDS analyzes the outcome of the data collection stage according to the algorithms of 
the reference model to identify the malicious activities.  
 Reference Model: it is the database unit that includes a model of the normal and 
expected behaviour of the system, attack signatures, or specification-based profile 
depending on the detection technique used; anomaly-based, signature-based, or 
specification-based detection techniques. More details about the detection techniques are 
available in chapter 3. 
 Configuration: WIDS typically includes a configuration file or settings that can be used 
to configure the WIDS according to the network characteristics and the Wi-Fi devices 
used, as well as to adjust the detection engine and the WIDS response according to the 
system security policy.   
 
Figure II-5: Wireless Intrusion Detection Process. 
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 Response: once the intrusion is detected, the WIDS generates alarms to either notify the 
network administrator or induce the complementary prevention countermeasure to take 
the proper action.    
Wireless intrusion detection system is considered a mature technology that is coupled with 
research efforts to produce the intended solutions to the problems of wireless network security. 
One of the significant features of WIDSs in wireless networks is the deployment characteristic 
that is manifested in three main architectures of WIDSs; standalone, distributed, and 
hierarchical architectures that serve the different modes and topologies of wireless networks. 
More details about the WIDSs characteristics will be covered in chapter 3. There are many types 
of commercial WIDSs such as AirMagnet [Airm13] and AirDefense [Aird13], but unfortunately 
with a lack of availability of open source WIDSs such as Kismet.     
1) Kismet 
Kismet [Kism13a] is an open source WIDS that operates at 802.11 MAC Layer. Kismet 
works by placing wireless cards in monitor (RFMON) mode, and thus continuously hopping 
between 802.11channels to gather data. Monitor mode puts the wireless network interface card 
into a state to monitor all traffic received from the wireless network. Monitor mode is different 
from promiscuous (or promisc) mode which is also used for packet sniffing, where it allows 
capturing the packets without obligatory association with an access point or Ad Hoc network. 
Monitor mode is only applied to the wireless networks, while promiscuous mode can be used for 
both wired and wireless networks. 
Kismet can collaborate or be combined with a network layer IDS like Snort [Snor13], to 
reinforce the system security as shown in the following system (WHIFF). 
2) WHIFF 
In 2002, a research team at Carnegie Mellon University developed WHIFF system 
[AmGP03] that integrates the two functions of wired and wireless intrusion detection. WHIFF 
combines two main components; Snort [Snor13] as a wired IDS to monitor the internal state of 
the host and Kismet [Kism13a] as a WIDS to monitor the RF traffic directed to the host. The 
WHIFF architecture is a distributed architecture and it comprises four modules; 1) Listener, 2) 
Correlation, 3) Notification, and 4) Interface. 
 Listener: the listeners act as data collectors for the wireless traffic and as intrusion 
detectors as well. They are machines with proper antenna to passively monitor 802.11 
traffic. These machines run Redhat linux 8.0 and use Snort IDS and Kismet WIDS to 
detect malicious activities and then send them to the correlation server. 
 Correlation: the correlation module receives the data from the listeners and processes it 
through a series of MySQL tables to be usable by the interface module. It compares all 
alerts and then eliminates the duplicates. The related alerts in rapid succession are 
classified under the corresponding classes of alerts. 
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 Notification: the notification and correlation modules are conceptually distinct, although 
they are technically intertwined. The function of the notification module is to gather the 
alerts data from the correlation module and deliver it to the administrator in real time. 
 Interface: the interface module provides a web-based console to view alerts, IDS 
incidents, rogue clients, and access points. It also allows the administrator to tag or add 
comments for subsequent investigations. 
 WIDSs Limitations B)
Basically, there is no security countermeasure has hundred percent strengths with zero 
weaknesses. As any security countermeasure, WIDSs suffer from some limitations that affect 
their performance.  
 False Responses: false responses problem refers to the unexpected responses from the 
WIDS. There are two main types of false responses; false alarms and false negatives. 
False alarms (also known as false positives) refer to the generated alarm when the WIDS 
classifies a benign activity as an intrusion, and false negatives refer to the failure of 
WIDS to detect the actual intrusive action; the intrusions occur without any raised alarms 
from the WIDS. The main problem in wireless networks that increases this limitation of 
false responses is that there is no obvious separation between normal and abnormal 
operation in wireless environment due to network topology changing. A wireless node 
may temporarily lose synchronization due to the fast or volatile physical movement, or 
the false information sent out from another compromised one. It is difficult for WIDS to 
distinguish the temporary system malfunction from the real intrusion, and this thus could 
lead to high false responses.   
 Redundant Alerts: WIDS systems may flag a large volume of alarms and thus 
overwhelm the complementary prevention part or annoy the system administrator. A 
great part of these alerts are redundant and can be neglected, and the whole volume of 
alerts can be minimized through correlation analysis of intrusion alerts as stated in 
[PiMa08]. Also, Debar and Wespi [DeWe01] described an aggregation and correlation 
algorithm for the intrusion detection alerts that can be used in design and implementation 
of intrusion detection console. 
 Weak Attack Recognition: one of the observed limitations of WIDSs is the inability to 
correctly recognize the detected attacks. This consequently affects the diagnosis 
capability, which is essential for restoring the compromised systems as well as taking 
corrective and preventive actions [DeMo02]. 
 Weak Immunity: due to the openness nature of wireless networks, the WIDS entities are 
vulnerable and attractive targets for wireless attacks. There is no guarantee of secure 
communication between the WIDS entities, especially in hierarchical architecture which 
is commonly used in wireless Ad Hoc networks, where the network is divided into 
clusters with a set of WIDS-agent nodes that are controlled by an elected cluster-head as 
a console for each cluster. This gives the opportunity for attackers to listen in the 
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transmission and messages exchanged between the WIDS agents and the cluster-head 
[ZhLe00], cut off the control branches between them, and hack the cluster-heads. 
 Bandwidth (BW) Limitation: the limited bandwidth of wireless links is one of the 
serious challenges facing the WIDSs. In WIDS distributed architecture, the deployed 
WIDS agents and console communicate with each other to take the collaborative 
decision about generating global alarms for the detected malicious activities. The 
communication between the WIDS agents and console must be restricted and respects 
the network bandwidth to avoid the network bandwidth congestion to give the main 
stations the ability to communicate without nuisance. 
 Conclusion 2.4.
This chapter provided a survey of wireless network security and introduced a security 
conceptual model that clarifies and simplifies the relationships between the main security 
concepts; vulnerabilities, threats, threat sources, risks, system infection, and security 
countermeasures. We discussed and analyzed the links between these security concepts and we 
demonstrated the crucial role of the security countermeasures in the network security. We 
discussed the vulnerabilities and breaches of the security countermeasures at the first line of 
defense (e.g., authentication, encryption algorithms, and firewalls) and demonstrated the 
usefulness of installing the wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDSs) at the second line of 
defense to detect the attacks escaped from the first one. This chapter also introduced a WIDS 
detection model that summarizes the detection process. We finally discussed the critical 
challenges facing WIDSs.  
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 Chapter 3: WIDSs Evaluation Methodology   .   III.
Wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) is considered a crucial element in wireless 
network security. Selecting a suitable WIDS for a system or network necessitates taking into 
account the evaluation of WIDSs performance. Evaluation can be defined as a systematic 
assessment of the ability of a WIDS to meet the intended and expected performance. Many 
different attributes evaluate the WIDS performance such as effectiveness, efficiency, 
interoperability, collaboration [Axel99], redundant alerts correlation, the impact on the 
monitored system resources, attack type recognition, scalability and flexibility, etc. WIDS 
effectiveness is considered the basic factor in evaluating the WIDS performance so that it 
receives great attention in this study.  
In this chapter, we present an overview of the previous work on the experimental evaluation 
of intrusion detection systems (IDSs), and the associated strengths and weaknesses. We discuss 
three main weaknesses which are summarized in the drawbacks of the followed evaluation 
methodology, attack classification, and evaluation metrics. These three aspects are considered 
the main pillars for managing a credible evaluation of IDSs/WIDSs. Thus, we are concerned 
with developing three novel aspects; comprehensive evaluation methodology, wireless attack 
taxonomy, and expressive evaluation metrics. We commence, in this chapter, with the novel 
comprehensive methodology for evaluating WIDSs performance. Our proposed methodology 
covers all essential dimensions for a credible evaluation. Dimensions of our methodology are 
organized in a sequential and well-engineered manner, starting from the main goals of WIDSs 
evaluation reaching the intended objectives. It is worth mentioning that this methodology is 
applicable to wired and wireless intrusion detection systems (IDSs) by considering the concepts 
and characteristics of each communications medium and characteristics of the IDSs related; in 
this chapter we are concerned with WIDSs. 
 An Overview of the Existing Experimental Evaluations of IDSs 3.1.
Most existing experimental evaluations of IDSs were concerned with the wired IDSs, with 
an observed lack of evaluating the wireless IDSs (WIDSs). This section presents an overview of 
the previous work on the experimental evaluation of IDSs performance. The previous IDSs 
evaluations vary in the followed methodology, dataset used, and evaluation metrics. Some of 
them managed the evaluation tests without clearly defined methodology, some others used 
trivial or inexpressive evaluation metrics, in addition to using biased dataset. A set of well-
known evaluations of IDSs are discussed in this section, such as the University of California-
Davis evaluation [PZCB96] [PCOM97], IBM Zurich Research Division evaluation [DDWL98], 
DARPA evaluations [LFGH00] [LHFK00], and LAAS evaluation [Gade08]. 
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 University of California-Davis Evaluation 3.1.1.
The first introduced evaluation of IDSs, to our knowledge, is the IDS testing managed by 
Puketza et al [PZCB96] [PCOM97]. They described a methodology and software platform for 
testing and evaluating IDSs performance. The methodology includes using simulation scripts for 
both normal (as a background) and intrusive activities to evaluate the detection ability of the 
IDS and the absence degree of the false alarms. Also, they evaluated the IDS performance under 
heavy load. They tested IDSs under automatically launched attacks using interactive telnet, FTP, 
and rlogin sessions. They evaluated Network Security Monitor (NSM) [HDLM90] which is the 
early developed network intrusion detection system. The NSM evaluation results show its 
deficiency in intrusion detection, especially under high CPU loads. Briefly, the test procedures 
in this methodology were crafted to evaluate three performance attributes: intrusion 
identification, resource usage and stress testing. There is no clearly defined evaluation metrics 
used in this work, besides a lack of managing unbiased dataset.  
 IBM Zurich Evaluation 3.1.2.
Another experimental evaluation of IDSs was carried out by IBM Zurich research Division 
[DDWL98]. The testbed consists of several client machines and server machines under the 
control of a single workstation used as a workbench controller. The attacks were obtained from 
a vulnerability database maintained internally by IBM; several attacks on FTP. In this 
experimental evaluation, four host-based IDSs (HIDSs) were compared, but unfortunately the 
report detailed neither which metrics were used nor which results were obtained. 
 DARPA Evaluations 3.1.3.
The most well-known evaluations of IDSs are DARPA98 [LFGH00], and DARPA99 
[LHFK00] evaluations. The implemented testbed contained various traffic types similar to what 
may be generated by hundreds of users on thousands of hosts. Seven weeks of training data, 
containing background traffic and labeled attacks, plus two weeks of unlabeled test data were 
recorded; many types of attacks embedded in a large amount of normal background traffic. The 
evaluation results were presented by Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. ROC is 
used to analyze the trade-off between the false alarms rate and detection rate. The drawbacks of 
using ROC curve in evaluating the intrusion detection systems are discussed in detail in chapter 
5; where a set of existing evaluation metrics of IDSs performance are discussed there. DARPA 
evaluated the IDSs against a set of attacks classified under four categories; probe, denial of 
service (DoS), remote-to-local (R2L), and user to root (U2R) attacks. This classification of 
attacks does not help in credible and unbiased evaluation, where it does not cover all dimensions 
of attacks that ensure a holistic classification. More details of the critiques of DARPA 
evaluations are available in [Mchu00].  
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 LAAS Evaluation 3.1.4.
Gad El Rab [Gade08] evaluated two IDSs, Snort and Bro, under sponsorship of LASS-
CNRS. Methodology of this evaluation missed some vital tasks for evaluating the IDSs, such as 
the evaluation challenges. The methodology seems at first glance as an engineered 
methodology, but the organization and sequence of some methodology dimensions violate the 
logical ordering. He depended, in evaluating the IDSs, on two trivial metrics, detection ratio 
(DR) and the detection ratio per attack type (DRPAT). These separated metrics are neither 
expressive nor meaningful in evaluating the IDSs effectiveness that relies on using a unified 
metric for measuring the detection ability and the absence degree of false alarms, with taking 
into account the hostility of the environment (i.e., it is measured by the probability of intrusions 
in the environment). The results show that Snort (with the out of box configuration) detects one 
attack out of the 19 test cases, but Bro has correctly detected more than half of the attacks 
included in the dataset.  
 Critiques of the Existing Work 3.2.
There are some critiques associated with most of the previous evaluations, and they may 
affect the evaluation credibility. As a result of our research, the apparent lack of comprehensive 
evaluation methodology, holistic attack classification, and/or expressive evaluation metrics are 
the main critiques which the existing evaluations suffer from. These three aspects are matter of 
concern in this study, due to their significance as main pivots for managing unbiased evaluation.  
 Evaluation methodology 3.2.1.
It was observed that most previous evaluations didn’t follow a comprehensive methodology 
in their evaluations of IDSs. Evaluation methodology is a crucial element in IDSs/WIDSs 
evaluation, where it gives the guidelines for the evaluation process. Evaluation methodology 
must satisfy some essential requirements: 1) methodology dimensions or tasks should be 
organized in sequential and practical manner, 2) it should cover all dimensions tasks for a 
credible evaluation. We propose in this chapter a comprehensive evaluation methodology that 
respects these requirements as possible to ensure a credible evaluation of WIDSs 
 Attack Taxonomy 3.2.2.
The second critique of most previous evaluations of IDSs is the lack of using representative 
attack test cases that need a holistic taxonomy of attacks. Most previous evaluations tested the 
IDSs under a set of attacks that were not representative of the possible attacks against the 
monitored system. This consequently leads to biased evaluation of IDSs. We propose (in chapter 
4) a holistic taxonomy of wireless security attacks from the perspective of the WIDSs evaluator, 
to subsequently extract the representative attack test cases. 
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 Evaluation Metrics 3.2.3.
No doubt that the evaluation metrics dimension is the most significant aspect in the 
evaluation process owing to its great role in assessing the IDSs/WIDSs performance. 
Unfortunately, most previous evaluations depended on ordinary trivial metrics, except 
DARPA98 [LFGH00] and DARPA99 [LHFK00] evaluations which depended on ROC curve 
that seems at first glance as a valuable metric, but it has some drawbacks that are discussed in 
detail in chapter 5.  Any evaluation metric should consider some important requirements; it 
should, 1) consider all essential parameters related to the IDSs/WIDSs performance, 2) be 
meaningful, 3) be quantifiable; composed of quantitatively measurable variables, 4) be relative; 
not absolute, 5) be unified; to facilitate the evaluation. Chapter 5 presents new evaluation 
metrics EID (intrusion detection effectiveness) and RR (attack recognition rate) that respect and 
satisfy these requirements. 
 New Evaluation Methodology  3.3.
We have commenced our evaluation of WIDSs with a simple proposed evaluation 
methodology [NaAF11], but due to some evaluation challenges that we have faced during the 
experimental evaluation of WIDSs, we have modified the evaluation methodology accordingly 
to produce a new comprehensive one [NaAF12] as shown in Figure  III-1. In our developed 
methodology, we believe that the premier logical step in any evaluation process is determining 
the main goals of the evaluation. In this study, our goal is evaluating the wireless intrusion 
detection systems (WIDSs) performance in wireless networks. It is obvious that our evaluation 
goal consists of three main parts; evaluation, WIDSs performance, and wireless networks. Then, 
our methodology starts accordingly from this evaluation goal towards three main directions; 
studying the evaluation challenges, WIDSs performance attributes, and operating environment 
characterization. By analyzing the evaluation challenges, we can extract the satisfactory 
requirements and take all possible measures to ensure the credibility of the evaluation. This can 
be managed by selecting the proper evaluation techniques and tools, and designing a robust 
testbed as well. Regarding the analyzed attributes of the WIDSs performance, the evaluation 
metrics can be defined and developed. Also, depending on the defined evaluation metrics and 
what we need to measure, the helpful and suitable techniques and tools will be selected. As a 
complement, the operating environment (i.e., wireless networks in this study) should be 
characterized, where it is considered the base for the deployment and configuration of the 
system under test (WIDS). Regarding the characteristics of operating environment and WIDS 
system, the evaluation dataset or workload can be characterized, and then the suitable generation 
tools can be selected. Basically, evaluation dataset consists of two main parts; normal traffic (as 
a background) and malicious traffic. Then, the testbed can be designed and configured on the 
basis of the characteristics of the operating environment and WIDS, and the selected evaluation 
techniques and tools, taking into account the avoidance of the evaluation limitations. Now, the 
evaluator can manage the evaluation tests using the evaluation tools and techniques, considering 
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the dataset characterization. Finally, using the defined evaluation metrics, the results can be 
interpreted and the WIDS is evaluated. In the following sections, we will discuss each 
dimension in our methodology in more details. 
 Evaluation Goals 3.3.1.
Evaluation goals, in general, interpret the evaluator’s objectives such as evaluating one or 
more of the WIDS performance attributes in a specific operating environment. The evaluator 
should be aware of the main aspects of his goal and the associated limitations to be able to 
determine the main dimensions and related subsequent ones. 
 Evaluation Challenges 3.3.2.
There are many critical challenges and limitations of evaluating WIDSs in wireless 
networks. We summarize these challenges as follows. 
 Openness of Wireless Environment 3.3.2.1.
One of the great problems in WIDSs evaluation is the openness of wireless environment 
which is rich in uncontrolled RF (Radio Frequency) traffic. Due to the continuous broadcasting 
of RF traffic from the adjacent wireless nodes in the range of the evaluation testbed, it is 
Figure III-1: Evaluation Methodology. 
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difficult to accurately measure neither the WIDSs detection rate, nor false positive rate, nor BW 
(Bandwidth) utilization. Basically, in the evaluation domain, measuring the false positive rate is 
based on observing and calculating the WIDSs response (i.e., whether it generates an alarm or 
not) for the generated and controlled benign traffic. No doubt that this generated traffic will be 
aggregated with the already existing RF traffic emitted from other adjacent wireless nodes at the 
receiving end of the WIDS. This leads to inaccurate measures of the false positives, and in the 
same way the detection rate (i.e., which is based on testing the WIDS response for the generated 
malicious traffic) and BW utilization. Another important challenge that must be taken into 
account is that some experimental evaluation tasks test the WIDSs under certain type of attacks 
that can overwhelm all the Wi-Fi devices in the range, such as “deauthentication/disassociation 
(Amok mode)” attack (chapter 4, section 4.5.8). When we launched this type of attacks for the 
first time in open space, we found that all the Wi-Fi devices in the range either the stations 
which participate in the test or the other ones in the vicinity are disconnected.  
The two main solutions to overcome the above mentioned limitations are managing the test 
and measurements either through RF isolated workspace or through virtually created 
environment using VM (virtual machines) software. To our knowledge, until now there is no 
VM software supports virtual creation of wireless environments. Then, the remaining solution is 
the former one that is manifested in managing the test and measurements through RF isolated 
enclosure or chamber such as “RF anechoic chamber” [WSPH08] that isolates and protects the 
testbed and measurements from the exterior uncontrolled RF traffic. For our experimental 
evaluation of WIDSs, since we have not in our laboratory RF shielded workspace such as RF 
anechoic chamber, we have constructed RF isolated testbed by building RF shielded enclosure 
to keep the access point and Wi-Fi adapters (i.e. connected to the stations which participate in 
the test) isolated from any exterior uncontrolled RF traffic; it will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 6. 
As a third solution that seems at first glance as a good solution, but in fact it has some 
limitations. The solution is changing the communications channels between the nodes of interest 
and selecting a specific one to operate on it. Unfortunately, this option is not supported by all 
WIDSs. This option is usually supported by WIDSs that include network traffic analyzer; this is 
available on some advanced WIDSs which most of them are commercial. This option of 
managing the test on a specific unique channel does not guarantee the absence of attacks in the 
range of the testbed, where the attacker can easily scan and sniff the communications in the 
testbed, and then affects the measurements by annoying attacks or even broadcasting normal 
traffic on the tuned test channel. This option seems useful for collecting the dataset (specially 
the normal background dataset) from the stations of interest, to replay it again in the testbed 
under the evaluator control, but the collected data must be reviewed and sanitized from any 
unwanted data. For example, AirMagnet, which is a commercial WIDS, gives the option of 
selecting a specific channel to filter and isolate the particular packets of interest. 
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 Biased Testbed 3.3.2.2.
The second critical challenge that the evaluator faces in WIDSs evaluation is the difficulty 
of benchmarking different WIDSs in a completely common testbed. The prominent reasons for 
that are the restricted compatibility of the WIDS with certain determined types of wireless 
network interface cards (WNICs) (i.e., usually commercial issue) and the supporting operating 
systems (e.g., Linux, Windows, or Mac). It might be difficult to find a WIDS that is compatible 
with multiple operating systems or different WNICs. This biasing in the evaluation testbed 
decreases the fairness of the benchmarking and evaluation. 
 WIDS Performance Attributes 3.3.3.
This section presents the WIDSs performance attributes and the associated challenges. Some 
of the IDS performance attributes were stated in [Axel99], but the author didn’t consider all the 
related attributes. In this section, we consider all related attributes that can be used for a 
comprehensive evaluation of the WIDSs performance. The WIDS performance attributes 
include the WIDS effectiveness, efficiency, interoperability, collaboration [Axel99], redundant 
alerts correlation, the impact on the monitored system resources, attack type recognition, 
scalability and flexibility, etc. The following subsections summarize these attributes. 
 Effectiveness 3.3.3.1.
The WIDS effectiveness is considered the main focal attribute in evaluating the WIDSs 
performance. Effectiveness reflects the ability of an IDS/WIDS to detect the intrusive activities 
in the monitored system, and the degree of keeping the benign activities pass without any raised 
alarms (i.e., the absence degree of the false alarms). The main challenge associated with the 
effectiveness attribute is the false responses problem which refers to the unexpected response 
from the IDS. There are two main types of false responses as discussed in chapter 2; false 
alarms (also known as false positives) which refer to the generated alarm when the IDS 
classifies a benign activity as an intrusion, and false negatives which refer to the failure of IDS 
to detect the actual intrusive action. False responses are considered the great challenge that the 
wired and wireless IDSs suffer from. 
 Efficiency 3.3.3.2.
WIDS efficiency includes many parameters related to the WIDS operation such as real-time 
detection, computing resources, biasing power resources, operation decay, etc. For the real-time 
detection, the WIDSs detect the intrusive activities in real-time (or near real-time), or process 
audit data with some delay and in turn postpone the detection (non-real-time detection). For the 
computing and biasing power resources, to avoid confusion, we should first distinguish between 
the types of resources in the context of WIDSs evaluation. In some cases the WIDS entities 
depend, in their operation, on the monitored system resources, but in other ones they are 
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standalone entities where they depend on their own resources. Also, operation decay is one of 
the practically observed weaknesses in the WIDS operation in the presence of heavy processing 
load. Hsiu et al [HKKJ05] proposed a scenario-based search algorithm to improve the 
IDS/WIDS efficiency by minimizing the number of rules selected by a rule selector module, to 
test them through a detection engine module. A part of operation decay might depend on the 
computing resources. The efficiency attribute can be fairly evaluated for the standalone WIDS 
system (as a hardware), where it depends on its own resources, but for the other case where the 
WIDS software is installed and depends on the monitored system resources, it is unfair to 
evaluate the WIDS efficiency, where the measurements will depend heavily on the monitored 
system capabilities, memory, loaded programs, etc. 
 Interoperability  3.3.3.3.
The WIDS interoperability measures the ability of a WIDS to interoperate with other ones. 
Unfortunately, different WIDSs rarely interoperate with each other. Thus, it is difficult to 
consolidate different WIDSs to work together for monitoring the same system. This problem is 
clearly observed in the commercial WIDSs. If an organization uses and distributes through its 
network a certain type of WIDSs, and after a period of time it wants to enhance the system 
security by adding another different type of WIDSs, it may face a problem of un-interoperability 
between the different WIDSs. Then, the organization may be compelled to replace the whole old 
WIDS system by a new one. 
 Collaboration 3.3.3.4.
No doubt that the additional effectiveness can be achieved when two or more of the security 
countermeasures work together in a synergy manner. WIDS collaboration measures the ability 
of a WIDS to collaborate with other security countermeasures to achieve the intended level of 
effectiveness. The combination of the security countermeasures should ensure providing at least 
the same level of security when each countermeasures applied singly would provide, and it does 
not lower the overall security of the monitored system [Axel99]. 
 Redundant Alerts Correlation 3.3.3.5.
Redundant alerts limitation is one of the critical challenges that the IDSs/WIDSs suffer from 
as mentioned in chapter 2. Redundant alerts correlation refers to the ability of a WIDS to 
correlate the redundant alerts that do not indicate significant events in intrusion detection 
process. Example of the redundant alerts, the numerous generated alerts from Kismet WIDS 
[Kism13a] (i.e., observed in our experimental evaluation) which indicate suspicious traffic, even 
though a great part of this traffic is benign traffic and has the same properties. Many of these 
alerts indicate repeated traffic from the same source MAC addresses.   
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 The Impact on the Monitored System Resources  3.3.3.6.
WIDS should not cause a load on the monitored system. The impact of WIDS on the 
monitored system is reflected in the system resources utilization; e.g., processor, memory, and 
BW utilization.  For wireless devices with limited biasing power such as wireless sensor nodes 
in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), it is important to take into account the impact of WIDSs on 
the power consumption of the sensor nodes. It is also important to consider the network BW 
utilization that affected by the exchanged traffic between the WIDS entities in the distributed 
and hierarchical WIDSs architectures. 
 Attack Type Recognition 3.3.3.7.
For IDSs/WIDSs, it is not enough to only notify of the intrusion detection, but also the 
intrusion type must be recognized. The criterion of interest here is evaluating the ability of the 
IDS/WIDs to recognize the type of the detected intrusion. This ability can be clearly observed 
with the signature-based IDSs than the anomaly-based IDSs, where the signature-based IDS 
inspects the system activities on the basis of detecting any evidence of attacks according to a 
predefined and established model of specific known attacks signatures, but the anomaly-based 
IDS inspects the system activities on the basis of detecting any deviations from a pre-established 
model of the normal and expected behaviour through the system. The main limitation associated 
with the signature-based IDSs is the difficulty of detecting the novel attacks or variants of the 
existing defined attacks. 
 Scalability and Flexibility 3.3.3.8.
WIDS should be scalable and flexible to accommodate expansion of the networks scale. 
Expansion can be achieved via clustering, multi-hop delivery, localization of computation, and 
data processing. Also, the WIDS should be adaptive to network topologies and configuration 
changes. 
 Evaluation Metrics  3.3.4.
One of the pivotal tasks in our methodology is defining the evaluation metrics that translate 
the criteria of evaluating the WIDSs performance into mathematical expressions to facilitate the 
results interpretation and conclusion. The main parameters that measure the ratio between the 
IDS’s input and output events are sometimes used as traditional metrics for evaluating the IDSs 
performance such as true positive rate (TPR) (also known as detection rate DR) which is the 
proportion of the malicious activities that are flagged as intrusive by generated alarms, false 
positive rate (FPR) which is the proportion of the benign activities that are flagged as intrusive 
with raised alarms, false negative rate (FNR=1-TPR) which is the proportion of the malicious 
activities that are not flagged as intrusive, and true negative rate (TNR=1-FPR) which is the 
proportion of the benign activities which pass without any raised alarms. The main drawback 
Performance Analysis of WIDSs  Khalid Nasr 
 
62 
 
lies in the inexpressive outcome of using these metrics individually for evaluating any attribute 
of IDSs/WIDSs performance. For example, the effectiveness evaluation is dispersed among 
these parameters, but it is preferred mathematically to use a unified metric that collects all the 
parameters related to the intrusion detection effectiveness in a unified expressive formula or 
equation.    
In addition to these trivial metrics, there are other valuable metrics proposed for evaluating 
the IDSs effectiveness such as Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve which was used 
by DARPA evaluations [LFGH00] [LHFK00], Bayesian Detection Rate (P(I|A)) [Axel99], 
Cumulative Cost [SFLP00], Expected Cost [GaUl01], Intrusion Detection Capability (CID) 
[GFDL06], and Intrusion Detection Operating Characteristic (IDOC) [CaBS06]. The benefits 
and drawbacks of these metrics will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, and also a novel 
evaluation metrics EID (intrusion detection effectiveness) and RR (attack recognition rate) will be 
introduced.   
 Operating Environment Characterization 3.3.5.
According to the evaluation goals, the wireless operating environment can be characterized 
on the basis of the network type, mode, and architecture.  
 Network Type 3.3.5.1.
Network type differentiates between military, commercial, academic networks, etc. Each of 
these networks has different security policies that determine the security level required and help 
in determining the accepted level of false alarms, thus adjusting the WIDS configuration file 
accordingly. Also, knowing the network type helps in determining the hostility of the operating 
environment.  
 Network Mode 3.3.5.2.
Network mode refers to the communications approach among the wireless stations, and the 
protocols that organize that communications. There are two main modes in wireless networks; 
wireless infrastructure mode and wireless Ad Hoc mode. It is worth mentioning that the 
deployment and configuration of the WIDS systems depend significantly on the wireless 
network mode.  
 Infrastructure Network A)
In wireless infrastructure network, the wireless nodes associate themselves with a wireless 
access point (AP) to get the network services and/or communicate with each other. The AP is 
usually connected to a wired network and provides a communication link between the associated 
wireless nodes and the wired network services (usually Internet). Also, AP operates as a radio 
relay to forward the information between the wireless nodes that are too distant to communicate 
directly with each other. 
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Based on the wireless infrastructure mode, we can differentiate between two main 
architectures; standalone and distributed system modes.  
1) Standalone Mode 
Standalone infrastructure network is mainly configured around a central access point (AP). 
The basic architecture of this mode is called infrastructure basic service set (BSS). However, a 
BSS covers a small limited area around the AP that serves the adjacent nodes in the range. It is 
worth noting that there is no restriction on the distance between the mobile nodes in the BSS 
coverage area.  
2)  Distributed System Mode 
The coverage area of wireless infrastructure network can be extended by joining BSSs to the 
backbone network to form extended service set (ESS) that serves the distributed system mode.  
In the distributed system mode, multiple APs are interconnected with each other by wired or 
wireless backbone system. This enables the wireless nodes to roam between the APs, thus 
providing greater range and mobility. In this mode, if a mobile wireless node moves out the 
coverage area of an AP, but it keeps its existence in the ESS range, it will re-associate with the 
next AP in the ESS range. 
 Ad Hoc Network B)
Wireless Ad Hoc network is a self-organized network which is a collection of autonomous 
wireless nodes that can be deployed and communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop 
radio network and maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. In Ad Hoc networks, the 
wireless nodes can interact as routers to forward packets without relying on any fixed 
infrastructure support such as access points, routers, or base stations.  
Ad Hoc networks are also called independent BSS (IBSS), where the nodes communicate 
directly with each other through their direct communication range. Basically, Ad Hoc networks 
generate a random BSSID with the Universal/Local bit set to 1 to prevent conflicts with 
officially assigned MAC addresses.    
 Network Architecture 3.3.5.3.
Wireless networks can be configured as either flat or multi-layered network infrastructure. In 
flat network infrastructure, all nodes are considered homogeneously equal and may participate 
in routing functions, while in multi-layered networks all nodes are not considered equal 
[BrKo03] and they are partitioned in clusters with an elected cluster head for each cluster. The 
communication between the clusters is managed through the cluster heads. 
 WIDS Characterization 3.3.6.
The deployment and configuration of WIDS system depend on the characteristics of the 
operating environment. For example, in infrastructure wireless networks, WIDS systems are 
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often deployed wherever the access points (APs) located, where the APs are the attractive 
targets of attacks. On the contrary, in Ad Hoc networks each wireless node may be a target of 
attacks, thus they necessitates specific deployment of WIDSs agents. Then, the standalone 
architecture of WIDS may be appropriate for infrastructure networks, but WIDS distributed or 
hierarchical architectures are required for Ad Hoc networks.  
Characteristics of wireless IDSs (WIDSs) do not deviate much more from the wired IDSs; 
wireless communications characteristics and wireless intrusions features are taken into account 
for WIDSs. There are a number of proposed classifications of wired and wireless IDS systems 
[DeDW99] [Sobh06], but they did not cover all characteristics related to WIDS systems. Some 
of the previous classifications focused only on some common characteristics such as detection 
techniques and IDS response. Some others considered also the detection time and granularity of 
data-processing. In addition to all these characteristics, it is important to take into account two 
important dimensions related to the WIDS architecture and WIDS administration that 
significantly serve the monitoring and attack detection in the wireless networks.  
Figure  III-2 summarizes the holistic taxonomy of WIDSs. One of the basic differences 
between IDSs and WIDSs classifications is the information source. In IDSs, the source of input 
information can be: 1) audit trails and system logs on a particular host, or 2) network traffic. On 
the other hand, in pure WIDS, the information source is the wireless traffic, and this can be 
achieved through RF (Radio Frequency) monitor mode (RFMON). 
 Detection Techniques 3.3.6.1.
Detection techniques describe the detection approaches for distinguishing the suspicious 
traffic from the benign traffic. There are two main mechanisms for identifying the intrusions; 
signature-based and anomaly-based detection techniques. In the recent past there has been a 
growing interest in developing the third advanced technique which is called the specification-
based detection technique [SGFS02] [TSBK05] [GiSC06].  
A) Signature-based Detection Technique  
Signature-based WIDS analyzes the network traffic on the basis of detecting any evidence of 
attacks with regard to a predefined and established model of specific attack signatures. This 
technique is used for identifying instances of known attacks; the only attack signatures that are 
registered in the databases are identified. The challenges facing the signature-based WIDSs are 
the difficulty of gathering information about all current attacks as well as the potential failure to 
characterize the new attacks or the variations in the existing ones. Thus, signature-based WIDSs 
may lack the ability to detect the newly invented or unknown intrusions. It is also susceptible to 
evasion techniques. Then, it is more prone to high rate of false negatives. 
B) Anomaly-based Detection Technique 
Anomaly-based WIDS analyzes the network traffic and system activities on the basis of 
identifying any deviation from a predefined model of the normal and expected activities through 
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the system. The reference model can be characterized by taking statistical samples of the system 
over a period of normal activities. This technique does not require a prior knowledge of attacks, 
where it is based on behavior identification; not specific patterns of traffic. Then, it could be 
able to detect the new attacks that may not be detected by the signature-based technique.  
Disadvantages of this technique are manifested in lack of the ability to detect the attacks that 
do not introduce significant anomaly behavior, false detection of non-attack events that may 
cause a momentary anomaly in the system, and lack of recognizing the type of the detected 
attacks.  Anomaly-based WIDSs are more prone to high rate of false positives due to the ever-
changing nature of wireless networks and applications. The analytical behaviour of this 
approach may impose a heavy processing load on the system. 
C) Specification-based Detection Technique 
Specification-based techniques identify the malicious activities on the basis of detecting the 
deviation from a reference model that is created by combining between the trained normal 
behaviour of the system with the constraints imposed by the security policy of the system. This 
combination could enhance the attack detection capability to achieve the goals of high detection 
 
 
 
Figure III-2: WIDSs Classification. 
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rate and low false alarms rate. Some researchers refer to the specification-based detection 
approach as an enhanced anomaly-based detection approach [GiSC06]. 
 Time of detection 3.3.6.2.
Based on the time of detection, there are two main groups. Those that attempt to detect 
intrusions in real-time or near real-time, and those that process audit data with some delay, 
which in turn postpones the detection (non-real-time detection). 
 Granularity of data-processing 3.3.6.3.
It differentiates between WIDS systems that process data continuously and those that 
process data in batches at regular intervals. 
Continuous: The WIDS collects information about the actions taken on the environment 
immediately after they happened, and analyzes it continuously. 
Periodic: The WIDS periodically takes and analyzes a snapshot of the traffic. 
This dimension is linked with the time of detection dimension, but they do not overlap, 
where the system could process the data continuously with considerable delay or process it in 
patches in real-time. 
 Architecture 3.3.6.4.
Architecture refers to the collaboration degree of WIDS agents on the monitored system. 
Based on the WIDS architecture, we differentiate between autonomous, distributed, and 
hierarchical WIDSs. 
A) Standalone WIDS 
In Standalone WIDS architecture, each WIDS node or agent operates independently and is 
responsible for detecting attacks on its own accord; there is no interaction between the network 
nodes. This architecture is more proper for the flat networks than the multi-layered networks. 
B) Distributed WIDS 
Distributed WIDS architecture comprises a number of network nodes which are responsible 
for collecting data and detecting signs of intrusions locally and independently, and then 
investigate them collaboratively in a broader range in order to carry out global decisions. 
Distributed WIDS is the suitable architecture for the decentralized nature of Ad Hoc wireless 
networks. Figure  III-3 shows the distributed WIDS architecture for wireless Ad Hoc Network. 
The different WIDSs nodes exchange two types of data; security data and intrusion alerts. The 
nodes are distributed, but they share the information locally and detect the intrusions 
collaboratively. This architecture is applicable to flat networks and multi-layered networks as 
well. 
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C) Hierarchical WIDS 
In this architecture, the network is divided into clusters with the formation of cluster-head 
nodes. These head-nodes are responsible for routing within the cluster, collect alert messages 
from local agents or nodes within the cluster, and accept all the accusation messages from the 
other cluster members indicating malicious activities. The cluster-head nodes may also detect 
the attacks against the other cluster-head nodes of the network as they constitute the backbone of 
the routing infrastructure. The cluster-head nodes collaborate to detect the intrusions in 
distribution manner (Figure  III-4, a)) or pass the collected data to a centralized base-station 
which manages the whole network (Figure  III-4, b)). There are several techniques to select the 
cluster head, such as voting [PXYN08] and spontaneous watchdog [RoJL06] techniques. This 
architecture is more suitable for multi-layered network. 
 Management 3.3.6.5.
WIDS system can manage the detection and response processes either in centralized or 
decentralized manner depending on the network characteristics. 
Centralized WIDS: In a centralized WIDS, a combination of individual sensors or agents 
sniff the local traffic and then pass the collected data to a centralized management console, 
where the collected data is processed and analyzed for identifying the intrusions. 
Decentralized WIDS: It consists of one or more devices that can perform the functions of 
both the IDS agents and the centralized management console. 
 Response 3.3.6.6.
Reponses of WIDS to the detected intrusions can be classified as passive or reactive. Passive 
systems notify the proper authority; and they do not try to hinder or mitigate the effects of 
attacks. On the other hand, the reactive WIDSs react to stop the attack (e.g., terminate the attack 
session); this function is more related to the wireless intrusion prevention systems (WIPSs).  
 
Figure III-3: Distributed WIDS Architecture. 
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 Dataset Characterization and Generation 3.3.7.
One of the focal points in our methodology is characterizing the evaluation dataset that 
includes two main parts of traffic; normal benign traffic (as background) and malicious traffic. 
The background traffic, which comprises normal and benign activities in the absence of attacks, 
can be generated as real traffic or synthetic traffic. The synthetic traffic can be generated 
artificially using traffic generation tools such as MGEN [Mgen13] and Rude/Crude [Rude13]. 
The main advantage of generating synthetic traffic is that it doesn’t include secret information, 
but the main drawback is that it doesn’t represent the real operation in the network. As for the 
real traffic, its generation can be managed by collecting and capturing the operational traffic 
during the normal operation of the network, and then replaying or injecting it into the testbed. 
Airodump-ng [Airo13] is an example of the capturing tools of the raw 802.11 traffic that can be 
replayed by aireplay-ng [Aire13] tool. Unfortunately, the collected real traffic may contain 
credential and confidential data besides some unwanted malicious traffic. This necessitates 
hence sanitizing the collected dataset before using it.  
 
 
Figure III-4: Hierarchical WIDS Architecture. 
a) 
b) 
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The second part of the evaluation dataset is the malicious traffic which is composed of 
intrusive activities. No doubt that the credibility of the WIDS evaluation test results depends 
significantly on comprehensive characterization of the malicious traffic. It is thus necessary to 
develop an attack classification that groups the common attack characteristics under expressive 
categories. This facilitates generating and extracting the representative attack test cases by 
combining the terminal classes of the classification. Therefore, we have developed a holistic 
taxonomy of wireless security attacks that classifies the attacks from the perspective of the 
WIDS evaluator as shown in chapter 4. The most well-known tools for generating the malicious 
traffic are Metasploit [Meta13a], CANVAS [Canv13], aircrack-ng suite [Airc13], and other 
Linux command line tools. 
 Evaluation Techniques and Tools 3.3.8.
The selection of the proper techniques depends on the available tools, resources and the 
desired level of accuracy. Basically, there are three main techniques for the system evaluation; 
analytical modeling, simulation, and experimental measuring [Jain91]. 
Analytical modeling: It refers to the analytical analysis of the system under evaluation, 
mainly by mathematically abstracting the features of the system as a set of parameters or 
parameterized functions. 
Simulation: It is the imitative representation of the operation of a system or process by 
means of the operation of another synthetic tool; software program or simulating device. 
Experimental measuring: It refers to the practical measuring of the system features. This 
can be managed through an actual real system or using a prototype. 
 Testbed Design and Test Management 3.3.9.
We reach now the penultimate task (i.e., the testbed level) that collects all aforementioned 
conditions and requirements to manage unbiased tests of WIDSs. These tasks of testbed design 
and test management are realized practically in chapter 6, with the experimental evaluation of 
WIDSs (Kismet & AirSnare).               
 Conclusion 3.4.
Due to the complexity of the evaluation process of WIDSs, developing a reliable evaluation 
methodology is a pressing necessity and it is considered the first logical step in the way of the 
evaluation process. Thus, this chapter introduced a comprehensive evaluation methodology that 
considered all essential dimensions for managing a credible evaluation of WIDSs. Since the 
WIDSs evaluation is not a trivial task, our developed methodology consists of sequential tasks 
that facilitate and clarify the evaluation procedures. The developed methodology considered 
some important dimensions that were ignored in the previous evaluations of IDSs such as the 
evaluation challenges. 
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 Chapter 4: WIDSs Evaluation Centric IV.
Taxonomy of Wireless Security Attacks 
Comprehensive and unbiased evaluation of WIDSs necessitates logically taking into account 
all possible attacks. While this is operationally impossible, it is necessary to develop an attack 
classification that groups the common attack characteristics under expressive categories. This 
facilitates generating and extracting the valid and representative attack test cases by combining 
the terminal classes of the classification. In this chapter, we study a set of previous 
classifications of attacks (wired and wireless), where we differentiate between them on the basis 
of the classification orientation, whether it is evaluation-centric or defense-centric classification. 
Regarding our concern in this thesis, we study and classify holistically the wireless attacks from 
the perspective of the WIDS evaluator, and how the possible and valid representative attack test 
cases can be extracted accordingly. Our proposed taxonomy of wireless attacks considers all 
essential dimensions for holistic classification of wireless attacks. The term “taxonomy” can be 
defined as a classification system that ensures a systematic arrangement into groups or 
categories according to established criteria [Merr03]. Besides considering the aspect of 
extracting the representative attack test cases that was ignored in most of the previous 
evaluations of intrusion detection systems (IDSs), we also consider another important aspect 
which is the probability of occurrence of each extracted test case. To the best of our knowledge, 
this aspect of the test cases probability was not considered before in the concept of IDSs 
evaluations.  
 Orientation of Security Attack Classifications 4.1.
In the network security domain, we believe that the classification of security attacks can be 
oriented towards one of the following two objectives: 1) security defense or 2) security 
countermeasure evaluation. 
In the first orientation, the attacks are classified from the perspective of the security 
defender. The considered taxonomy is created by extracting the attack signs or signatures from 
all possible attacks and assembling the common attack signs under representative dimensions. 
These dimensions guide to the techniques and mechanisms that can be followed by the security 
defender to prevent the attacks. This taxonomy can be called defense-centric taxonomy.   
In the second orientation, the attacks are classified from the perspective of the security 
countermeasure evaluator. The dimensions of this taxonomy guide to the attack generation 
process and help in extracting the representative attack test cases. In this taxonomy, the 
evaluator generally describes the main phases of attack; preparation phase, exploiting phase and 
infecting phase. This taxonomy can be called evaluation-centric taxonomy.  
Several considerable attempts of attack classification were developed, but much more of 
them were concerned with wired network attacks [Loug01][HaHu05][GaAD07]. Also, some 
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taxonomies focused on the security flaws [LBMC94], others focused on the exploited 
vulnerabilities, and others just listed the terms and types of attacks [Cohe97][Cohe95][IcSV95]. 
There is a lack of developing holistic taxonomy of wireless security attacks that can cover all 
essential dimensions for attack classification, especially from the perspective of the security 
countermeasure evaluation. We thus develop, regarding our concern with evaluating the wireless 
intrusion detection systems (WIDSs), a WIDS evaluation-centric taxonomy of wireless security 
attacks.   
 An overview of the Existing Security Attack Classifications  4.2.
This section presents some of the previous work on the attack classification. We study and 
categorize these taxonomies from the perspective of the defense-centric and evaluation-centric 
as mentioned in the previous section. It is worth mentioning that many of the proposed 
taxonomies, that have been originally developed to help the security defender, followed the 
direction of the security countermeasure evaluation. 
 Defense-Centric Taxonomy 4.2.1.
Kumar [Kuma95] proposed an attack taxonomy that is considered a defense-centric one. 
This classification was based on inspecting the attack signatures, to help ultimately in designing 
and building a signature-based IDS. The author classified the attack signatures under the 
following dimensions: existence, sequence, regular expression patterns, and other patterns that 
contain all other intrusion signatures that cannot be represented directly in one of the earlier 
categories. Existence patterns look for the evidence that may have been left behind by an 
intruder. For sequence patterns, some attacks manifest themselves as a sequence of events. 
Regular expression patterns include events that often specify several activities to be done 
jointly. 
Killourhy et al. [KiMT04] classified the attacks from the perspective of the anomaly-based 
IDS defender. This classification is based on observing the anomalies of attack manifestation: 
foreign symbol, minimal foreign sequence, dormant sequence, and non-anomalous sequence. In 
foreign symbol, the attack manifestation contains a system call which never appears in the 
normal record. For minimal foreign sequence, the attack manifestation contains a system call 
sequence which never appears in the normal record, but all subsequences appear in the normal 
record. In dormant sequence, a sequence of system calls in the attack manifestation matches a 
subsequence in the normal record, but does not match the full sequence. In non-anomalous 
sequence, the attack manifestation entirely matches the normal sequence without any anomaly. 
In the same way, Barse and Jonsson [BaJo04] were concerned with extracting the attack 
manifestations for intrusion detection.  
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 Evaluation-Centric Taxonomy 4.2.2.
In this section, we study the attack taxonomies that followed one step or more towards the 
evaluation-centric taxonomy. 
Most of the popular taxonomies in this direction concerned with two main dimensions: 
passive and active attacks [Bidg06][Stal10]. These two broad dimensions or classes are then 
subdivided into terminal subclasses. Passive attacks are subdivided into traffic analysis and 
eavesdropping. Active attacks are subdivided into masquerading, relay, message modification, 
and denial of service. This type of classification is not much more useful, as a complete 
taxonomy, for the security countermeasure evaluation or designing appropriate security 
countermeasures. This taxonomy can be used as an assistant object in the preparation phase of 
the evaluation-centric taxonomy, but to be efficient it needs more details about the attack 
features, attack techniques, exploited vulnerabilities, and attack objectives. 
The taxonomies presented by Wood and Stankovic [WoSt04] and Howard [Howa97] 
followed close methodologies and provided nearly similar categorizations. Due to space 
limitations, we couldn't list all dimensions of these taxonomies. These taxonomies can be 
adapted to become a complete evaluation-centric taxonomy; by deleting some unuseful 
redundant dimensions and adapting others according to the evaluator’s point of view. 
Gad El Rab et al. [GaAD07] proposed an attack taxonomy to use it in evaluating the wired 
IDSs. This taxonomy has five dimensions; 1) Firing source: indicates the launching point of 
attack, 2) Privilege escalation: refers to the elevated access gained by an attacker to the system 
resources, 3) Vulnerability: specifies the exploited network vulnerabilities, 4) Carrier: describes 
the auxiliary means by which the attack reaches the victim; either via network traffic or through 
a local action, 5) Target: refers to the attack objectives. Although this taxonomy is an interesting 
one, it does not cover all dimensions of attacks from the perspective of the IDSs evaluator.  
In the following section, we treat the shortcomings of the previous attempts of attack 
classification in the direction of the evaluation-centric, and accordingly we develop a new 
taxonomy of wireless attacks. 
 Our Proposed Taxonomy of Wireless Security Attacks 4.3.
Before defining our classification attributes, it is important first to define some important 
requirements for the satisfactory and holistic taxonomy: 
 Orientation: The orientation of attack classification must be clearly determined and 
defined; defense-centric or evaluation-centric. 
 Completeness/exhaustive: Taxonomy should consider all possible attacks and develop 
the corresponding representative categories.  
 Methodical: Taxonomy classes should be organized on the basis of a clearly defined 
methodology.  
 Mutually exclusive: Each attack should be classified into only one category. 
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 Repeatable: Taxonomy should be repeatable and ensures always the same classification 
of an attack regardless of who is classifying.  
 Unambiguous: Each category of the taxonomy should be clearly and precisely defined.  
In this section, we propose the essential dimensions for creating a holistic and satisfactory 
taxonomy of wireless attacks from the perspective of the WIDS evaluator. Basically, these 
dimensions can be extracted from the conception of the attack generation process. The logical 
sequence of this process begins by determining what does the attacker want? i.e., attack 
objectives. Then, according to the network mode and access privileges, the attack objectives can 
be achieved via exploiting the network vulnerabilities using certain attack techniques and 
mechanisms. This sequence interprets the methodology of our classification. In the following 
subsections, we will explain the importance of each dimension in our taxonomy which is 
summarized in Figure  IV-1. 
We try by our proposed taxonomy to consider the essential dimensions without overkill or 
disregard, to finally have main categories that cover the existing attacks and novel attacks in the 
future. It may seem, for some, at first glance that the wireless attacks at MAC layer do not 
necessitate a grand or holistic classification, but there are two reasons necessitate developing a 
holistic taxonomy of wireless attacks. First, due to the enormous progress in information 
technology and programing in recent years, each attack can be launched by numerous tools and 
techniques ranging from simple command lines to GUI (Graphical User Interface) tools. For 
example, WEP Cracking attacks can be managed passively by AirSnort [Airs13a] based on FMS 
attack [FlMS01] notion or actively by  aircrack-ng suite [Airc13].  Thus, we will consider not 
only the attack type, but also the attack tools and techniques as shown in Appendix A; it is clear 
from the different tools used for each attack that some of these tools follow the same attack 
process and some others deviate by one dimension or more. Second, the novel attacks appear 
overnight. The endless vulnerabilities of wireless network and security systems open the door 
for novel and unlimited potential attacks, so that we also consider in our taxonomy the potential 
attacks. For example, we consider the misfeasor as a class under the access privileges 
dimension, despite its rarity of occurrence, but it is not far to happen; the future hides many 
potential attacks. 
 Network Modes 4.3.1.
The first dimension in our taxonomy focuses on specifying the wireless network mode 
which is considered as the base of the attack test cases in wireless environments. It helps in 
determining the manifestation and launching point of attack. As mentioned in chapter 3, there 
are two main modes in wireless networks; wireless infrastructure mode and wireless Ad Hoc 
mode. Most attacks objectives depend on the network mode; for example, in wireless 
infrastructure mode the wireless access point is the most attractive target for attacks, but in 
wireless Ad Hoc mode all the nodes are equal in their susceptible to attacks. 
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 Infrastructure Mode 4.3.1.1.
In wireless infrastructure mode, the wireless nodes associate themselves with a wireless 
access point to get the network services and/or communicate with each other. Basically, the 
access point announces its presence to the wireless nodes in the range by periodically 
broadcasting beacon frames that carry a service set identifier (SSID). SSID is used to identify 
WLAN by 1-32 characters unique ID as a network name. Basically, in infrastructure networks, 
SSID may consist of one or more Basic SSIDs (BSSIDs) which present the MAC addresses of 
the access points in the range. SSID helps in the differentiation between the wireless LANs 
(WLANs) in the range. The wireless node scans SSIDs in the range, and selects the intended one 
to associate with. Sometimes the access point may resort to conceal the SSID by disabling its 
broadcasting, and consequently the wireless nodes would not be able to identify and associate 
with the access point and they instead need foreknowledge of the SSID. This mechanism is not 
Figure IV-1: WIDSs Evaluation Centric Taxonomy of Wireless Security Attacks. 
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considered as an effective security mechanism, where despite stopping the broadcast of SSID on 
the beacon frame, it may be sent out in other management frames.       
It is worth mentioning that the access point can buffer frames unicast to a specific node 
when it goes to the sleeping mode. When the node wakes up, it sends PS Poll (Power Save Poll) 
request frame to the access point to retrieve the buffered data.  An attacker could spoof the PS 
poll frame to activate the retrieval of the buffered data instead of the node, and then hinders it 
from receiving its buffered data.   
 Ad Hoc Mode 4.3.1.2.
Wireless Ad Hoc network is a decentralized network which allows the wireless nodes to 
communicate with each other without need to infrastructure organization. Each node, in a 
wireless Ad Hoc network, participates in routing by forwarding data to the other nodes 
Usually, mobile nodes in mobile Ad Hoc network (MANET) work with limited power, and 
the efficient utilization of this power is important for increasing the lifetime of the individual 
nodes as well as the overall network. The attacker can exploit this vulnerability to exhaust the 
energy of the mobile nodes. For example, an adversary may consume the biasing power of the 
sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) by sending several fake requests in order to 
cause denial of service (DoS) attacks. 
 Access Privileges 4.3.2.
Access privilege restriction is one of the important security measures for organizing the 
access rights of users, and limiting the data exposure and system resources utilization. Based on 
the access privilege, we differentiate between authorized and unauthorized access. 
 Authorized Access 4.3.2.1.
Authorized access privilege determines which level of access a particular authorized user 
should have to join the secured network data and resources. Each of them, the system user and 
administrator, has a determined access privilege to perform his assigned tasks. From the 
perspective of the authorized access violation, we can differentiate between the internal 
penetrator and misfeasor. 
 Internal Penetrator A)
Usually, the system user has a restricted access privilege where he is authorized to access a 
certain determined area of the network services and resources, but he is not authorized to access 
another specific one. Internal penetrator is the malicious user who may violate this restriction by 
performing a number of malicious activities to hack the restricted area of the network services 
and resources. For example, the malicious user who is already associated with a network via an 
access point, could be able to exploit the existing vulnerabilities to breach the access point 
security and change its configuration, steal MAC control list, discover confidential information, 
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or recruit the access point to launch attacks against the associated stations or stations in the 
range. There are many real examples [Cve09a][Cve13a] about compromising the access points 
and wireless control devices by internal penetrators. As registered in [Cve09a], the access point 
Netgear WNDAP330 which uses Atheros wireless driver, can be easily exploited by an 
authenticated user to cause denial of service attacks or execute arbitrary code via a truncated 
reserved management frame. Also, Cisco WLAN Controller (WLC) devices with software 7.0, 
such as Cisco Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIPS), are vulnerable to be exploited by 
an authenticated user to bypass wireless management settings and read or modify the device 
configuration [Cve13a]. 
 Misfeasor B)
Misfeasor refers to the malicious administrator who misuses his authorized access privilege 
to the system resources and databases. However, system administrator has a superior level of 
authorized access to the system and its data. He is able to assign the users’ access privileges, 
monitor and log the activity of users’ sessions, and know where the highest value of information 
resides. He may discover the users’ private information such as users’ profile data, bank account 
details, and confidential data.   
 Unauthorized Access 4.3.2.2.
Unauthorized access can be defined as an accidental or deliberate violation of the system 
security policy or bypassing the system security countermeasures to disclose, alter, or steal 
private accounts, messages, files, or confidential information without legal permission, 
superintendence, or authority. The attacker tries to penetrate the security system by exploiting 
the system vulnerabilities, using several compromising and hacking techniques, to achieve the 
intended malicious objectives.  
 Attack Techniques and Mechanisms 4.3.3.
Attack techniques and mechanisms clarify the tactics that can be followed to prepare and 
execute the attack. Based on the attack techniques and mechanisms, we differentiate between 
scanning techniques, spoofing techniques, attack management, attack rate organization, and 
attack collaboration. 
 Scanning Techniques 4.3.3.1.
The premier intuitive procedure in the preparation phase of wireless attacks is the scanning 
process. It helps to locate the access points, wireless stations, vulnerable services, in addition to 
discovering the secret data, passwords, and so on. Based on the scanning techniques, we 
differentiate between passive and active scanning. 
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 Passive Scanning A)
In wireless networks, the attacker can use the radio channels in the RF (radio frequency) 
monitor mode to listen in the network traffic which broadcasts over the wireless medium. One 
of the intended attack objectives of passive scanning technique is sniffing the service set 
identifier (SSID) which leads to discovering the MAC addresses of the access points and the 
associated stations to determine after that the next step in the attack. As mentioned, each access 
point announces its presence by broadcasting beacon frames that carry SSID. The attacker could 
exploit this broadcasting process to sniff the beacons and SSIDs. At a certain level of network 
security, the network administrator may disable the SSID broadcasting. In this case, the attacker 
can wait and sniff any associate request from a legitimate station that already carries the network 
SSID. Then, the attacker can take steps to scan passively and collect the MAC addresses. 
KisMAC [Kism13b] and AirTraf [Airt13] are examples of passive scanning tools. 
 Active Scanning B)
When the attacker is unable to collect the intended information using passive scanning 
technique, or if he does not wish to wait patiently for voluntary associate requests from the 
legitimate stations that carry the networks SSIDs, he resorts to use active scanning technique. In 
active scanning technique, the attacker sends out probe request frames [Ieee12] or artificially 
constructed packets that contain a spoofed MAC address to discover the network activity or 
trigger useful responses from the target. The probe response frames from the access points 
contain the SSIDs and other information similar to which in the beacon frames. The attacker 
sniffs these probe responses and extracts SSIDs, and consequently collects the MAC addresses. 
NetStumber [Nets13], Wellenreiter [Well13], and WiFiFoFum [Wifi13a] are popular tools for 
wireless active scanning.  
 Spoofing Techniques 4.3.3.2.
Using spoofing techniques, the attacker can forge his identity to masquerade as another one, 
or even creates a single or multiple illegitimate identities. The attacker may resort to use this 
technique to evade detection by security defense systems, impersonate another network device, 
bypass access control mechanisms, gain authorized access, or falsely advertise services to 
wireless clients. On the basis of the spoofing techniques, we differentiate between MAC address 
spoofing, IP address spoofing, and Frame spoofing. 
 MAC Address Spoofing A)
MAC address is a layer 2 unique identifier that is burned into network devices or network 
interface cards (NICs) during manufacturing. However, MAC address is 6-bytes long, the first 
3-bytes are assigned by IEEE and indicate which manufacturer fabricated the NIC, and the last 
3-bytes are assigned by the manufacturer to differentiate between the NICs. MAC spoofing 
refers to altering the manufacturer-assigned part. Using MAC address spoofing, the attacker 
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may be able to bypass the access control mechanisms or advertise fake services to achieve 
intended objectives.  
In wireless networks, typical access points usually predefine access permission for a set of 
machines or nodes with MAC addresses registered in an assigned address-set (MAC control 
list). The attacker may spoof a legitimate MAC address of a node that already exists in the MAC 
control list to have the ability to associate with the access point. Also, the attacker can create a 
fake access point with spoofed MAC address to deceive the wireless nodes in the range to 
associate with it, thus he may be able to capture secret information of the associated nodes or 
overwhelm the adjacent nodes by beacon flood attack. 
In certain attacks such as DoS attacks, the attacker needs a heavy number of MAC addresses 
than he could collect by sniffing. Therefore, the attacker resorts to generate random MAC 
addresses. However, the attacker generates a random MAC address by selecting an IEEE-
assigned part appended with additional 3-bytes manufacturer-assigned [Bidg06]. SMAC 
[Smac13], MAC MakeUP [Make13], and Macchnager [Macc13] are examples of MAC 
spoofing tools that alter the software based MAC addresses; not the hardware burned-in MAC 
addresses. Sheng et al. [STCK08] has discussed three methods for detecting MAC address 
spoofing; sequence-number analysis, transceiver fingerprint and signal strength analysis. 
 IP Address Spoofing B)
IP address is a layer 3 unique identifier for the host connection and packet routing in the 
network. Every IP address consists of 32-bits that are divided into two parts, one of them 
identifies the network and the other identifies the host, according to the address class and the 
subnet mask. IP addresses are usually assigned as static or dynamic addresses. Static IP address 
is the fixed permanent address that is assigned to the host on the network by the administrator or 
Internet service provider (ISP). Dynamic IP address is a temporary address assigned to the host 
each time it accesses the network. The main difference between MAC address and IP address is 
that although the MAC address is a unique identifier for the network devices, it doesn’t know 
how to route the packets through the network; which is the main function of IP address. In other 
words, direct connected transmission uses MAC addresses for frame delivery, and routed 
transmission uses IP addresses for packet delivery. 
IP spoofing refers to the creation of IP packets with a forged source IP address. Using IP 
address spoofing, the attacker may intercept the link between two communicated nodes and 
pretends alternately as an end-point to each one of them. Then, the attacker can control the 
traffic, alter or eliminate information exchanged between the two points, i.e. this type of attack 
is called man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. In the same way, the attacker can disclose 
confidential information by deceiving the victim.  
Another type of attacks that depend significantly on IP spoofing is the denial of service 
(DoS) attacks that aim to consume network resources and bandwidth. However, there are many 
scenarios of DoS attacks. One of these scenarios is flooding the victim by heavy traffic with 
spoofed IP address to conceal the attack origin. Another scenario is sending request to a set of 
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network nodes with a spoofed IP address of a targeted victim to redirect the reply to the victim 
to exhaust its resources. RafaleX [Rafa13] and SendIP [Send13] are examples of IP spoofing 
tools. 
 Frame Spoofing C)
Frame spoofing is the most popular spoofing in wireless networks, where most wireless 
attacks at MAC layer depend on it. Frame spoofing usually includes by default MAC spoofing. 
The lack of authentication for the management frames in wireless communications leads to 
numerous types of attacks, especially DoS attacks, depending on the frame spoofing technique. 
For instance, when a wireless station selects an access point to associate with, it must first 
authenticate itself to the access point before establishing further communication. A part of the 
authentication process is the deauthentication frame that can be sent by the station to the access 
point to notify it about its disconnection. Unfortunately, this frame itself is not authenticated 
using any keying material. Consequently, the attacker could spoof this deauthentication frame, 
either pretending to be the access point or the station, and directs it to the other party to break 
the connection between the station and the access point. Similarly, a part of the association 
process is the disassociation frame that may be also sent to notify the network about the station 
leaving. This disassociation frame can be also spoofed and exploited to terminate the station 
connection and cause denial of service. Also, the authentication frames can be used for 
launching authentication flood attacks that overwhelm the access point by several authentication 
requests. Much more tools can be used for these attacks, such as AirJack [Airj13], KisMAC 
[Kism13b], Void11 [Void13], etc.    
 Attack Management 4.3.3.3.
This dimension refers to the management of the attack phases. Basically, depending on the 
system immunity, exploited vulnerabilities, attack objectives, attack techniques, and attack tools, 
one or more of the attack phases (i.e., preparation, exploiting, and infecting phases) can be 
managed either manually, automatically, or semi-automatically. With the notable progress in the 
software used for wireless network analysis in the recent past, this task of attack management 
depends greatly on the attack tools rather than the other conditions.  
 Manual A)
Manual management of the attack refers to executing all phases of the attack process, from 
the preparation phase until the infecting phase, manually. The attacker scans the system 
vulnerabilities manually and exploits them to reach the intended objectives manually as well. 
This technique is rarely used in the present, especially by the skillful attackers, where a lot of 
time is spent and much more efforts are exerted to perform the intended objectives of infecting 
victims or obtaining information. Manual management of attacks can be observed clearly in 
using the Linux command line tools such as aircrack-ng suite [Airc13]; airmon-ng, airodump-
ng, aireplay-ng, aircrack-ng, etc. The attacker who uses command line tools should be more 
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technically literate and aware of using these tools to successfully manage the attacks. Recently, 
there is a trend towards implementing the aircrack-ng suite tools in GUI (Graphical User 
Interface) tools to facilities their utilization, and to be an easy task to manage automatic or even 
semi-automatic of attack.   
 Automatic B)
The automatic attack technique refers to performing all phases of attack automatically. All 
attack features such as attack type, rate, duration, and victim addresses are pre-programmed in a 
specified field for firing the attack by a keystroke. Some tools help in managing the attack 
automatically such as CommView toolset [Comm13]; just select the attack type, specify the 
attack features, and then launch the attack by a keystroke. 
It is worth mentioning that the attacker could compromise and recruit one or more of the 
stations or access points in the range to launch certain attacks. This type of attacks can be 
managed automatically and remotely; just firing the command of attack with the specified 
features.    
  Semi-automatic C)
Semi-automatic attack technique merges between both the manual and automatic techniques. 
In the semi-automatic attack, not all the attack phases are launched automatically by a simple 
unique command. There are a number of attacks that should be managed semi-automatically at 
the preparation phase and may be at the exploiting phase as well, but the infection phase is 
performed automatically. On the contrary, some other attacks can be performed automatically at 
the preparation and exploiting phases, but the infection phase should be managed manually by 
specifying the attack type, onset, and rate. Some attackers prefer to use this technique to have 
more control on the victim. During the attack, the attacker might be able to manage all the attack 
features according to the state of the victim and the intended attack objectives.  
 Attack Rate Organization 4.3.3.4.
One of the pivotal techniques that are used to reinforce the attack impact is the attack rate 
organization. Basically, the attack rate can be organized according to the analysis of the real-
time state of the targeted system and the intended attack objectives. The attack can be managed 
at steady, increasing, or intermittent rate. 
  Steady Rate A)
Using several tools, the attacker may be able to generate a steady number of attack packets 
during the attack interval. DoS attack, which is the most dangerous attack in wireless network 
security, can use this tactic to overwhelm and flood the victim resources by a heavy steady rate 
of traffic to exhaust the victim resources. The main challenge of combating DoS attack is the 
difficulty of distinguishing the malicious traffic from the legitimate traffic. DoS attack is more 
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severe when the attacker recruits agent machines to overwhelm simultaneously the victim 
resources; this is a form of distributed DoS (DDoS) attack.  
 Increasing Rate B)
Typical successful attack resorts to many tactics to evade the attack detection. One of these 
tactics is generating the attack at a gradually increasing rate. This can lead to a slow exhaustion 
of the victim resources, as aimed by some flooding attacks, and it thus delays the early detection 
of attack.  
 Intermittent Rate C)
Another successful tactic with low probability of revealing the attack is generating the attack 
at an intermittent rate. In the intermittent rate tactic, the attacker generates the attack in alternate 
intervals, where he launches attack during a certain interval (on-state), and holds it during 
another alternative interval (off-state). At the end of off-state, the attacker resumes the attack 
again and so on. The attacker can adjust the on and off intervals according to the real-time state 
of the victim. Also, during on-state, the attacker may use steady constant rate or gradually 
increasing rate. 
 Attack collaboration 4.3.3.5.
This dimension determines the collaboration degree between the attack entities. Based on the 
attack collaboration, there are two main strategies to prepare and perform the attack; 
autonomous or collaborative attack. 
 Autonomous Attack A)
Autonomous attacker can prepare and launch the attack independently without any 
contribution or help from any other entity. In this category, the attacker is responsible for 
discovering the system vulnerabilities, determining the targets, planning the attack, selecting the 
appropriate tools and techniques, launching and managing the attack autonomously. However, 
autonomous attack is commonly used and easy to be managed, where the attacker doesn’t need 
any arrangement with any other entity for intervention or managing the attack.     
 Collaborative Attack B)
Collaborative attack refers to the collaboration between the attack entities to perform 
intended objectives. However, collaborative attack can be performed by one of two strategies. 
The first strategy is manifested in the contribution between autonomous attackers to reach and 
achieve a common goal. In the second strategy, the attacker can compromise and recruit 
multiple agents (centrally controlled) to be collaborated in launching an intended attack against 
a certain victim. 
 
Performance Analysis of WIDSs  Khalid Nasr 
 
83 
 
 Vulnerabilities 4.3.4.
Vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system design, implementation, configuration, or 
security measures that could be accidentally or intentionally exploited by a threat source, and 
results in a violation of the system security policy. In this section, we classify the vulnerabilities 
into four main categories; exposed medium, design flaws, implementation flaws, and 
configuration errors. 
 Exposed Medium 4.3.4.1.
Due to the openness of the exposed wireless medium, the attacker can easily eavesdrop on 
the wireless connection, intercept the messages exchanged between wireless nodes, and access 
the wireless network with poor authentication. However, most of the wireless networks are not 
configured securely and often only MAC address spoofing is required to gain full access. Radio 
jamming and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are examples of attacks that exploit the 
openness vulnerability of wireless medium. Radio jamming attack overwhelms wireless 
communications or corrupts the received signals using radio interference by transmitting radio 
signals to the intended victim at the same frequency band or sub-band as the transmitter uses. In 
MIMT attack, the adversary eavesdrops on the communications between the communicated 
points and intercepts the data transferred between them to discover secret information and/or 
inject false information. It is worth mentioning that the exposed medium vulnerability is the gate 
that facilitates the exploitation of the other vulnerabilities; design flaws, implementation flaws, 
and configuration errors.  
 Design Flaws  4.3.4.2.
Design flaws refer to the weaknesses in the services or protocol design that can be exploited 
to violate the assumption of normal behaviour in the network. As an example of the design 
flaws, 802.11 authentication is a one-way authentication which is useful and commonly used in 
infrastructure networks. The one-way authentication is attractive to some serious attacks that 
rely on using rogue access points. Although the access points authenticate the wireless stations 
to ensure that only the authorized stations access the network, it is not obligatory for the access 
point to authenticate itself to the station wants to join the network, then a rogue access point 
could spoof SSID and steal authentication credentials to deceive the wireless stations in the 
range to associate with it to steal confidential data. 
Also, there is a lack of authenticating the management frames in 802.11 networks, and this 
may lead to exposing the wireless stations to many attacks ranging from spoofing, to 
deauthentication, to authentication flood attacks.  
 Implementation Flaws  4.3.4.3.
Implementation flaws refer to errors in hardware construction or software coding due to the 
unfamiliarity with the programming language or the ignorance of security issues. For example, 
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inadequate boundary checking which may result in a buffer overflowing with attacker controlled 
contents [HsSL08]. Some implementation flaws are the translation of design flaws. For 
example, some wireless network cards reset the initialization vector (IV) to zero each time they 
are re-initialized and regularly increase the IV by one for each packet transmitted [BoGW01].  
Example of implementation flaws is the vulnerability CVE-2001-0160 [Cve01] of  
Lucent/ORiNOCO WLAN cards that generate predictable initialization vector (IV) values of 
WEP protocol which might allow attackers to quickly compile the information to decrypt the 
transmitted messages. More examples of implementation flaws can be found in Appendix A 
with the registered vulnerabilities CVE-2007-5651 [Cve07a], CVE-2007-4012 [Cve07b], CVE-
2009-0052 [Cve09a], and CVE-2009-0282 [Cve09b].  
 Configuration Errors 4.3.4.4.
Configuration errors are the result of improper settings of a particular environment, threat 
model, or program utilities that are installed in a wrong place, or incorrect installation of 
program parameters. As registered in CVE-2013-4613 [Cve13b], the default configurations of 
the administrative interface on the Canon MG3100, MG5300, and MX922 printers do not 
require authentication, then the attacker could modify the configuration by open access.    
 Attack Objectives 4.3.5.
Attack objectives are the ultimate goals of attack. They can be classified into four main 
categories; access privilege escalation, denial of service, compromising data integrity, and 
discovering confidential data. 
 Access Privilege Escalation 4.3.5.1.
Access privilege escalation is the act of exploiting the system vulnerabilities to gain elevated 
access to the system resources that are normally protected against any unauthorized use. 
However, the malicious unauthorized user can escalate the access privilege of an authorized user 
(i.e., remote-to-local (R2L) privilege escalation), or the authorized user may escalate to the 
administrator level (i.e., user-to root (U2R) privilege escalation). Usually, this task is considered 
as a penultimate goal that is used to achieve another ultimate goal. For example, the 
authenticated user can exploit the vulnerability of Cisco WLAN Controller (WLC) software (4.2 
through 6.0) [Cve10] to bypass the access restrictions and modify the configuration to gain 
administrative privileges.. Also, the vulnerability CVE-2005-3802 [Cve05] (Appendix A) shows 
another example of access privilege escalation. 
 Denial of Service 4.3.5.2.
Denial of service (DoS) goal can be achieved by obstructing the normal operation of the 
targeted stations or preventing the targeted system from serving the legitimate stations. DoS 
attacks aim to disrupt the normal operation of the system by exhausting its resources (CPU time, 
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memory, band-width, battery power, etc.) or creating fake requests to deauthenticate and 
disconnect the legitimate nodes from the network. Despite the exerted effort to combat DoS 
attacks or mitigate their impact, the wireless communications still suffer from their threats. The 
main challenge associated with DOS attack is the difficulty of distinguishing the legitimate 
traffic from the malicious traffic, where the DoS malicious traffic seems usually compliant with 
the specification of the legitimate traffic. Most wireless attacks are denial of service (DoS) 
attacks and this is obvious from the huge number of the registered DoS attacks. As shown in  
[Cvew13] and Appendix A, most of the registered cases (CVE-2013-1105, CVE-2011-0196, 
CVE-2009-0052, CVE-2006-6059, CVE-2009-2861, etc.) are DoS attacks.   
 Compromising Data Integrity 4.3.5.3.
Data integrity refers to the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of data during operation 
of transfer, storage, and retrieval; data is never altered and reaches the destination intact. 
Usually, data integrity is imposed on the database at its design stage through using standard 
rules and procedures, and it is maintained through using error checking and validation routines. 
Data integrity can be compromised by altering the data stream. However, the attacker may 
intend to modify the contents of the system data or inject complete created packets into the data 
stream, or replace relevant information with nonsensical or offensive content. Airpwn [Airp13] 
and File2air [File13] are examples of attack tools used to compromise the data integrity. Airpwn 
is a wireless packet injection tool. It listens in the transmitted packets, and if the data matches a 
pattern specified in the configuration files, then Airpwn spoofs the response from the access 
point with custom content and injects it to the client; this is similar to, but not identical, the 
classic MITM attack. File2air tool is a command line utility for injecting 802.11 frames from 
binary files into the wireless channel using AirJack drivers [Airj13].  
 Discovering Confidential Data 4.3.5.4.
Due to the exposed wireless medium and other network vulnerabilities, the attacker can sniff 
and probe the wireless beacon frames or access illegitimately the system database to look for 
and discover the secret and confidential data. They attempt to discover private and secret data by 
eavesdropping and intercepting it over the wireless link, escalating to gain access to the 
confidential data under a fake identity, or deceiving the wireless nodes in the range to associate 
with a fake access point. Eavesdropping, encryption key cracking, rouge access point phishing, 
and MITM attacks are examples of confidentiality attacks. For example, the attacker may intend 
to discover the WEP shared secret key. One of the available tools for WEP cracking is AirSnort 
[Airs13a] that passively monitors and captures the transmitted packets. Once enough packets 
have been gathered, AirSnort can compute and extract the WEP key. Also, one of the available 
eavesdropping tools is WireShark [Wire13] which is a packet analyzer used to passively capture 
802.11 packets being transmitted over the wireless link. 
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 Attack Test Cases Generation 4.4.
On the basis of our proposed taxonomy of wireless attacks, we can generate all the possible 
attack test cases and extract the valid and representative ones. The most appropriate tool in this 
context is the Classification Tree Editor (CTE) [Cte13] that helps in automatic generation of the 
attack test cases. CTE is a graphical editor tool that is based on the Classification Tree Method 
(CTM) which supports test cases design using descriptive tree-like notation. Using CTE, the test 
cases are designed with regard to systemic classification of the test objects into a finite number 
of mutually exclusive terminal classes. CTE gives a compact and clear presentation of the 
overall test objects.  
Regarding our concern in this study, the attack test cases can be generated using CTE 
through two main steps. The first step is specifying the dimensions or classes relevant to the test 
of interest, and organizing them in a tree-like classification according to our classification of 
wireless attacks. The second step is generating the attack test cases by combining the terminal 
classes using the logical combination rules that are supported by CTE.  
The logical combination rules are organized according to the scope of the test. Since the 
generated test cases may contain some invalid ones, then the evaluator can revise them and 
extract the valid representative ones which are the input situations to be tested. The main 
advantages of using CTE are that the evaluator can easily modify the test specification when 
necessary, and can control the complexity and number of test cases according to the scope of the 
test. 
The logical combination rules organize the relationship between the taxonomy dimensions in 
mathematical formula. For example, the following formula (Eq.  IV-1) that collects all the main 
dimensions of our taxonomy generates all possible test cases that are 6912 test cases. It is worth 
mentioning that not all these test cases are available or valid, so that they need an intervention to 
extract the valid ones.  
 
                                                    
                                    
 
Eq. ‎IV-1 
 
Where “*” and “+” represent AND and OR logic operators respectively. The generated test 
cases are controlled according to the dimensions of interest. For example, if we want to extract 
the attack test cases in wireless infrastructure mode only with the concern about two 
vulnerabilities (implementation flaws and design flaws), and two attack objectives (DoS and 
discovering confidential data), then the CTE formula will be: 
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Eq. ‎IV-2 
This formula (Eq.  IV-2) generates a set of test cases that are limited and related to these 
dimensions only. For example, Figure  IV-2 shows a sample of the attack test cases generated 
according to our taxonomy of wireless attacks. The generated test cases can be also minimized 
by using the logical dependency rules that are also supported by CTE. In conclusion, CTE helps 
the evaluator to avoid time consuming and error prone that may be caused by the manual 
creation of the test cases, especially if the classification is too large. The evaluator is also able to 
intervene, revise, and modify the generated test cases according to the scope of the test.     
 Classification of Some Wireless Attacks 4.5.
In this section, we study and classify some of wireless attacks from the perspective of our 
proposed taxonomy. 
 
 
 
Figure IV-2: Sample of the Attack Test Cases. 
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 WEP-based Attacks  4.5.1.
Wired equivalent privacy (WEP) algorithm suffers from some security breaches. These 
security breaches which can be easily exploited demonstrate the ineffectiveness of WEP 
algorithm. Basically, WEP uses two main algorithms, encryption algorithm RC4 and the 
integrity check algorithm CRC-32 that are susceptible to attacks due to their design flaws. 
Examples of the attacks that can exploit RC4 and CRC-32 weaknesses are FMS attack and 
chopchop attack. 
 FMS Attack 4.5.1.1.
FMS attack is the first key recovery attack against WEP. Fluhrer et al [FlMS01] analyzed 
the weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4 and they demonstrated how it can be 
easily cracked and WEP secret key is derived. They introduced FMS attack that exploits the 
correlation between the initialization vector (IV) and the key sequence produced by RC4 
algorithm to recover the secret key. FMS attack is based on collecting numerous encrypted 
packets including the initialization vectors (IVs), and analyzing them analytically to derive the 
secret key. WEPCrack [Wepc13] and AirSnort [Airs13a] are open source WEP cracking tools 
that realize and implement the theoretical idea of FMS attack.   
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized 
Passive / Active 
 
Manual / Automatic 
 
Autonomous  
Design flaws  
Discovering confidential data 
 Chopchop Attack 4.5.1.2.
The chopchop attack was initially posted on the NetStumbler Internet forum by an individual 
under the pseudonym KoreK [Kore04]. Chopchop can decrypt a WEP packet without knowing 
the encryption key. This attack does not recover the WEP key itself, but it merely reveals the 
plaintext. Chopchop attack exploits the weaknesses of integrity algorithm (CRC-32) that is used 
to compute the integrity check value (ICV). In chopchop, the attacker intercepts the encrypted 
packet and truncates it by chopping the last byte. The attacker guesses the value of the last byte 
and patches the truncated packet, and then computes the new ICV of the modified packet. Then, 
the attacker sends the new packet to the access point with a multicast destination address. When 
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the access point receives the packet, the access point decrypts it and checks the ICV value. If the 
ICV is correct, the access point retransmits the packet to the network, then the attacker knows 
that his guess of the last byte of the packet is correct, and he can continue with the second last 
byte and so on, until guessing and revealing all clear byte of the plaintext. If the ICV is 
incorrect, the packet is silently discarded, and accordingly the guess at the last byte is incorrect 
and this induces the attacker to make another different guess. After at most 256 trials, the 
attacker can guess the correct value of the last byte, and so on. Chopchop attack can be managed 
by tools such as aircrack-ng suite [Chop13] 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Active 
MAC  
Manual 
Steady 
Autonomous  
Design flaws  
Discovering confidential data 
 RF Jamming Attack  4.5.2.
RF jamming attack exploits the openness of wireless medium and uses a high gain antenna 
to send powerful RF signals to interfere with the radio frequency (RF) used by legitimate 
stations, to prevent them from exchanging information[KhMM08]. Sometimes, RF jamming 
attack is used to damage the electronic components of the access point by high power RF signals 
and make the access point permanently out of service. Wifi jammer [Wifi13b] and AirHORN 
[Airh13] are examples of RF jamming tools.  
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Unauthorized  
Active 
Frame 
Manual / Automatic 
Steady 
Autonomous   
Exposed Wireless Medium  
DoS  
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 Authentication flood attack 4.5.3.
Authentication flood attack is a type of denial of service (DoS) attack that generates a flood 
of authentication frames requesting to join a network through an access point. Thus, the access 
point or authentication server will be overwhelmed and cannot respond to the flood of 
authentication requests and it consequently fails to respond or establish successful connections 
to the legitimate stations. The attacker can easily adjust the hacking rate to be either steady rate 
or intermittent rate. Void11 (gvoid11) [Void13], MDK3 [Mdk13], and KisMAC [Kism13b] are 
examples of tools that can be used to control the authentication attack rate.  
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Passive 
Frame 
Manual / Automatic 
Steady  
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS 
 Association Flood Attack 4.5.4.
Association flood attack is another type of DoS attacks, like authentication flood, which 
generates a flood of association frames to interrupt the wireless services by depleting the 
resources of the access point, particularly the association table. When the association table 
overflows, the legitimate stations cannot get associated. Void11 [Void13] is also used for 
association flood attacks. 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Passive 
Frame 
Manual / Automatic 
Steady  
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS 
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 Deauthentication Attack 4.5.5.
A part of the authentication framework (Figure  II-4) is the deauthentication message which 
allows the wireless node and access point to explicitly request deauthentication from each other. 
Unfortunately, this message itself is not authenticated. Therefore, the attacker can spoof this 
message, pretending to be either the access point or the wireless node, and directs it to the other 
part to terminate the authentication state between the wireless station and access point. Once the 
station is deauthenticated, it is no longer able to access the network until the authentication is re-
established. This attack is usually called deauthentication attack and it causes denial of service. 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Passive / Active 
Frame 
Manual / Automatic 
 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS  
 Disassociation Attack 4.5.6.
Disassociation is a part of the association framework. The disassociation suffers from 
vulnerability as that found with the deauthentication frame, where it is also unauthenticated. 
This vulnerability gives the attacker an ability to spoof the disassociation frame and terminates 
the association session. The disassociation attack is slightly less efficient than the 
deauthentication attack, where the victim can return to the associated state by a small effort than 
that can be done with the deauthentication attack; it is clear in Figure  II-4 that shows the states 
of authentication and association processes and their relevant parts. 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Passive / Active 
Frame 
Manual / Automatic 
 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS 
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 Deauthentication flood attack 4.5.7.
Deauthentication flood attack is an advanced form of the deauthentication attack. In the 
simple form of deauthentication attack, when the attacker sends a deauthentication frame to 
break the connection between the wireless station and access point, the station would attempt to 
reauthenticate. If the attacker wants to hinder the station from connecting the network, he needs 
to send a stream of deauthentication frames, usually in steady rate. This is called 
deauthentication flood attack and it is considered one of the severe DoS attacks. Metasploit 
[Deau13], Void11 (gvoid11) [Void13], and aireplay-ng [Aire13] are examples of tools that can 
be used in performing deauthentication flood. Metasploit command lines can be managed easily 
by Armitage [Armi13] through GUI. 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Passive / Active 
Frame 
Manual / Automatic  
Steady 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS 
 Deauthentication / Disassociation  (Amok Mode) 4.5.8.
Deauthentication attack (Amok mode) does not merely disconnect a specific station from the 
access point as the aforementioned deauthentication attacks, but it effectively breaks the 
connections between the wireless stations and access points in the range. The most popular tool 
for this type of attacks is MDK3 [Mdk13]. 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Passive 
Frame 
Manual 
Steady 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS 
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 Fake authentication Attack 4.5.9.
Fake authentication attack performs the two steps of authentication and association. It can be 
used for authentication/association with the access points that use WEP algorithm, but it cannot 
be used against WPA/WPA2 access points. Aireplay-ng [Aire13] is a premier used tool for 
managing the fake authentication attack.  
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Active 
Frame 
Manual 
Steady / Intermittent 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
Access Privileges Escalation 
 Rogue AP 4.5.10.
Rogue Access Point (Rogue AP) is a wireless access point that is either installed on a 
network by a legitimate user without authorization from the network administrator or created by 
an attacker to discover the confidential data. Airsnarf [Airs13b] and KARMA [Karm13] tools 
can be used in creating  a simple rogue AP to steal usernames and passwords.   
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Internal Penetrator / Unauthorized  
None / Active 
Frame   
Manual 
Steady 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
Discovering confidential data   
  PS Poll Attacks 4.5.11.
Power management is one of the critical features of wireless devices. IEEE 802.11 standard 
provides a power save (PS) mode to conserve the wireless node energy. Actually, before 
entering the power save mode, the wireless node informs the access point that it will go to the 
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sleeping state. At this state, the access point starts to buffer data that is destined to this node. 
When the wireless node wakes up, it checks the Traffic Indication Maps (TIM) [GuCh05], and 
sends power save (PS) poll frame to demand the buffered data (referenced by its MAC address). 
When the access point receives the poll message, it delivers the buffered data to this wireless 
node and subsequently discards the contents of its buffer. The attacker can exploit this 
vulnerability and spoofs a PS poll frame on behalf of the wireless node while it is in sleep state, 
and then hinders it from receiving the buffered data which is consequently discarded from the 
access point. 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure  
Unauthorized  
Passive 
Frame 
 
 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS  
 RTS/CTS Attacks 4.5.12.
Basically, RTS (request-to-send)/CTS (clear-to-send) mechanism [RCS03] is used to avoid 
frame collision among the wireless nodes. In RTS/CTS mechanism, a wireless sending node 
transmits RTS frame to a destination node, to reserve the radio link for the transmission. When 
the destination node receives the RTS request, it responds by CTS frame that confirms the 
reservation of the link. Using RTS and CTS frames, the radio link between the sending and 
receiving nodes will be reserved and all the nodes in the transmission range will be silent and 
refrained from using the link by the transmission duration that is determined by the value of 
NAV (Network Allocation Vector). The attacker can exploit the vulnerability of this mechanism 
to launch two types of denial of service attacks; RTS flood and CTS flood. 
   RTS Flood Attack 4.5.12.1.
The attacker can send a great amount of RTS frames to the wireless nodes in the 
transmission range to block and hinder them from sending data. Sensor nodes in wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs) can be easily hacked by a flood of RTS frames, where the receiving node will 
respond by equivalent CTS frames and this may lead to exhausting its biasing power battery or 
preventing it from pursuing its normal operation.  
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Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Unauthorized     
 
Frame 
Semi-Automatic 
Steady 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS 
 CTS Flood Attack 4.5.12.2.
Also, the attacker can flood the stations in the range by periodic spurious CTS frames with 
the objective of forcing other nodes to update their NAV values and then preventing them from 
using the channel until the attacker stops transmitting the CTS frames. 
Taxonomy Dimensions   Attack Classification  
Network Mode:  
Access Privilege:  
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management:  
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration:   
Vulnerability:  
Attack Objective:   
Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Unauthorized     
 
Frame 
Semi-Automatic 
Steady 
Autonomous   
Design flaws  
DoS 
 
Other wireless attacks and vulnerabilities have been classified in Appendix A. It is worth 
mentioning that some of wireless vulnerabilities that are registered in website Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures [Cvew13] are already exploited by some wireless attacks, and 
some others are merely registered weaknesses of some network devices and they are susceptible 
to be exploited by known attacks or under design attacks, such as FMS attack that was firstly an 
idea and cryptanalysis of WEP weaknesses by Fluhrer et al [FlMS01], and then it was realized 
by many hacking tools such as WEPCrack [Wepc13]and AirSnort [Airs13a]. As another 
example, the registered vulnerability CVE-2006-6059 [Cve06] describes the buffer overflow in 
the driver of NetGear MA521 PCMCIA adapter that may allow the attacker to execute arbitrary 
code via beacon or probe 802.11 frame responses with long supported rates. This vulnerability 
has been already exploited by an attack which is designed by the hack community as shown in 
the Metasploit module [Netg13]. In addition to our classification of some well-known wireless 
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attacks, we also analyzed, in Appendix A, some popular wireless vulnerabilities and studied the 
relevant attacks from the perspective of our taxonomy of wireless attacks. Even the existing 
vulnerabilities that are not yet exploited by specific attacks, we analyzed them and considered 
the potential attacks. Most of these vulnerabilities are relevant to specific wireless devices that 
are widely used in wireless networks. If the operating environment uses one or more of 
vulnerable devices, then their vulnerabilities and the relevant potential attacks should be taken 
into account to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of WIDSs. The potential attacks are 
considered by the representative attack test cases and their probabilities that ensure the fairness 
of the evaluation.  
 Test Cases Probability 4.6.
The important aspect that should be taken into account is that each test case has probability 
of occurrence among all possible attacks in a specific network. Most previous evaluations of 
IDSs tested the IDSs under a set of selected attacks, and they calculated the detection rate 
according to this set of attacks. These evaluations are considered biased and unfair ones, where 
they calculated the detection rate by only the proportion of the selected attacks that are flagged 
as intrusions, although the selected attacks may not be representative of other potential attacks 
under the same conditions. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there is no IDSs evaluation 
took into account the probability of each attack or test case in calculating the detection rate, 
despite the importance of this concept in managing unbiased evaluation. In this study, we try to 
follow the best way towards unbiased and fair evaluation of WIDSs, where we extract the test 
cases of attacks to be representative of all the potential attacks relevant to each test case, and 
then we calculate the probability of each test case accordingly taking into account the conditions 
of the operating environment. This concept is considered the main factor in calculating the 
actual representative ratio of each test case among all the test cases. The significance of this 
concept is demonstrated in chapter 6.   
 Conclusion 4.7.
The growing exploitation of the system vulnerabilities and enormous progress in hacking 
tools and techniques ranging from simple command lines to GUI tools necessitate combining the 
possible attacks under representative attack test cases. This chapter introduced a new taxonomy 
of wireless security attacks from the perspective of the WIDS evaluator. Our proposed 
taxonomy considered the essential dimensions without overkill or disregard, to finally have 
main categories that cover the existing attacks and novel attacks in the future. This taxonomy 
helps in extracting the representative attack test cases rather than evaluating the WIDSs under 
the all possible attacks. We also considered a new important concept of the probability of 
occurrence of attack test cases that was ignored in most previous work. This concept reflects the 
actual occurrence of possible attacks according to the operating environment conditions, and this 
is crucial in calculating the actual intrusion detection rate and effectiveness of IDSs/WIDSs.  
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 Chapter 5: Evaluation Metrics V.
Evaluation metrics play a significant role in evaluating IDSs/WIDSs performance. Various 
appreciable efforts have been exerted in the recent past for developing reliable evaluation 
metrics. In this chapter, we discuss the most valuable and well-known metrics for IDSs 
evaluation, their benefits, and their drawbacks. The common conspicuous drawback of most 
existing metrics is building their main notion on the basis of comparing two or more IDSs to 
select the best one, although this selected one may be ineffective. We thus develop a novel 
metric called intrusion detection effectiveness (EID) that manipulates the drawbacks of the 
existing metrics for evaluating the IDSs/WIDSs effectiveness. Effectiveness attribute is 
considered the basic factor in evaluating the IDSs/WIDSs performance, where it reflects the 
ability of IDS to detect the intrusive activities against the monitored system, and the absence 
degree of the false alarms. Our developed metric EID helps in measuring the actual effectiveness 
of IDSs/WIDSs instead of measuring the relative effectiveness as followed by the previously 
proposed metrics. The notion of EID is based on comparing the operating curve of the IDS under 
test to the optimal operating curve (i.e., created as a zero reference curve for the optimal 
operating state) by calculating the variation between the two curves. The variation value 
interprets the deviation of the IDS operation from the intended optimal operation. We also 
propose another metric called attack recognition rate (RR) that measures the proportion of the 
detected intrusions that are recognized.  
 An Overview of the Existing Evaluation Metrics 5.1.
Many different evaluation metrics of IDSs performance have been proposed; most of them 
are concerned with the effectiveness attribute that is considered the main aspect in the evaluation 
of IDSs/WIDSs performance. Besides the well-known evaluation metric called receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve that was used by DARPA evaluations [LFGH00] 
[LHFK00], there are other valuable metrics proposed for IDSs evaluating such as Bayesian 
detection rate (      ) [Axel99], cumulative cost [SFLP00], expected cost [GaUl01], intrusion 
detection capability (CID) [GFDL06], and intrusion detection operating characteristic (IDOC) 
[CaBS06]. Each of these metrics was based on a different theoretical approach such as decision 
theory [GaUl01], information theory [GFDL06], cost-based analysis [SFLP00] [GaUl01], etc. 
Some of these metrics have specific drawbacks, in addition to the common drawback which they 
all suffer from. We discuss the benefits and drawbacks of these metrics in the following sections, 
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and we consequently propose a novel evaluation metric called intrusion detection effectiveness 
(EID) to manipulate the drawbacks of the previously proposed metrics. 
 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 5.1.1.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is the first unified metric used in the 
experimental evaluation of intrusion detection systems [LFGH00] [LHFK00]. ROC curve is used 
to analyze the trade-off between the detection rate and false alarms rate. Detection rate (DR) 
(i.e., also known as true positive rate (TPR)) is the proportion of the malicious activities that are 
flagged as intrusive by generated alarms, and false alarms rate (i.e., also known as false positive 
rate (FPR)) is the proportion of the benign activities that are flagged as intrusive with raised 
alarms. The ROC curve can be generated by plotting the detection rate and false alarms rate 
values associated with different IDS operating points. The main notion of using ROC curve in 
IDSs evaluation is based on comparing the IDSs curves to select the best one. For example, if we 
have two IDSs, e.g., IDS1 and IDS2, with two ROC curves which do not cross as shown in 
Figure  V-1. Since IDS1 with the upper ROC curve has higher values of DR than IDS2 for every 
FPR values, then IDS1 is considered better than IDS2. As another example, if we have two IDSs, 
e.g., IDS3 and IDS4, with two ROC crossed curves as shown in Figure  V-2. Then, it is difficult to 
differentiate between them on the basis of the curve level where the two curves interchange their 
levels. In this case the differentiation between the two IDSs is calculated on the basis of the area 
under each curve. ROC curve was initially used in the domains and applications concerned with 
signal detection [HaWi66] such as communications and radar, then it was applied successfully to 
 
 
Figure V-1: ROC Curves of IDS1 and IDS2. 
Performance Analysis of WIDSs  Khalid Nasr 
 
99 
 
other fields. One the drawbacks of using ROC curve as an evaluation metric of IDSs 
effectiveness is that the IDSs effectiveness depends on more parameters than those considered in 
ROC. The important parameter that was ignored in ROC is the base-rate parameter [Axel99] that 
refers to the probability of intrusion      that reflects the hostility of the operating environment.  
 Bayesian Detection Rate (P(I|A)) 5.1.2.
Bayesian detection rate (      ) [Axel99] defines a mathematical relation, in a unified 
equation, between the parameters related to intrusion detection effectiveness, i.e., detection rate, 
false alarms rate, and  base-rate. The main advantage of this metric is its considering the base-
rate or intrusion probability (    ) that was ignored in other evaluation metrics, despite its 
importance in achieving credible evaluation of IDSs/WIDSs effectiveness. Axelsson [Axel99] 
derived Bayesian detection rate (      ) from the Bayes’ theorem as follows: 
        
           
    
 Eq. V-1 
The probability      can be expanded for a set of n possible mutually exclusive outcomes  , 
then      can be defined by the following equation Eq.  V-2: 
 
 Figure V-2: ROC Curves of IDS3 and IDS4. 
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      ∑                         
 
   
 Eq. V-2 
Combining the above two equations Eq.  V-1and Eq.  V-2 to reach to: 
        
           
∑                 
 
   
           Eq. V-3 
It was easy for Axelsson, by applying equation Eq.  V-3 on the IDSs case with the two 
possible events, to get the Bayesian detection rate (        as follows: 
        
           
                         
   Eq. V-4 
Where, Bayesian detection rate        (also known as positive predictive value PPV) is the 
posterior probability of an intrusion given the IDS output is an alarm,     is the probability of 
intrusion,        is the probability of no intrusion,        is the probability of the output is a 
generated alarm given an intrusion at the input (i.e., it refers to the detection rate DR or true 
positive rate TPR),         the probability of the output is a generated alarm given no intrusion 
at the input (i.e., it refers to the false alarms or false positive rate FPR).   
Axelsson studied the effect of the base-rate fallacy on the intrusion detection. He 
demonstrated that due to the base-rate fallacy problem, the limiting factor for the IDS 
performance is not the ability to correctly identify the intrusions, but rather its ability to suppress 
the false alarms. We totally agree with him in this point, where the effectiveness of IDSs/WIDSs 
depends not only on the ability of intrusion detection ability, but also on the absence degree of 
false alarms. 
Unfortunately, despite the prominence of Bayesian detection rate and its considering the 
three main parameters                         that are significant for evaluating the IDSs 
effectiveness, it is not completely expressive metric for measuring the IDSs effectiveness or even 
the detection rate. Equation Eq.  V-4 demonstrates that Bayesian detection rate        mainly 
measures the proportion of the generated alarms that correspond to intrusions. To prove that, we 
need to analyze mathematically         (Eq.  V-4) to reach the following results:  
Case 1: if                   
Combining these values with equation Eq.  V-4, then; 
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Since                , then; 
               Eq. V-5 
Case 2: if            
Combining this value and equation Eq.  V-4, then; 
            Eq. V-6 
We can observe that Bayesian detection rate        gives a reasonable expression for the 
IDSs effectiveness, just in the above two cases. In case 1 of passing all the traffic with raised 
alarms (                 ,        equals the probability of intrusion      (Eq.  V-5) that 
is considered the perfect expression in this case; where the ratio of the detected intrusions to the 
generated alarms corresponds to the ratio of intrusions to the input traffic. In case 2,        
equals zero when the detection rate        is zero (Eq.  V-6), where the detection rate        is 
the predominant parameter in equation Eq.  V-4. However, one of the drawbacks of Bayesian 
detection rate        can be observed when the false alarms or false positive rate         is 
close to zero as shown in the following case. 
Case 3:  as P(A|¬I) approaches 0, then equation Eq.  V-4 can be written as follows; 
 
   
         
          
         
           
                         
  
           
           
   
 
 
 
 
Eq. V-7 
It is obvious from equation Eq.  V-7 that when the false positive rate         equals or 
approaches “0”, the Bayesian detection rate        is equal to constant value “1” for any value 
of the detection rate       ; this unfortunately seems illogical. How the IDSs effectiveness can 
be evaluated in disregard of the detection rate       ? Merely considering the complete absence 
of false alarms is insufficient. Thus the Bayesian detection rate         in this case, is 
inexpressive metric for measuring the IDSs effectiveness or even the detection rate. However, 
we propose a reasonable solution for this drawback through our adaptation of Bayesian detection 
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rate to become enhanced Bayesian detection rate (   ) (section  5.3.1.1) that is used as a base 
for our developed metric     (intrusion detection effectiveness) shown in section  5.3.1. 
 Cost-Based Metrics 5.1.3.
Cost-based metrics analyze the intrusion detection from the perspective of costs. We focus on 
studying two noted cost-based metrics; Cumulative Cost [SFLP00], and Expected Cost 
[GaUl01]. 
 Cumulative Cost 5.1.3.1.
The first cost-based metric for evaluating the fraud and intrusion detection in financial 
information systems is Cumulative Cost metric which was proposed by Stolfo et al. [SFLP00]. 
They defined three types of costs; operational, damage, and challenge costs. These costs are 
derived from the credit card fraud case. Operational cost refers to the resources needed to run the 
IDS. Damage cost is the amount of damage caused by the intrusions without detection. 
Challenge cost is the cost of acting upon an intrusion when it is detected. It is clearly observed 
that the damage cost indicates the false negatives (  ), and the challenge cost indicates the true 
positives (  ).  
Stolfo et al. discussed and analyzed the results of JAM project [SPTL97]. Table  V-1 
illustrates their perspective on the three types of costs in credit card fraud and intrusion detection. 
In the credit card case, the damage cost is the amount of a fraudulent transaction that the bank 
losses and it is denoted by           . The challenge cost is the cost of acting upon an alarm 
and it is denoted by overhead, but the operational cost was not considered. 
In the IDS case, the damage cost was characterized as a function that depends on the type of 
service and attack on that service, and it is denoted by                      . The challenge 
cost, as considered in the credit card case, is the cost of acting on an alarm; also denoted by 
overhead. The operational cost is the feature costs and it is denoted by       . 
Stolfo et al. applied challenge and damage costs on the outcome parameters of intrusion 
detection (false negative (  ), false positive (  ), true positive (  ), and true negative (  )) 
Cost Type Credit Card Fraud Network Intrusion 
Damage 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑡 𝑡  𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘  
Challenge overhead overhead 
Operational subsumed in overhead 𝑂𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
 
 
Table V-1: Cost Types in Credit Card Fraud and Network Intrusion. 
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and added to them the operational cost to develop a                   metric (Eq.  V-8) to 
evaluate an IDS over some test set “S” of labeled connection “c”. 
                   ∑                   
   
 Eq. V-8 
         is calculated by Table  V-2, where            indicates the damage cost associated 
with the particular type of service “s” and attack ”a”. 
This cost-based metric is more suitable for and applicable to financial information systems 
than other systems that are interested in other important impacts than the prior determining of the 
costs in the system. Also, this metric didn’t consider the base-rate in the operating environment 
that indicates the hostility degree.    
 Expected Cost Metric 5.1.3.2.
Another metric which takes the costs into account is the expected cost metric which was 
proposed by Gaffney et al. [GaUl01]. They argued that both the ROC analysis and Cumulative 
Cost metric are incomplete metrics. They used decision analysis techniques to combine and 
extend ROC analysis and cost-based analysis methods to provide an expected cost metric. The 
expected cost metric depends not only on the system ROC curve, but also on the IDS operational 
and damage costs, and hostility of the operating environment.  
The formula of the expected cost metric can be derived from analyzing the decision tree 
shown in Figure  V-3. This decision tree shows the sequence of actions (represented by squares) 
that describe the responses on the basis of the reports, the events (represented by circles) that 
may be a normal or intrusive event, and the consequences (corresponding costs) of the 
combinations of actions and events. The formula is derived for the minimum expected cost.  
Outcome 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒄   
𝑭𝑵 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠 𝑎   
𝑭𝑷 
Overhead 
0 
if  𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠 𝑎  > overhead 
if 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠 𝑎  ≤ overhead 
𝑻𝑷 
𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠 𝑎  
Overhead if 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠 𝑎  > overhead 
if 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠 𝑎  ≤ overhead 
𝑻𝑵 0  
 
Table V-2: Cost Model for Connection. 
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There are three probabilities specified in the decision tree; P1 is the probability of no 
generated alarm, P2 is the conditional probability of no intrusion given that the detector reports 
no alarm, and P3 is the conditional probability of no intrusion given that the detector reports an 
alarm. Consequences of the combinations of the system inputs and responses are specified by the 
costs. The cost of responding as though there is an intrusion when actually there is none is 
denoted by Cα. The cost of failing to respond to an intrusion is denoted by Cβ. The costs of 
correct responses are assumed to be zero. Gaffney et al. rescaled costs and defined the cost ratio 
C=Cα/Cβ, thus this substitution results in costs of 1 and C as shown in Figure  V-3. The 
conditional probabilities of the detector reports given the state of the system are shown in 
Table  V-3. Then, the expected cost formula can be derived as follows. 
                                
                                       
                                                             
                                                    
                                                   
                                                       
Then, the expected cost (Eq.  V-9) is: 
 
 
Figure V-3: Decision Tree of The Detectors Expected Cost. 
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                  {            (      )}     {                    }    Eq. V-9 
 Intrusion Detection Capability (CID) 5.1.4.
Gu et al.[GFDL06] proposed another evaluation metric called intrusion detection capability 
(CID). They argued that the main motivation for introducing this metric is that the cost measures 
in information security domain are often determined in a subjective way. Then, the authors 
proposed an information-theoretic measure of the intrusion detection capability as an objective 
metric. They depended on the notion of having less uncertainty about the IDS input given the 
IDS output. They introduced intrusion detection capability (CID) metric (Eq.  V-10) as the ratio of 
the mutual information between IDS input and output, and the entropy of the input (as a 
normalization factor). The CID is maximized by calculating the operating point that minimizes 
the uncertainty of the input. 
 
Detector Report 
State of the system 
No Intrusion   𝑰  Intrusion  𝑰  
No Alarm   𝑨  1-α β 
Alarm  𝑨  α 1-β 
 
Figure V-4: Abstract Model for Intrusion Detection. 
 
 
Table V-3: Conditional Probabilities of the Detector Reports given the State of the System. 
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  Eq. V-10 
Where,        is the mutual information that indicates the amount of information shared 
between the two random variables X and Y, and it can be defined as: 
        ∑∑         
      
         
  
   
Eq. V-11 
And      is the entropy (or self-information) of a discrete random variable X, and it is 
defined by: 
       ∑           
 
                      Eq. V-12 
Where, X is a random variable represents the input of the IDS (X=1 represents an intrusion, 
and X=0 represents no intrusion), and Y a random variable indicates the output alarms of an IDS 
(Y=1 indicates an alarm, and Y=0 indicates no alarm). Figure  V-4 shows the intrusion detection 
model that was used with this metric CID. It is worth mentioning that      and      are the 
probability of random variables X, and Y respectively, and        is the joint probability of 
them. Also,   denotes the base-rate (    ).  
As for       , that is the entropy of   given  , can be defined as follows: 
 
        ∑∑             
          
    
 
           
      
             
 
      
  
             
              
          
             
          
      
             
 
 
 
Eq. V-13 
Where   and   denote false negative rate and false positive rate respectively. The main 
advantage of this metric is that it takes into account all main parameters related to intrusion 
detection effectiveness.  
Basically, information theory is the science of operations on data such as communications, 
data compression, and statistical signal processing. We believe that the notion of CID for 
minimizing the uncertainty of the input is practically inapplicable to the IDSs/WIDSs evaluation. 
Performance Analysis of WIDSs  Khalid Nasr 
 
107 
 
 Intrusion Detection Operating Characteristic (IDOC) 5.1.5.
Cardenas et al. [CaBS06] used the Bayesian detection rate        (Eq.  V-4) and introduced 
another evaluation metric called intrusion detection operating characteristic (IDOC) as a trade-
off curve between the probability of intrusion detection        and the positive predictive value 
PPV or       . IDOC is basically derived from the Bayesian detection rate [Axel99]; just the 
graphical representation curves (which are based on the same equation Eq.  V-4) are the main 
difference between the IDOC and Axelsson’s proposal [Axel99]. Axelsson studied graphically 
the trade-off between the PPV and the false alarms, but Cardenas et al. [CaBS06] studied the 
trade-off between the PPV and the probability of intrusion detection to introduce the IDOC. As a 
consequence of the dependence of IDOC on the Bayesian detection rate, it carries all its 
drawbacks (section  5.1.2). 
 The Common Drawback of the Existing Metrics  5.2.
The common drawback of most existing metrics is manifested in their main notion that is 
based on comparing two or more IDSs to select the best one, whereas this selected one may not 
be effective. This direct comparison between the IDSs is performed by the differentiation 
between the curves level, the area under the curves, or the values of the measured attributes or 
costs. This is considered a deficient approach that leads to measuring the relative effectiveness 
rather than the actual effectiveness. We are concerned with manipulating this drawback and the 
aforementioned ones.  
 Novel Evaluation Metrics 5.3.
The second pivotal dimension in our methodology (chapter 3), which is the fundamental task 
in WIDSs evaluation process, is defining the evaluation metrics. In this section, we present two 
metrics for evaluating IDSs/WIDSs.  
Before defining our developed metrics, it is important first to define some important 
requirements for reliable and satisfactory evaluation metrics: 
 Meaningful: Evaluation metrics should have a meaning that is easy to understand and 
makes sense [Long09]. 
 Quantifiable: Evaluation metrics must be composed of quantitatively measurable 
variables.  
 Expressive: Evaluation metrics should be expressive and sensitive to the parameters that 
reflect the IDS/WIDS performance. 
 Relative: The formulas and equations of evaluation metrics should represent the 
relationship between the parameters in a relative form (not absolute). 
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 Unified. For each performance attribute, all the related parameters should be collected 
and defined in a unified metric; this facilitates the evaluation.   
 Intrusion Detection Effectiveness (EID ) 5.3.1.
The logical approach for measuring the actual effectiveness is comparing the IDS under test 
to the optimal operating level (as a reference). We thus propose a new evaluation metric EID 
(intrusion detection effectiveness) that is based on the notion of comparing the operating curve of 
the IDS under test to the optimal operating curve (created as a zero reference curve ZRC) by 
calculating the variation between the two curves. The variation value interprets the deviation of 
the IDS from the intended optimal operation. We believe that the main parameters which the IDS 
effectiveness depends on are detection rate, false alarms rate, and base-rate. To realize the 
notion of EID, we need an expressive formula or equation that considers these parameters to be 
used as a base for EID. As a result of our research, we discovered that Bayesian detection rate 
(Eq.  V-4) regards the needed parameters, but it is inappropriate as a base equation due to its 
drawback when the false alarms equals or approaches “0” (Eq.  V-7). We thus manipulate this 
drawback to derive a new completely expressive formula called enhanced Bayesian detection 
rate (   ) to become the base for EID.  
 Deriving EBD (Enhanced Bayesian Detection Rate) 5.3.1.1.
As a brief summary of our analysis of Bayesian detection rate in section  5.1.2, in Case 1 
(                  and Case 2 (           Bayesian detection rate        gives a 
reasonable expression for the IDSs effectiveness, but it is inexpressive in Case 3 when         
equals or approaches “0”. Consequently, we are concerned with manipulating Case 3 to make 
Bayesian detection rate an expressive metric in this case. By analyzing Case 3, we found that the 
logical expressive formula for Bayesian detection rate in the absence of false alarms should be 
equal to the detection rate       . This can be achieved by modifying the denominator of 
equation Eq.  V-7 to produce the following new formula.  
 
   
         
          
         
           
                            
  
           
              
        
 
Eq. V-14 
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From equations Eq.  V-4 and Eq.  V-14, Case 1 (Eq.  V-5), and Case 2 (Eq.  V-6), we can 
produce a new Bayesian detection rate that is completely expressive metric under all the 
operating conditions. We called this new formula enhanced Bayesian detection rate (   ) (Eq. 
V-15). 
     
           
                  
   Eq. V-15 
Property 1 
 Enhanced Bayesian detection rate (   ) can be defined as the posterior probability of 
detected intrusion (TP) given the total output of intrusion-related responses (     ) and false 
alarms (   .  
Proof 
The intrusion detection can be summarized by the simple model shown in Figure  V-5, where 
 ,   ,  ,   ,   ,   ,   , and    denote intrusion, normal traffic, alarm, no alarm, true 
positive, false positive, false negative, and true negative respectively. 
Basically,  
             ⁄   
               ⁄  
           ⁄           ⁄  
             ⁄           ⁄  
 
Recalling equation Eq.  V-15 and solving it by the parameters of intrusion detection model 
(Figure  V-5), then; 
 
Figure V-5: Intrusion Detection Model. 
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Eq. V-16 
Equation Eq.  V-16 shows the significance of enhanced Bayesian detection rate (   ) for 
measuring the proportion of the intrusion-related responses (     ) and false alarms (    
that correspond to the detected intrusions (   . This is considered one of the great advantages of 
enhanced Bayesian detection rate (   ) over Bayesian detection rate        that disregards the 
false negatives (FN) parameter, as demonstrated in the following.    
We can analyze Bayesian detection rate       , in the same way, by recalling equation 
Eq.  V-4 and solving it by the parameters of intrusion detection model (Figure  V-5), then; 
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Eq. V-17 
From Equation Eq.  V-17, Bayesian detection rate        represents the proportion of the 
generated alarms that correspond to intrusions. This interprets the notion of Bayesian detection 
rate that is related to the Positive Predictive Value (PPV) which is defined as the posterior 
probability of an intrusion given the IDS output is an alarm. Then, Bayesian detection rate 
ignores the FN parameter that boosts the expressiveness of the metrics concerned with the IDSs 
effectiveness.  
To clarify more the benefit of     over         about taking the whole false responses 
(     ) into account, the relationships between the IDS’s input and output events are 
depicted through Venn diagram as shown in Figure  V-6. The intersections between the different 
events are represented by the areas denoted by numbers from 1 to 4. Area 1 represents the 
tranquil area of no intrusion and no alarm, but areas 2, 3 and 4 represent the challenge areas of 
false responses (area 2 and 4) and detected intrusions (area 3). These events in areas 2, 3 and 4 
have a great significance in evaluating the IDSs effectiveness, where the intrusion detection and 
false responses are considered the main limitations and challenges of the effectiveness attribute. 
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Thus, they should be represented by the evaluation metric. This is attained by enhanced Bayesian 
detection rate (EBD) as shown in equation Eq.  V-16. On the other hand, Bayesian detection rate 
       considers only areas 3 and 4 of the detected intrusions and false positives only. 
Property 2 
    is an expressive metric under different operating conditions.  
Proof 
Case 1: if                   
Combining these values with equation Eq.  V-15, then; 
     
    
          
    
Since             , then; 
            Eq. V-18 
 Equation Eq.  V-18 shows that EBD presents the intrusion probability      in the case of 
passing all the traffic (intrusive and normal) with raised alarms (                ).      
represents the logical expressive formula in this case, where it matches the proportion of the 
generated alarms that correspond to intrusions.  
 
 
 
Figure V-6: The Relationships between the IDS’s Input and Output Events. 
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Case 2: if            
Combining this value and equation Eq.  V-15, then; 
 
         Eq. V-19 
Equation Eq.  V-19 shows that     equals “0” when the detection rate        is “0”. This is 
considered the expressive result in this case, where logically the IDS is considered ineffective 
when it is unable to detect the intrusions.   
Case 3:  as         approaches 0, then equation Eq.  V-15 can be written as; 
 
   
         
       
         
           
                  
  
           
    
        
 
Eq. V-20 
As shown in equation Eq.  V-20,     is equal to the detection rate        in the case of the 
absence of false alarms (        equals or approaches “0”).       , which refers to the 
proportion of intrusions that are detected, is the expressive formula for the IDSs effectiveness in 
this case.  
Case 4: if           
Combining this value with equation Eq.  V-15, then; 
     
           
          
    
Since             , then; 
                 
 
      
 
  
 
 
  
        
  Eq. V-21 
Equation Eq.  V-21 demonstrates the expressiveness of     in the worst case of false alarms 
(         ).  
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Case 5: if          
Combining this value with equation Eq.  V-15, then; 
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Eq. V-22 
As shown in equation Eq.  V-22,     equals the proportion of the generated alarms that 
correspond to the detected intrusions. This is the expressive formula in this case of the absence 
of false negatives (               ). 
Equations Eq.  V-18, Eq.  V-19, Eq.  V-20, Eq.  V-21, and Eq.  V-22 show that enhanced 
Bayesian detection rate (   ) is an expressive metric for measuring IDSs effectiveness under 
different operating conditions. 
 Deriving  EID (Intrusion Detection Effectiveness) 5.3.1.2.
Following the main notion of our metric EID (as mentioned in section  5.3.1), we consider the 
trade-off between EBD and       that helps in developing the more expressive metric EID. To 
simplify dealing with EBD (Eq.  V-15), we adapt it to be a function of       as shown in 
equation Eq.  V-23. The first step in deriving EID is calculating and plotting the zero reference 
curve (ZRC) (i.e., optimal operating curve) as a trade-off between EBD and       with 
assumption of the optimal operating case of the IDS under test.  
     
                   
                   
   Eq. V-23 
To clarify the idea of calculating and plotting ZRC, we assume that we have an IDS under 
test in an operating environment with hostility or probability of intrusion     =3*10-4, then the 
probability of no intrusion (benign traffic)               0.9997. First, we assume that 
the IDS (under test) operates at the optimal case with perfect detection rate (      =1) and 
complete absence of false positive rate (         ). We use these values to plot ZRC 
(Figure  V-7) that is a straight line represents the optimal operating case. The second step, we plot 
the real operating curve of the IDS under test with the actual values of detection rate and false 
positive rate; we assume their values            and               . Now we have two 
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operating curves; one as a zero reference curve (ZRC) for the optimal operation and another 
represents the real operating curve (Figure  V-7). The variation between the two curves is 
represented by the dotted area.         denotes the probability of no intrusion in the operating 
environment, and it refers to the upper limit of the variation area.  
We normalize this variation by the area under ZRC (only through                 ]) to 
have a representative metric EID of values in the range [0,1]; where “0” indicates zero deviation 
and then high effectiveness, but “1” indicates the maximum deviation from the intended optimal 
operation, then zero effectiveness. EID is represented by equation Eq.  V-24, where       , 
         , and            denote EBD, detection rate, and false alarms of ZRC respectively. 
Also,      ,         , and           denote EBD, detection rate, and false alarms of IDS 
under test respectively.       is considered the integration variable. 
     
 
∫       
       
        
(∫               ∫             
       
 
       
 
)  
 
Eq. V-24 
 
 
Where, 
 
           
                 
                        
     
 
 
Eq. V-25 
 
 
 
Figure V-7: The Trade-off between EBD and P(¬I). 
POE(¬I) 
Variation area 
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Eq. V-26 
 
 
 
Then equation Eq.  V-24 becomes;  
       
∫             
       
 
       
 Eq. V-27 
Integration of       can be solved according to the following integral formulas [ZiWr12]. 
               ∫
 
    
     
 
 
         Eq. V-28 
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         Eq. V-29 
Then; 
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 Then equation Eq.  V-27 of EID (intrusion detection effectiveness) becomes; 
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 Eq. V-30 
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Property 3 
EID is an expressive metric for measuring the actual effectiveness of IDSs by values in the 
range [0,1], where “0” indicates the ideal case and supreme effectiveness, but “1” indicates the 
worst case of zero effectiveness. 
Proof 
Case 1: when the IDS (under test) detects all the intrusive traffic (        ) and generates 
no false alarm (         ), its deviation from the optimal operating case can be measured by 
equation Eq. V-30, as follows; 
       
                       
                        
   
       
       
   Eq. V-31 
Equation Eq.  V-31 demonstrates the supreme effectiveness of the IDS by its zero deviation 
from the optimal operating case.  
Case 2: when the IDS (under test) detects no intrusion (        ), its deviation from the 
optimal operating case can be measured by equation Eq. 30 as follows; 
       
 
        (           )
   Eq. V-32 
Equation Eq.  V-32 demonstrates the maximum deviation of the IDS from the optimal 
operating case and consequently the ineffectiveness of the IDS. It is the logic result for the idle 
IDS.  
It becomes clear from equations Eq.  V-31 and Eq. V-32 that EID is expressive metric for the 
actual effectiveness of wired or wireless IDSs.  
 Verifying  the utility of EID 5.3.1.3.
This section demonstrates the utility of EID over the existing metrics under different operating 
conditions. We start by analyzing the trade-off between EID and the intrusion detection rate 
         under different conditions of false alarms           and intrusion probability (    ). 
To clarify well the relationship between EID and         , we consider two cases of intrusion 
probability or hostility of the operating environment (              ), along with different 
values of false alarms           in each case. 
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In the first case, we assume an operating environment with little hostility or intrusion 
probability (            , then               . We consider four different values of false 
alarms starting from very small value (                  until approximately half of the 
benign traffic (              . This case is described graphically in Figure  V-8 that shows the 
inverse proportion of EID to         . We can observe that EID approaches “1” as          
approaches “0”, and this proves the aforementioned property and notion of EID where it measures 
the deviation of the IDS under test from the optimal operating case. EID decreases as          
 
Figure V-9: Case 2 of the Trade-off between EID and PID(A|I). 
 
 
Figure V-8. Case 1 of the Trade-off between EID and PID(A|I). 
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increases with obvious negative slope, especially as             . The variation between the 
curves (Figure  V-8) increases as          and           increase, and it is obvious when 
            . We can also observe that the variation between the curves is slight for the small 
values of false alarms (           0.0035, 0.035]), and this explains the slight effect of the 
small values of false alarms. This agree with important truth, where there is no real system with 
zero false alarms, but any real system considers an acceptable level of false alarms that is usually 
very small and does not obstruct the overall system operation. This proves another important 
feature of EID, where it reflects mathematically the real effect of false alarms. We need to study 
the variation between these curves when the hostility of the operating environment increases to 
approximately fifty percent; this will be discussed in the following case. 
In the second case, we assume that the intrusion probability (         , then         
   . We also consider the same values of false alarms considered in the first case (          
 0.0035, 0.035, 0.35, 0.6]). Figure  V-9 shows the same principle of inverse proportion of EID to 
         and approximately the same slopes of the curves. We can observe that the variation 
between the curves for the very small values of false alarms (                          is 
nearly neglected, and it increases as          and           increase but not by the same ratio 
of variation as the first case. This interprets the very slight or neglected effect of small values of 
false alarms with high hostility of the operating environment. This also prove the importance of 
considering the base-rate parameter (    ) in EID and its effect in evaluating the IDSs 
effectiveness.   
For more comprehensive understanding of the utility of EID, we need to study it versus the 
false alarms          .  We consider here also two cases of intrusion probability along with 
different values of intrusion detection rate          in each case.  
In the first case, we assume an operating environment with little hostility or intrusion 
probability (            , then               . We consider also four different values of 
intrusion detection rates (                           . Figure  V-10 shows the direct 
proportion of EID to          . EID approaches (          ) as           approaches “0”, 
and this interprets one of the important features of EID where it does not ignore the detection rate 
in the case of complete absence of false alarms as followed by Bayesian detection rate (Eq.  V-7), 
but it considers this case and calculates the IDS effectiveness accordingly (          ). This 
proves another aspect of the utility of EID and how it is expressive metric. From Figure  V-10, we 
can observe that the slopes of the curves increase positively as           and          increase, 
especially when              . This interprets the considerable effect of high values of 
          and         . We need to study these conditions with high hostility of the operating 
environment. 
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In the second case, we assume that the intrusion probability (         , then         
   . We also take into account the same values of the detection rate considered in the first case. 
Figure  V-11 shows the same principle of discussed in the first case, the slopes of the curves 
increase as           and          increase, especially when              , but not in the 
same manner where increasing the intrusion probability decreases the effect of           . This 
concept can be clarified well by analyzing the trade-off between EID and the environment 
hostility as shown in Figure  V-12. The relationship between them is studied under different 
Figure V-11. Case 2 of the Trade-off between EID and PID(A|¬I). 
 
Figure V-10. Case 1 of the Trade-off between EID and PID(A|¬I). 
 
Performance Analysis of WIDSs  Khalid Nasr 
 
120 
 
values of          and          . We can observe that the slopes of the curves decrease as the 
environment hostility increases. Also, the slopes of the curves depend largely on           that 
has a neglected effect in the very small values.  The above studied cases show the importance of 
considering the three main parameters         ,          , and      in the evaluation of 
IDSs/WIDSs effectiveness, and prove the utility of EID and how it is an expressive metric. To 
clarify more the utility of EID, we suppose the following examples.   
 Example 1: applying EID on the above supposed example of the IDS under test 
with             ,                 , and                  then; 
                       
  EID value indicates the great deviation of the IDSs operation from the intended optimal 
operation, then it is not more effective. 
Example 2: if we manage, under the same environment hostility (                
                  another evaluation of an IDS with results              and 
              , then; 
                      
 
Figure V-12. The Trade-off between EID and POE(¬I). 
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This value of EID indicates more deviation of the IDS from the intended optimal operation, 
due to the increase in the false alarms. This interprets the effect of false alarms in measuring the 
effectiveness by    .    
Example 3: we suppose, under the same environment conditions                 a tested 
IDS with results              and               , then; 
                      
It is easy to observe that the IDS has approximately medium effectiveness, despite the high 
value of the detection rate. This also interprets the effect of false alarms in measuring the 
effectiveness by    .    
Example 4: in this example, we assume the same IDS in the example 3 (             and 
               , but under different environment conditions              , then; 
                       
Comparing example 3 and example 4, we can observe the little effect of false alarms as the 
environment hostility increased. This also reflects the effect of environment hostility in 
measuring the effectiveness by    . 
 Attack Recognition Rate 5.3.2.
Also, the attack type recognition attribute can be represented by a metric    (attack 
recognition rate) which measures the proportion of the detected intrusions that are recognized. 
TP (true positive) and TPR (recognized true positive) denote the truly detected intrusions and the 
recognized ones respectively. 
    
   
  
 Eq. V-33 
 Conclusion 5.4.
In this chapter, the benefits of most existing evaluation metrics were discussed and their 
drawbacks were criticized. Consequently, we have proposed a novel evaluation metric     
(intrusion detection effectiveness) that manipulated all the drawbacks of the existing ones. Our 
metric     attained measuring the actual effectiveness through its main notion of comparing the 
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operating curve of the IDS under test to the optimal operating curve, by calculating the variation 
between the two curves that interprets the deviation of the IDS operation from the intended 
optimal operation.     was based on the enhanced Bayesian detection rate (   ) which was 
derived from Bayesian detection rate        after manipulating its drawbacks to ultimately 
produce a completely expressive formula. We have proved the great advantages and 
expressiveness of     under different operating conditions. We also demonstrated the importance 
of considering the main parameters (i.e., detection rate         , false alarms rate          , 
and intrusion detection     ) and how they affect directly the evaluation of the IDSs/WIDSs 
effectiveness. We also proposed another metric    (attack recognition rate) that is useful in 
measuring the ability of IDS/WIDS to recognize the attack type.  
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 Chapter 6: Experimental Evaluation of  VI.
WIDSs 
In this chapter, we follow our methodology (chapter 3) to evaluate experimentally two 
popular WIDSs; Kismet [Kism13a] (for Linux) and AirSnare [Airs13c] (for Windows). As we 
mentioned in chapter 1, the three main pivots in the preparation phase of WIDSs evaluation are; 
1) comprehensive evaluation methodology (achieved in chapter 3), 2) attack classification from 
the perspective of the WIDSs evaluator (achieved in chapter 4), 3) defining reliable and 
expressive evaluation metrics (achieved in chapter 5). The remaining phase is the experimental 
phase that is achieved in this chapter. We commenced the experimental phase with constructing 
RF shielded environment for hosting our testbed to overcome the evaluation limitations. In this 
chapter, we demonstrate the utility of our proposed taxonomy of wireless attacks and the 
importance of considering the probability of the attack test cases in calculating the actual 
intrusion detection rate of WIDSs. We also prove the benefits of our developed metrics EID 
(intrusion detection effectiveness) and RR (attack recognition rate), and how they are meaningful 
and expressive. Finally, we present the evaluation results of the two WIDSs; Kismet and 
AirSnare. 
 RF Shielded Environment  6.1.
As we mentioned in chapter 3 (section 3.3.2.1), one of the critical problems that we have 
faced, for the first time, in the experimental evaluation is the problem of uncontrolled 802.11 
traffic from the adjacent wireless stations and access points, where it caused Kismet WIDS to 
generate more than 50 false alarms per hour. It was difficult to take our measurements under 
these conditions. We thus resorted to isolating our testbed from the uncontrolled RF traffic to 
take the measurements with only our controlled dataset. Also, some attacks such as 
deauthentication/disassociation (Amok mode) attack that disconnects the Wi-Fi devices in the 
range should be managed in an RF isolated workspace. Since we have not, in our laboratory, RF 
shielded workspace such as “RF anechoic chamber” [WSPH08], we have taken steps in 
constructing RF shielded enclosure. In fact, it was difficult to isolate a grand place, thus we 
concerned with isolating only the Wi-Fi adapters and access point together in a small RF 
shielded chamber or enclosure and pass the wired cables from the Wi-Fi adapters and access 
point through the enclosure to outside to be connected to main stations or machines. As a result 
of our research [Tong08] [DeRa97], we found the possibility of constructing a small RF shielded 
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enclosure using aluminum foil. Basically, radio frequency (RF) is a rate of oscillation in the 
range of about 3 kHz to 300 GHz, which corresponds to the frequency of radio waves and the 
alternating currents (AC) which carry radio signals. Then, RF wave is considered as AC current. 
It is worth mentioning that the skin effect property of AC conductors forces AC current to be 
distributed within the conductor to become with largest value at the surface and decreases within 
the inner depth of the conductor. Then, aluminum foil with skin effect property can be used 
effectively in constructing our RF shielded enclosure.  
We used a cuboid box, as shown in Figure  VI-1, with dimensions 40x40x70, and we wrapped 
it completely (internal and external surfaces) by aluminum foil. When the RF traffic arrives at 
the aluminum foil sheet, it will be distributed within the outer surface with inability to pass to the 
other side. At first, we tested the RF isolation effectiveness of the enclosure using a mobile 
phone, and we obtained a good result for a complete RF isolation, but unfortunately the situation 
was different when we used the Wi-Fi adapters that pick up all the 802.11 traffic outside the 
enclosure. With many experimental attempts we reached the conclusion that the wired cables, 
which pass through the enclosure from Wi-Fi adapters to the main stations outside the enclosure, 
work as parasitic antennas [Mill05] for coupling the interior of the enclosure with its exterior. To 
solve this problem, we installed on the enclosure three RF filtered connectors, i.e., STERF13 
connector [Rams13] for the power connection and CONN278 connectors [Rams13] for data 
connection, to completely isolate the interior of the enclosure from the exterior uncontrolled RF 
traffic. Now, the RF shielded environment is ready to host our designed testbed to manage the 
experimental evaluation of WIDSs. We used three Wi-Fi adapters connected to three base 
 
Figure VI-1: RF Shielded Environment. 
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stations besides one access point; the all were hosted inside the RF Shielded enclosure. The Wi-
Fi adapters used CONN278 connectors to be connected to the base stations outside the enclosure, 
and the access point used only the power connector STERF13 to be connected to the power 
supply. 
 Normal Background Traffic Generation  6.2.
As we mentioned in chapter 3, there are two main methods to generate the normal 
background traffic; 1) generating synthetic traffic that doesn’t contain secret data, but it doesn’t 
represent the real operation in the network, or 2) generating real traffic by capturing the 
operational traffic during the normal operation of a network, and then replaying or injecting it 
into the testbed. The second method is the suitable one for the real measurements, but the main 
drawback is that the collected dataset must be sanitized from any credential or confidential data 
or any suspicious traffic before using it. To overcome the complexity of the sanitization process, 
we have followed the second method with an adaptation by capturing the normal traffic from a 
private network adjusted for this purpose. This private network includes an access point (i.e., it is 
connected to the Internet through a Ethernet cable), three workstations (i.e., two machines 
operate under Windows and the third one operates under Linux) associated with the access point 
through Wi-Fi adapters, and two mobile phones (i.e., operate under Android system) adjusted to 
associate with the access point via Wi-Fi connections as well. These devices were running to 
collect the exchanged traffic between them in a period of two weeks. Figure  VI-2 shows a 
sample of the collected normal traffic, and Table  V-1 shows the statistics of the collected traffic. 
 
Figure VI-2: Sample of the Collected Normal Traffic. 
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Frame Subtype Frame Count 
Association request 38 
Association response 43 
Reassociation request 172 
Reassociation response 142 
Probe request 227081 
Probe response 218602 
Beacon 378 
Disassociation 332 
Authentication 169 
Deauthentication 80 
Action frames 3484 
Null data 89920 
QoS data 1723 
QoS null data 19868 
Total 562032 
 
 Malicious Traffic Generation 6.3.
For generating the malicious traffic or attacks, we used numerous tools such as Metasploit 
[Meta13a], Armitage [Armi13], Backtrack [Back13], WireShark [Wire13], in addition to the 
aircrack-ng suite [Airc13] such as airmon-ng, airodump-ng, aireplay-ng, aircrack-ng, etc; each 
one for specific functions. We didn’t find a tool includes all wireless attacks, so that we resorted 
to use numerous tools to manage the test with the possible attacks. The launched attacks are 
listed in Table  VI-2. 
 Test Management  6.4.
In this section, we manage the experimental evaluation of two popular WIDSs; Kismet(for 
Linux) [Kism13a] and AirSnare (for Windows) [Airs13c]. We used these two WIDSs in the out 
of box configuration; with just little intervention in Kismet configuration file to configure the 
Table VI-1: The Collected Normal Traffic. 
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Wi-Fi adapter deriver and network interface. We used the RF shielded environment 
(Figure  VI-1), an access point Linksys WRT54GL, and three workstations (Linux and Windows) 
with Wi-Fi adapters ALFA awus036h and D-Link DWA-110 that respect the compatibility with 
the operating systems and WIDS programs. We concerned ourselves with the wireless 
infrastructure mode. For this mode, we have two possible scenarios for the installation of WIDSs 
(Figure  VI-3). Scenario 1, the WIDS was installed on the access point. Scenario 2, the WIDS 
was installed on a terminal machine which is considered as a victim. Table  VI-2 shows the list of 
the launched attacks, the attack detection and recognition results of WIDSs Kismet and AirSnare. 
TP and TPR denote the detected and recognized attacks respectively. 
From section 4.4, section 4.5, Appendix A, and Table  VI-2, we can extract the attack test 
cases shown in Figure  VI-4 and Table  VI-4. From Appendix A and Figure  VI-4, we can observe 
that some attack generations by different tools are classified under the same representative attack 
test cases. For examples, the deauthentication flood attack generation tools (Appendix A); 
Metasploit and Armitage follow the same attack process as gvoid11 and MDK3 respectively, 
thus they are classified under the same representative attack test cases 2 and 3 (Figure  VI-4). 
For calculating the attack detection rate, if we follow the ordinary method that was used in 
most previous evaluations of IDSs, then Table  VI-2 is sufficient for the calculations and 
consequently the detection rate is               for Kismet, and                for 
AirSnare. These values are not real expressive values of the detection rate, and they thus affect 
negatively the calculation of the real effectiveness of WIDSs. The best way for calculating the 
 
 
Figure VI-3: Testbed of WIDSs Evaluation. 
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expressive detection rate is considering the probability of occurrence of the attack test cases 
under the operating environment conditions. 
In our evaluation tests, we considered and used 100 attack instances of the attacks listed in 
Table  VI-2. We considered the instances of the generated attacks by the ratios that are 
approximately expressive of the probability of attack occurrence in some real systems. The 
attack instances were selected according to the registered attacks and vulnerabilities in popular 
websites such as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [Cvew13], National Vulnerability 
Database – NIST [Nvdn13], and others. It is worth mentioning that we considered in our 
calculations the deauthentication/disassociation flood attack instances with deauthentication 
requests > 30 (Table  VI-2); we generated it by 8 instances from total of 100 instances of all the 
 
Generated Attacks 
Kismet AirSnare 
TP TPR TP TPR 
Deauthentication/Disassociation Flood (< 10 Request)   x x 
Deauthentication/Disassociation Flood (< 20 Request)   x x 
Deauthentication/Disassociation Flood (> 30 Request)    x 
Deauthentication/Disassociation Flood (> 100 Request)    x 
Deauthentication/Disassociation (Amok mode)   x x 
Fake Authentication   x x 
Authentication Flood   x x 
Beacon Flood (evil duplicate AP DoS)  x x x 
MITM attack x x x x 
ARP Request Replay Attack x x x x 
WPA Downgrade  x x x 
WPA Cracking  x x x 
WEP Cracking x x x x 
Chopchop x x x x 
Hidden SSID Brute Force x x x x 
Rogue AP x x x x 
RF Jamming  x x x 
MAC Spoofing x x   
 
Table VI-2: Attack Detection and Recognition. 
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generated attacks. We classified the generated attacks under representative test cases 
(Figure  VI-4 and Table  VI-3), and adjusted the estimated probability of occurrence as shown in 
Table  VI-4. Consequently, the expressive detection rate is               for Kismet, and 
              for AirSnare. As we mentioned in chapter 3 and chapter 4, the detection rate of 
WIDS varies according to the operating system conditions, since the probability of the system 
hostility and attack types are varied. Also, it is essential to take into account the special 
vulnerabilities of specific devices used in the test; these vulnerabilities and the relevant attacks 
should be considered in the attack test cases and their probabilities. For our testbed, we searched 
about any vulnerability associated with the used devices (Linksys WRT54GL, ALFA awus036h, 
and D-Link DWA-110), but we didn’t find any specific vulnerability (e.g., some of specific 
vulnerabilities of some Wi-Fi devices are mentioned in Appendix A). Then, we didn’t consider 
any special attack test case related to the used devices. In our evaluation environment, the used 
100 attack instances generated approximately 1500 malicious frames, in addition to the 
generated background normal traffic (Table  VI-1). Then, we have hostility or intrusion 
probability                  , and no intrusion probability              . Also, the 
registered false alarms for the two WIDSs are                    for Kismet and 
                    for AirSnare. 
 
 
 
Figure VI-4: Attack Test Cases. 
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Generated Attacks Representative Attack Test Cases 
Deauthentication/Disassociation Flood 1, 2, 3 
Deauthentication/Disassociation (Amok mode) 3 
Fake Authentication  4, 5 
Authentication Flood 2,3 
Beacon Flood (evil duplicate AP DoS) 3 
MITM attack 6,7 
ARP Request Replay Attack 8 
WPA Downgrade 3 
WPA Cracking 9 
WEP Cracking 10, 11, 12 
Chopchop 13 
Hidden SSID Brute Force 11 
Rogue AP 14, 15, 16, 17 
RF Jamming 18, 19, 20 
MAC Spoofing 21, 22 
 
Table VI-3: Generated Attacks and the Corresponding Test Cases. 
 
 
Attack Test Cases Estimated Probability 
WIDSs Detection Ratio 
Kismet AirSnare 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0.46   (0.08) 
6, 7 0.05 x x 
8 0.04 x x 
9 0.13  x 
10, 11, 12 0.1 x x 
13 0.04 x x 
14, 15, 16, 17 0.07 x x 
18, 19, 20 0.06  x 
21, 22 0.05 x  
Total 1 0.65 0.13 
 
Table VI-4: Probability of Occurrence of the Generated Attack Instances. 
Performance Analysis of WIDSs  Khalid Nasr 
 
131 
 
 Results Interpretation  6.5.
We can now interpret the evaluation results and present some conclusions on the two WIDSs. 
We commence with evaluating the effectiveness of Kismet and AirSnare using our proposed 
metric     (intrusion detection effectiveness).  
Recalling     (Eq. V-30); 
 
      
         (        (
 
(           )
  )                            )
        (           )
  
Then,  
                  
 
                     
 
As described in detail in chapter 5, we can plot the operating curves of the two WIDSs to 
show graphically the deviation degree of each one of them from the optimal operating case that 
is represented by the zero reference curve (ZRC). The deviation degree reflects the effectiveness 
level of each one of them. The operating curves of Kismet and AirSnare besides ZRC are shown 
in Figure  VI-5, Figure  VI-6, and Figure  VI-7. In Figure  VI-5, we can observe the increase in the 
slope of Kismet’s operating curve, especially as          . This reflects the effect of false 
alarms (                  ) on the operating curve as       increases, and this confirms 
what we discussed in chapter 5 (section 5.3.1.3). The deviation degree of Kismet’s operating 
curve from ZRC interprets the     value that shows the acceptable level of Kismet effectiveness. 
Figure  VI-6 shows the straight forward case of AirSnare’s operating curve with just little 
observed change in the slope as            . This also reflects the little effect of false alarms 
(                    ) on the operating curve as       increases. The great deviation of 
AirSnare’s operating curve from ZRC interprets its ineffectiveness as shown by    value. It is 
enough to review section 5.3.1.3, especially Figure  V-12, to be aware of the important effect of the 
three parameters, false alarms          , detection rate          , and intrusion probability 
    , on the form and slope of the operating curve, and consequently their effect on the WIDS 
effectiveness. This proves the utility of our proposed metric     that considers these parameters 
in an expressive formula.  
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 Figure VI-5: The Trade-off between EBD and P(¬I) of Kismet and ZRC. 
 
 
Figure VI-6: The Trade-off between EBD and P(¬I) of AirSnare and ZRC. 
Figure VI-7: The Trade-off between EBD and P(¬I) of Kismet , AirSnare, and ZRC. 
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Also, we can apply the second proposed metric    (Attack Recognition Rate) to Kismet and 
AirSnare as follows; 
Recalling    (Eq. V-33); 
   
   
  
          
 
From Table  VI-2, then, 
 
                  
 
 
     
                     
 
 
     
 
Figure  VI-8 and Figure  VI-9 show the impact of the Kismet and AirSnare, respectively, on 
the monitored system resources. 
 Kismet. Kismet operation doesn’t deviate much more from the optimal case ZRC. Kismet is 
considered a light software with little utilization of the monitored system resources in the 
absence of intrusions, but its increasing impact on the monitored system appears when the 
system is under attack (Figure  VI-8). The level of its utilization of the system resources depends 
on the attack type. It has a good ability to recognize the attack type besides the attack detection 
ability. It is worth mentioning that during launching the beacon-flood attack, which can be 
performed by creating a lot of fake APs with the same name and the same channel but with 
different MAC addresses, Kismet didn't generate any alarm for this type of attack; it just notified 
that there are new APs found. Although all these fake APs are with the same name and the same 
channel, Kismet considers them as different APs and unfortunately couldn’t correlate between 
them. Also, there is no correlation between the generated redundant alerts that are a heavy load 
on the complementary prevention part. 
AirSnare. It is considered ineffective WIDS where it has high deviation degree from the 
optimal case. Also, it has a little ability to recognize the intrusion type. It is considered as a light 
software with nearly the same impact on the system resources in the presence and absence of 
attacks (Figure  VI-9). In fact, AirSnare itself is very weak against attacks, especially flooding 
attacks, where its operation froze with a heavy traffic of deauthentication flooding attack. 
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 Conclusion 6.6.
This chapter was concerned with the experimental phase of our work. We have followed our 
proposed methodology and applied our proposed solutions to evaluate two WIDSs; Kismet and 
AirSnare. We overcame the problem of uncontrolled traffic from the adjacent wireless stations 
by constructing an RF shielded environment to host our designed testbed. We generated real 
representative dataset and managed our test tasks accordingly. The great advantages of our 
developed metrics for measuring the intrusion detection effectiveness (EID) and attack 
recognition rate (RR) have been demonstrated. We also demonstrated the difference between the 
ordinary calculations of intrusion detection rate that were followed by the previous evaluations 
of IDSs and our proposed notions that lead to the accurate calculation of the actual effectiveness 
of WIDSs. The results showed the acceptable effectiveness of Kismet and ineffectiveness of 
AirSnare, and their impact on the monitored system resources.  
 
 
 
 
Figure VI-8: The impact of Kismet on the Monitored System Resources. 
Figure VI-9: The impact of AirSnare on the Monitored System Resources. 
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 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work VII.
The evaluation of the IDSs/WIDSs performance is not a trivial task, but it necessitates a 
comprehensive methodology considers all the necessary related dimensions. This chapter 
summarizes our conclusions on our proposed solutions and the obtained results. Also, we present 
some notions and ideas that are taken into account for the future work.   
 Conclusions 7.1.
The growing security violations in wireless networks and the lack of reliable evaluation of 
WIDSs were the main motivations for our work. We commenced with studying the wireless 
security concepts and the relationships between them, and we crystallized that in a security 
conceptual model. This model clarifies well the crucial role of the security countermeasures in 
manipulating or neutralizing the system vulnerabilities, combating the attack attempts, and 
mitigating the attack effect. Studying the role of each security countermeasure illuminated the 
importance of the WIDS as a second line of defense. The question that arises is which WIDS is 
effective for our system? The answer should inevitably take into account the evaluation of 
WIDSs performance.   
Thus, we have developed an evaluation methodology that provided a comprehensive road 
map for managing a credible evaluation of WIDSs. The dimensions of our methodology are 
arranged in a sequential manner starting from the evaluation goals, passing the subsequent tasks, 
and reaching the intended task of experimental evaluation of the WIDSs. The benefits of our 
methodology are manifested in the obtained results. The main pivotal tasks in our methodology 
are characterizing the evaluation dataset, defining the evaluation metrics, and overcoming the 
evaluation limitations.            
For the evaluation dataset, which mainly composed of two parts of normal traffic and 
malicious traffic, we had a major concern about the malicious activities that affect significantly 
the management of unbiased evaluation. For the normal traffic, we used real traffic that was 
mainly collected from a private network (i.e., installed for this purpose) to avoid the irritating 
sanitization of the data collected from the real system. As for the malicious traffic, we have 
developed a holistic taxonomy of wireless attacks. The classification methodology of our 
taxonomy was based on the conception of the attack generation process. This taxonomy helps in 
generating and extracting the representative attack test cases that are necessary in managing a 
comprehensive evaluation of WIDSs. We also considered a new concept of the probability of 
occurrence of the attack test cases that helps in handling accurate calculations of the actual value 
of intrusion detection rate      that helps consequently in evaluating the actual effectiveness of 
IDSs/WIDSs. Unfortunately, most existing evaluations of IDSs didn’t consider the above-
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mentioned concepts, thus their results don’t refer to the actual performance of IDSs. The 
obtained results have proved the advantages of our proposed solutions over the previously 
proposed ones.    
For the second pivotal task of defining the evaluation metrics, we studied the previously 
proposed metrics and analyzed well their strengths and weaknesses. We subsequently introduced 
a novel metric called intrusion detection effectiveness (EID) which manipulated the drawbacks of 
the existing metrics of evaluating the IDS effectiveness, especially the defective main notion of 
most of them for comparing two or more IDSs to select the best one, although this selected one 
may be ineffective; this leads to measuring so-called relative effectiveness. EID ensured 
measuring the actual effectiveness depending on its main notion of comparing the operating 
curve of an IDS (system under test) to an optimal operating curve (created as a zero reference 
curve ZRC), by calculating the variation between the two curves that indicates the deviation of 
the IDS operation from the intended optimal operation. We demonstrated in detail the utility of 
our proposed metric EID over the existing ones, and the obtained results proved also how it is an 
expressive and perfect metric. We also developed another metric called attack recognition rate 
(RR) for measuring the ratio of the detected attacks that are recognized.   
As for the third dimension of overcoming the evaluation limitation that was manifested in the 
uncontrolled traffic in the open wireless medium, we solved this problem by constructing an RF 
shielded testbed that helped us in taking all the measurements under our control without any 
interfering from any uncontrolled traffic. 
 Finally, we have followed our methodology and conducted experimental evaluation tests of 
two popular WIDSs; Kismet (for Windows) and AirSnare (for Linux). The results showed that 
Kismet is more effective than AirSnare, but the two have the same value of RR (attack 
recognition rate) where the ratios of the recognized attacks to the detected ones are matched for 
the two WIDSs. Kismet had impact on the monitored system according to the attack type, but 
AirSnare didn’t affect the system resources under the different types of attacks.  
 Future Work    7.2.
We are interested in pursuing our scientific research and experimental work to manage some 
experimental tasks and develop new proposals.    
Attack Scenarios: We aim to extract detailed attack scenarios, with the aid of our proposed 
taxonomy of wireless security attacks. The attack scenarios help in inspecting the intermediate 
stages between the starting stage and final stage of attacks, thus they could help the WIDSs 
designers to enhance the WIDSs performance. We picked up this idea from our experimental 
evaluation of WIDSs, where we observed that some attacks such as WEP cracking can be 
partially detected in the intermediate stages before reaching the ultimate goal. Most of these 
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attacks usually interact with the access points or stations by using active scanning or spoofing 
tools that indicate the malicious preparation of attacks. This could facilitate the early detection of 
intrusions using the WIDS. For example, one of the known approaches to crack WEP key is 
using ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) Request Replay attack to capture a large amount of 
IVs (initialization vectors) for later WEP cracking.  ARP Request Replay attack itself requires 
earlier connection to the network to generate the initial ARP packet, and this connection can be 
achieved by Fake Authentication attack or spoofing MAC of an authorized station. Early 
detection can help in protecting the secured system from severe risks. 
New Evaluation Metrics: In addition to our proposed evaluation metrics EID and RR, we are 
interested in developing new evaluation metrics to evaluate the remaining attributes of WIDSs 
performance. We are concerned with deriving a new metric to measure the ability of IDS/WIDS 
to detect the intrusion in early stage before the infection occurs. This metric is directly linked to 
the above-mentioned proposal of the attack scenarios that help in discovering the intermediate 
stages between the starting point and the objective point of attack. The notion of this metric is 
based on evaluating the WIDS capability which is equivalent to the level or rank of the 
intermediate stages where the WIDS is able to discover the attacks before reaching the ultimate 
objectives. The rank of each intermediate stage or point is evaluated by two main parameters. 
The first parameter measures the deviation of the intermediate point from the objective point. 
The second parameter refers to the probability of the attack’s ferocity at the intermediate point. 
As a result of our experimental work, the deviation of the intermediate point from the objective 
point is not the only criterion for evaluating the point rank, but also the attack level should be 
considered, where there are some penultimate stages of attacks cause very little or neglected 
impact, but other earlier stages cause an observed harm, and vice versa. We are also interested in 
deriving a new metric to evaluate the redundant alerts correlation attribute, where the output 
alarms are analyzed according to some fields of the detected data such as the source address and 
the alarm type. 
Combating DoS/DDoS: Denial of Service/Distributed Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) attacks 
are without doubt the most dangerous attacks in wired and wireless networks. There is 
appreciable work on the classification of DoS/DDoS attacks and defense mechanisms 
[DoMi04][MiRe04][BiTa09] that could be helpful in understating the DoS attacks as well as 
designing robust defense mechanisms. Despite the valuable work exerted in developing defense 
mechanisms [KMMZ06][NiLD08][HCCB12] to prevent or even mitigate the effect of DoS 
attacks, they are still the most pressing problem facing the network security owing to the 
difficulty of distinguishing the intrusive traffic from the normal traffic. We are thus interested in 
emulating some defense mechanisms of the natural immune system to produce artificial robust 
mechanisms for combatting the DoS attacks. We consider the self-organized and distributed 
manner of the natural immune system. We also consider the role of the vaccine in training the 
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immune system to recognize and combat the pathogens. We already commenced with analyzing 
some defense mechanisms of the natural immune system, and we intend to pursue our work 
towards the intended objective of developing robust defense mechanisms.   
Penetration Testing: We are interested in implementing the wireless attacks using 
Metasploit framework [MiRe04] to be able to manage automatic generation of the possible 
wireless attacks according to our concept of the probability of occurrence of the attacks in regard 
to the system conditions. We have already commenced with the implementation of some wireless 
attacks, and we are pursuing our work on the remaining possible ones.           
Design and implementation of a distributed WIDS: There is an apparent lack of the 
distributed WIDS that can serve well the distributed architecture of the infrastructure and Ad 
Hoc wireless networks. We are thus interested in designing and implementing a distributed 
WIDS with enhanced specification-based detection techniques to manipulate the defects of the 
existing ones. We consider the data-mining and clustering techniques, besides the helpful 
techniques to achieve our goal. We also intend to extend our designed testbed to be suitable for 
some complex tasks of the experimental evaluation of WIDSs. 
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Appendix A: Wireless Security Attacks and 
Vulnerabilities 
 In this Appendix, we classify some possible wireless attacks according to our taxonomy. More 
details about the security attacks and vulnerabilities are available at the websites of Aircrack-ng 
suite [Rams13], Metasploit Auxiliary Modules & Exploit Database [Airc13], BackTrack Linux - 
Penetration Testing Distribution [Meta13b], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [Back13], 
National Vulnerability Database - NIST [Cvew13], and other websites of wireless penetration 
testing tools. 
 
Attack  
(Generation Tool)  
&  
Vulnerability ID 
Classification and Description 
WEP Cracking 
(aircrack-ng suite) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique: MAC 
Attack Management:  Manual  
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data   
Description: Using aircrack-ng suite, WEP cracking can be managed 
in five steps: 1) Starting the monitor mode of the wireless interface 
by airmon-ng, to be able to listen in the wireless traffic in the range, 
2) Capturing initialization vectors (IVs) from the selected access 
point by airodump-ng, 3) Using aireplay-ng to do a fake 
authentication with the access point,  4) Starting aireplay-ng in ARP 
request replay mode to inject ARP packets into the network, where 
the access point normally rebroadcasts ARP request packets and 
generate new IV, and finally 5) Running aircrack-ng to obtain the 
WEP key from the IVs gathered in the previous steps. 
WEP Cracking 
(FMS- WEPCrack) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Manual   
Attack Rate:    
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Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data   
Description: As mentioned in chapter 4, FMS attack is based on 
collecting numerous encrypted packets including the initialization 
vectors (IVs), and analyzing them analytically to derive the secret 
key. WEPCrack tool can be used to realize FMS attack by cracking 
WEP encryption keys using the latest discovered weakness of RC4 
key scheduling. WEPCrack comprises the following Perl scripts: 1) 
WeakIVGen.pl script that generates a file "IVFile.log" that contains 
IVs that can weaken the secret key used to encrypt the WEP traffic, 
2) prism-getIV.pl script that reads prismdump/Ethereal captured files, 
and looks for weak IVs in WEP traffic. If weak IVs are found, then 
they are placed in the file "IVFile.log" along with the 1st encrypted 
output byte, 3) WEPCrack.pl script that reads IVFile.log, and uses the 
weak IVs+ encrypted output to determine the secret key used. 
WEP Cracking 
(FMS- AirSnort) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  Passive 
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Automatic   
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data   
Description: AirSnort is another tool that can realize FMS attack. 
AirSnort operates by passively monitoring the transmissions, 
computing the encryption key when enough packets have been 
gathered. It is nearly automatic tool for WEP cracking; just running 
it, and then choosing the intended mode that is either "scan" mode to 
scan through all 802.11 channels at a regular interval or "channel” 
mode to monitor a specific channel. It can crack WEP key in few 
minutes.       
WEP Cracking 
(chopchop – 
aircrack-ng suite)  
Network Mode:  Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:  MAC   
Attack Management:  Manual  
Attack Rate:   
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
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Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data   
Description:  Chopchop attack exploits the weaknesses of integrity 
algorithm (CRC-32) that is used to compute the integrity check value 
(ICV).  It can decrypt a WEP data packet without knowing the key. It 
does not recover the WEP key itself, but merely reveals the plaintext 
as explained in chapter 4.  
Cracking WPA 
Migration Mode 
(aircrack-ng suite) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:  Frame   
Attack Management:  Manual  
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data   
Description: WPA Migration Mode is a configuration setting 
supported by Cisco access points, and it enables both WPA and WEP 
stations to associate with the access point using the same Service Set 
Identifier (SSID). Cracking WPA Migration Mode helps in gathering 
a large number of IVs in a short period, and then accelerates the 
extraction of WEP key. 
WPA/WPA2 
Cracking 
(aircrack-ng suite) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique: Active 
Spoofing Technique:  Frame   
Attack Management:  Manual  
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data   
Description: Unlike WEP, where statistical methods can be used to 
speed up the cracking process, the brute force techniques can be used 
against WPA/WPA2 algorithm. WPA/WPA2 cracking can be 
managed by firstly capturing the WPA/WPA2 authentication 
handshake by airodump-ng and deauthenticating the wireless station 
by aireplay-ng to actively speed up the process of capturing the 
authentication handshake, to ultimately cracking the pre-shared key 
by aircrack-ng. 
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WPA/WPA2 
Downgrade 
(MDK3) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Passive 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual    
Attack Rate:  Steady  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws   
Attack Objective: DoS  
Description: WPA/WPA2 downgrade attack blocks the stations and 
access points, only if they use WPA encryption, by deauthenticating 
them. This induces the system administrator to use a weaker 
encryption WEP algorithm or disable the encryption. 
CTS/RTS Flood 
(Metasploit) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized     
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:  Frame  
Attack Management: Manual 
Attack Rate: Steady 
Attack Collaboration:  Autonomous 
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective:  DoS 
Description: In CTS/RTS flood (Metasploit module), the attacker 
sends 802.11 CTS/RTS requests to block the transmission between 
the wireless stations.  
Deauthentication 
Flood 
(aircrack-ng suite) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual    
Attack Rate:  Steady  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws   
Attack Objective: DoS  
Description: The attacker can exploit the vulnerability of 
deauthentication process, as explained in chapter 4, to spoof the 
deauthentication frame between the wireless station and access point 
to pretend to be either the access point or the station, and direct the 
deauthentication frame to the other party.  Deauthentication attack 
can be prepared by firstly discovering the access points and 
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associated stations in the range, and this can be managed passively by 
sniffing the 802.11 traffic using some tools such as AirTraf or 
actively using other tools such as airodump-ng after running the NIC 
in monitor mode by airmon-ng. Then the attacker uses aireplay-ng to 
launch the deauthentication attack between the selected access point 
and wireless station. aireplay-ng supports the ability to control the 
number of deauthentication requests sent.    
Deauthentication 
Flood 
(gvoid11) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Passive   
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Automatic    
Attack Rate:  Steady  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws 
Attack Objective: DoS  
Description: gvoid11 is the GUI (Graphical User Interface) 
implementation of void11 that automates the deauthentication 
process. Using gvoid11, the attacker just adjusts the network 
interface and attack type, and then launch the deauthentication attack 
by a keystroke. 
Deauthentication  
(Amok mode – 
MDK3) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Passive   
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual    
Attack Rate:  Steady  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: DoS  
Description: MDK3 is a Linux-based command line tool. MDK3 can 
be used for deauthentication (amok mode), where it stops the 
connection between the stations and access points in the range. 
Deauthentication 
Flood 
(Metasploit) / 
(Armitage) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Passive   
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual / Automatic   
Attack Rate:  Steady  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
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Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: DoS  
Description: 802.11 DEAUTH Flooder (Metasploit module) can be 
used to break the connection between the wireless stations and access 
point by deauthentication frames, with a control of the number of the 
deauthentication frames being sent. Armitage makes the penetration 
testing easy by adding a GUI to the Metasploit framework. 
Fake 
Authentication 
(aircrack-ng suite) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual    
Attack Rate:  Steady / Intermittent 
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: Access Privilege Escalation 
Description: Fake authentication attack can be used for 
authentication/association with the access points that use WEP 
algorithm, but it cannot be used against WPA/WPA2 access points. 
Fake authentication attack, as other attacks, is prepared by firstly 
discovering the access points, and this can be managed by active 
scanning (e.g., by airodump-ng). Then the attacker uses aireplay-ng 
to launch the Fake authentication attack between the selected access 
point and wireless station. Aireplay-ng supports the ability to control 
the number of authentication requests sent.    
Wi-Fi DoS Attacks 
(deauthentication, 
fake authentication, 
Jamming attack) 
(WebSploit) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Active   
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Semi-automatic      
Attack Rate:  Steady  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Exposed Medium / Design flaws  
Attack Objective: DoS  
Description: WebSploit tool is a powerful tool that supports semi-
automatic generation of a set of Wi-Fi DoS attacks (i.e., 
deauthentication, fake authentication, Jamming attack) by in the same 
time a keystroke. 
ARP Request 
Replay Attack 
Network Mode: Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
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(aircrack-ng suite) Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual    
Attack Rate:  Steady 
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data 
Description: ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) request replay 
attack is used to replay ARP packets and quickly generate IVs for 
WEP cracking. This attack simply captures an ARP packet and 
replays it to a certain access point. Because it is an ARP request 
packet, the access point will retransmit the packet and generate a new 
IV. This allows the attacker to capture a large amount of IVs in a 
short time for WEP cracking. Before running this attack, the fake 
authentication is required first, where the attack station needs to be 
connected to the network to generate the initial ARP packet.      
Cafe Latte Attack 
(aireplay-ng) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized       
Scanning Technique:  Passive 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame Spoofing 
Attack Management:  Manual  
Attack Rate:  Steady 
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data 
Description: Cafe Latte can be managed by capturing an ARP packet 
from a station, manipulating it and then sending it back to the station. 
The station in turn generates packets which can be captured by 
airodump-ng. Then aircrack-ng can be used to determine the WEP 
key.      
Beacon flood (evil 
duplicate AP DoS) 
(MDK3) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized        
Scanning Technique: Passive 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual 
Attack Rate:  Steady 
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: DoS  
Description: Beacon flood (evil duplicate AP DoS) attack can be 
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managed by sending out a lot of beacon frames of the network SSID 
which is targeted to be out of service. While the attack is active, any 
legitimate station is not able to establish a connection with the 
targeted network SSID.   
Rogue Access Point 
(AirSnarf) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Internal Penetrator / Unauthorized        
Scanning Technique: Active 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual 
Attack Rate:  Steady 
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data  
Description: Airsnarf is a simple utility for creating the rogue 
wireless access points to steal usernames and passwords from the 
public wireless hotspots.     
Rogue Access Point 
(KARMA) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Internal Penetrator / Unauthorized        
Scanning Technique: Active 
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual 
Attack Rate:  Steady 
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data  
Description: KARMA is originally a set of tools for assessing the 
security of wireless clients at multiple layers. It can be used for 
creating rogue wireless access points.     
Rogue Access Point 
(Metasploit) 
Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege:  Internal Penetrator / Unauthorized        
Scanning Technique:   
Spoofing Technique:   Frame  
Attack Management:  Manual 
Attack Rate:  Steady 
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data  
Description: Using Metasploit module - Wireless Fake Access Point 
Beacon Flood, the attacker can advertise thousands of fake access 
points, using random SSIDs and BSSID addresses.     
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MITM 
(Ettercap & 
Wireshark) 
 
Network Mode: Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized    
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:  MAC 
Attack Management: Semi-Automatic    
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability: Design flaws  
Attack Objective: Compromising data integrity / Discovering 
confidential data 
Description: Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a form of active 
eavesdropping in which the attacker intercepts the connections 
between two stations and pretends alternately as an end-point to each 
one of them, and relays the messages between them, making them 
believe that they are talking directly to each other. Thus, the attacker 
can discover, control, alter, or eliminate the information exchanged 
between the two stations. 
Null Probe 
Response 
(Metasploit) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure 
Access Privilege:  Internal Penetrator / Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  Active 
Spoofing Technique:  Frame   
Attack Management:  Manual 
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Implementation flaws 
Attack Objective: DoS   
Description: Null probe response attack exploits the firmware-level 
vulnerability in a variety of 802.11 devices. The attacker sends a null 
probe response to a wireless station to lock up the firmware of its 
wireless network interface card (NIC). 
MAC Spoofing 
(SMAC) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:  MAC   
Attack Management: Automatic  
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Access Privilege Escalation   
Description: In MAC address spoofing, the attacker spoofs the MAC 
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address of a legitimate station in an attempt to be granted that station 
access privileges or to be used in a next stage of attack. SMAC is a 
powerful MAC address changer (for Windows) that is easy to use. It 
helps in changing MAC address in simple steps. 
MAC Spoofing 
(Macchanger) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique:  
Spoofing Technique:  MAC   
Attack Management: Manual 
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Access Privilege Escalation   
Description: Macchanger is a Linux-based tool for changing the 
MAC address of network interfaces.  Macchanger gives the ability to 
change Mac addresses manually by command line tools or 
automatically using Macchanger GUI (Graphical User Interface). 
Cracking hidden 
SSID  
(MDK3 – 
dictionary attack) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure 
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique: Active  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management: Manual 
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data  
Description: At a certain level of network security, the access point 
is configured with disabling the SSID broadcasting. In this case, the 
attacker can discover the hidden SSID by a dictionary attack, where 
the attacker uses a wordlist text file to check which dictionary’s word 
matches the hidden SSID.   
Cracking hidden 
SSID  
(MDK3 – brute 
force attack) 
Network Mode:  Infrastructure 
Access Privilege:  Unauthorized   
Scanning Technique: Active  
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management: Manual  
Attack Rate:   
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability:  Design flaws 
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data  
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Description: If the dictionary attack is not effective in cracking the 
hidden SSID of the access point, then the attacker may resort to use a 
brute force attack. The brute force attack depends on the matter of 
guessing, and trial and error, where the character set is adjusted in the 
first trial. 
CVE-2001-0160 Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Manual / Semi-automatic   
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration:  Autonomous 
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information / 
Compromising data integrity. 
Description: Lucent/ORiNOCO WLAN cards generate predictable 
Initialization Vector (IV) values of WEP key which might allow the 
attacker to quickly compile the information to decrypt the transmitted 
messages.   
CVE-2001-0618 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized  
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Manual 
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability:  Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: Discovering confidential data.   
Description: Orinoco RG-1000 Wireless Residential Gateway uses 
the last 5 digits of the routinely broadcast SSID as the default WEP 
key. Then the attacker could easily determine the WEP key and 
decrypt the RG-1000 traffic.  
CVE-2013-1105 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Internal Penetrator 
Scanning Technique:  Passive / Active 
Spoofing Technique:   
Attack Management: Manual  
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Implementation flaws     
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Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information / 
Compromising data integrity.   
Description: Cisco WLAN Controller (WLC) devices with software 
7.0, such as Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers Wireless Intrusion 
Prevention System (WIPS), are vulnerable to be exploited by an 
authenticated user to bypass wireless management settings and read 
or modify the device configuration. 
CVE-2010-3033 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Internal Penetrator  
Scanning Technique:  Passive 
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Manual  
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous     
Vulnerability: Implementation flaws     
Attack Objective: Access Privilege Escalation / Disclosure 
confidential Information / Compromising data integrity.   
Description: Cisco WLAN Controller (WLC) software (4.2 through 
6.0) allows the authenticated user to bypass the access restrictions 
and modify the configuration to gain administrative privileges. 
CVE-2009-0052 Network Mode:  Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Internal Penetrator    
Scanning Technique: Passive / Active  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:  Manual / Automatic / Semi-automatic 
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Implementation flaws        
Attack Objective:  DoS 
Description:  The wireless driver in some Wi-Fi access points, such 
as the ATHEROS-based AP-Netgear WNDAP330, allows the 
authenticated user to cause a denial of service (reboot or hang the 
access point) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a truncated 
reserved management frame.    
CVE-2006-6059 Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege: unauthorized  
Scanning Technique:  Passive / Active 
Spoofing Technique: Frame   
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate: steady  
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Attack Collaboration: Autonomous    
Vulnerability:  Implementation flaws          
Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information / 
Compromising data integrity / Denial of Service.   
Description: The buffer overflow in MA521nd5.SYS driver 
5.148.724.2003 for NetGear MA521 PCMCIA adapter allows the 
attacker to execute arbitrary code via beacon or probe 802.11 frame 
responses with heavy rate. This vulnerability have been already 
exploited and the attackers designed an attack for that as shown in the 
Metasploit module [Nvdn13]. 
CVE-2013-4613 Network Mode: Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege: Internal Penetrator  
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Manual  
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous      
Vulnerability: Configuration error    
Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information / 
Compromising data integrity / Denial of Service.   
Description: The default configuration of the administrative interface 
on the Canon MG3100, MG5300, MG6100, MP495, MX340, 
MX870, MX890, MX920, and MX922 printers does not require 
authentication, thus the attacker may be able to modify their 
configuration through open access.   
CVE-2012-6371 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized  
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous    
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws    
Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information  
Description: The WPA2 implementation on the Belkin N900 
F9K1104v1 router establishes a WPS PIN based on 6 digits of the 
LAN/WLAN MAC address, which makes it easier for the attacker to 
obtain access to the network by inspecting the broadcast packets.    
CVE-2011-4507 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized  
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Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous    
Vulnerability: Configuration Error    
Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information  
Description: D-Link DIR-685 router, where certain WPA and WPA2 
configurations are used, does not maintain an encrypted wireless 
network during the transfer of a large amount of network traffic, thus 
the attacker may be able to obtain sensitive information or bypass the 
authentication.   
CVE-2011-0196 Network Mode: Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:     
Attack Collaboration:  Autonomous 
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: Denial of Service 
Description: AirPort in Apple Mac OS X 10.5.8 allows the attacker 
to cause a denial of service by injecting Wi-Fi frames.   
CVE-2012-4366 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized  
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:  
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous    
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws    
Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information  
Description: Belkin wireless routers Surf N150 Model F7D1301v1, 
N900 Model F9K1104v1, N450 Model F9K1105V2, and N300 
Model F7D2301v1 generate a predictable default WPA2-PSK 
passphrase based on eight digits of the WAN MAC address, thus the 
attacker may access the network by sniffing the beacon frames.   
CVE-2009-2861 Network Mode: Infrastructure / Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive Scanning  
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Spoofing Technique: Frame Spoofing   
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous    
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: Denial of Service / Compromising data integrity 
Description: The Over-the-Air Provisioning (OTAP) functionality on 
Cisco Aironet Lightweight Access Point 1100 and 1200 devices does 
not properly implement the access point association, thus the attacker 
may spoof the controller and cause a denial of service (service 
outage) via crafted remote radio management (RRM) packets. 
CVE-2009-3341 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration:  Autonomous  
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: Disclosure confidential Information / 
Compromising data integrity/ DoS. 
Description: Buffer overflow on the Linksys WRT54GL wireless 
router allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code via unspecified 
vectors.   
CVE-2009-0282 Network Mode: Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: DoS. 
Description: The vulnerability of integer overflow in Ralink 
Technology USB wireless adapter (RT73-3.08), and other wireless 
card drivers including rt2400, rt2500, rt2570, and rt61, allows the 
attacker to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary 
code via a Probe Request packet with a long SSID.   
CVE-2007-5651 Network Mode: Infrastructure  
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
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Scanning Technique: Passive Scanning  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous    
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: DoS. 
Description: The vulnerability of the Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP) implementation in Cisco IOS 12.3 and 12.4 on Cisco 
Access Points and 1310 Wireless Bridges (Wireless EAP devices), 
IOS 12.1 and 12.2 on Cisco switches (Wired EAP devices), and 
CatOS 6.x through 8.x on Cisco switches, may allow an attacker to 
cause a denial of service via a crafted EAP Response Identity packet.   
CVE-2007-4012 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive Scanning  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management:    
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous    
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: DoS. 
Description: The vulnerability in Cisco 4100 and 4400, Airespace 
4000, and Catalyst 6500 and 3750 WLAN Controller (WLC) 
software 4.1 (before 4.1.180.0), may allow the attacker to cause a 
denial of service (ARP storm) via a broadcast ARP packet that targets 
the IP address of a targeted client.  
CVE-2007-2927 Network Mode: Ad Hoc 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive Scanning  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Semi-automatic         
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous   
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: DoS. 
Description: The vulnerability in Atheros 802.11 a/b/g wireless 
adapter drivers before 5.3.0.35 and 6.x (before 6.0.3.67) may allow 
the attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted 802.11 
management frame.   
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CVE-2007-2039 Network Mode: Infrastructure 
Access Privilege: Unauthorized 
Scanning Technique: Passive Scanning  
Spoofing Technique:    
Attack Management: Semi-automatic       
Attack Rate:    
Attack Collaboration: Autonomous  
Vulnerability: Implementation Flaws     
Attack Objective: DoS. 
Description: The Network Processing Unit (NPU) in the Cisco 
WLAN Controller (WLC) before 3.2.171.5, 4.0.x (before 4.0.206.0, 
and 4.1.x) allows the attackers on a local wireless network to cause a 
denial of service (loss of packet forwarding) via crafted SNAP 
packets, malformed 802.11 traffic, or packets with certain header 
length values.   
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